10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1899–2022 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2021See People v. Johnson, 368 Ill. 2021See People v. Johnson, 368 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2005Finally, in Stewart, this court pointed out that “ ‘a prosecutor cannot arbitrarily impose the death penalty’ since imposition of that penalty is the province and responsibility of the sentencing body.” Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d at 112 , quoting People v. Lewis, 105 Ill. 2d 226, 252 (1984). 2005Finally, in Stewart , this court pointed out that "`a prosecutor cannot arbitrarily impose the death penalty' since imposition of that penalty is the province and responsibility of the sentencing body." Stewart, 121 Ill.2d at 112 , 117 Ill.Dec. 187 , 520 N.E.2d 348 , quoting People v. Lewis, 105 *671 Ill.2d 226, 252, 85 Ill.Dec. 302 , 473 N.E.2d 901 (1984). | 2 | 3 |
McCleskey v. Kempgreen2 sentences2005Ed. 2d 262 , 281 n.17, 107 S. Ct. 1756 , 1768 n.17 (‘Requiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct of scores of prosecutors is quite different from requiring a prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous challenge to his own acts’).” (Emphasis added.) Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d at 112 . 2005See McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), 481 U.S. 279 , 296 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 1768 n. 17, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 , 281 n. 17 (`Requiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct of scores of prosecutors is quite different from requiring a prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous challenge to his own acts')." (Emphasis added.) Stewart, 121 Ill.2d at 112 , 117 Ill.Dec. 187 , 520 N.E.2d 348 . | 2 | 3 |
People v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2005Ed. 2d 262 , 281 n.17, 107 S. Ct. 1756 , 1768 n.17 (‘Requiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct of scores of prosecutors is quite different from requiring a prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous challenge to his own acts’).” (Emphasis added.) Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d at 112 . 2005See McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), 481 U.S. 279 , 296 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 1768 n. 17, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 , 281 n. 17 (`Requiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct of scores of prosecutors is quite different from requiring a prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous challenge to his own acts')." (Emphasis added.) Stewart, 121 Ill.2d at 112 , 117 Ill.Dec. 187 , 520 N.E.2d 348 . | 1 | 2 |
People v. Silagygreen1 sentence1988Moreover, this court has previously rejected studies proferred by defendants in an effort to show that the death penalty is arbitrarily imposed, holding that, inter alia, "a prosecutor cannot arbitrarily impose the death penalty" since imposition of that penalty is the province and responsibility of the sentencing body. ( People v. Lewis (1984), 105 Ill.2d 226, 252 ; see also People v. Silagy (1987), 116 Ill.2d 357, 372-73 .) The prosecutor is authorized only to seek the death penalty, and even then his discretion is not unfettered since he may only do so where one or more statutory aggravatin | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Knapp
green
1 sentence2022But Knapp expressly limited its reasoning to its facts in two crucial respects: ¶ 61 First, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that “the record in this case” or “on this record” there was insufficient evidence that “petitioner was hesitant or unsure of his decision not to testify or otherwise wished to exercise his right to testify.” Id. ¶ 58. ¶ 62 Second, when discussing Hartsfield v. Dorethy, 949 F.3d 307 , 315 n.15 (7th Cir. 2020), the Court declined to adopt an exception to the contemporaneous requirement, finding the Seventh Circuit’s “concerns inapplicable here.” Knapp, 2020 IL 1249 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Phillip Hartsfield v. Stephanie Dorethy
green
1 sentence2022But Knapp expressly limited its reasoning to its facts in two crucial respects: ¶ 61 First, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that “the record in this case” or “on this record” there was insufficient evidence that “petitioner was hesitant or unsure of his decision not to testify or otherwise wished to exercise his right to testify.” Id. ¶ 58. ¶ 62 Second, when discussing Hartsfield v. Dorethy, 949 F.3d 307 , 315 n.15 (7th Cir. 2020), the Court declined to adopt an exception to the contemporaneous requirement, finding the Seventh Circuit’s “concerns inapplicable here.” Knapp, 2020 IL 1249 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Musitief
green
1 sentence2020Heard, 187 Ill. 2d at 61 ; Musitief, 201 Ill. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Heard
green
1 sentence2020Heard, 187 Ill. 2d at 61 ; Musitief, 201 Ill. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
City of Chicago v. Geraci
green
1 sentence1977App. 3d 699 , 332 N.E.2d 487 .) The contemporaneous rule offers little assistance in determining what the City Council intended. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Steele v. Burkhardt
neutral
1 sentence1899In this case Baker v. Portland, 58 Maine, 199, is cited with approval, in which it is said: “ Undoubtedly there are many cases when the contemporaneous violation of the law by the plaintiff is so connected with his claim as to preclude his recovery.” Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59 , is a case where plaintiff was violating an ordinance, but a recovery was sustained. | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Fountain v. Leckie
neutral
1 sentence1899In the opinion the court uses this language : “ It is time generally that while no person can maintain an action to which he must trace his title through his own breach of the law, yet the fact that he is breaking the law does not leave him remediless for injuries willfully or carelessly done to him, and to which his own conduct has not contributed.” In Heland v. City of Lowell, 3 Allen, 407 , it was held that a person driving over a bridge faster than a walk, in violation of an ordinance of which he had notice, could not recover for damages sustained through defects in the bridge. | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.