contemporaneous warning in California

2015(Cf., e.g., Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 990-991 [in determining if fee award is unduly inflated, court may consider whether, viewing the scope of the litigation as a whole, the award exceeds “the time an attorney might reasonably [have been] expect[ed] to spend” thereon]; Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 62-63 [insured’s investigation costs are payable by insurer as part of insurer’s duty to defend if, “assessed under an objective standard,” the investigation would have been conducted, and the expenses incurred, by a “reasonable insured under the same

2014Moreover, it is clear she was responding to defense counsel’s argument. “‘Although the remarks of a defense counsel do not justify retaliation by the prosecution, such remarks must be considered in assessing the prejudicial effect of the prosecutorial misconduct.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Alvarado (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1585 .) Significantly (and, in our view, dispositively), although the trial court overruled the contemporaneous defense objection, it subsequently gave an express limiting instruction that was directed precisely to the evidence at issue.

2013In re Sheena K, supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 , does not overrule the requirements of People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th 228 .

2013In re Sheena K, supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 , does not overrule the requirements of People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th 228 .

2013In re Sheena K, supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 , does not overrule the requirements of People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th 228 .

2013In re Sheena K, supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 , does not overrule the requirements of People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th 228 .

2009In Rhode v. Olk-Long (8th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 284 , the court's entire answer to the petitioner's argument that applying a presumption of competence at a retrospective hearing violates due process, is as follows: "The Medina decision was based upon the long-standing principle that state legislatures, not federal courts, should establish state rules of criminal procedure. [( Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 445-446.)] Because we believe that this principle applies with equal force to post-conviction competency hearings, we decline to accept Rhode's narrow reading of Medina. " ( Rhode v. Olk-Long ,

2009In Rhode v. Olk-Long (8th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 284 , the court's entire answer to the petitioner's argument that applying a presumption of competence at a retrospective hearing violates due process, is as follows: "The Medina decision was based upon the long-standing principle that state legislatures, not federal courts, should establish state rules of criminal procedure. [( Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 445-446.)] Because we believe that this principle applies with equal force to post-conviction competency hearings, we decline to accept Rhode's narrow reading of Medina. " ( Rhode v. Olk-Long ,

2009In Rhode v. Olk-Long (8th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 284 , the court's entire answer to the petitioner's argument that applying a presumption of competence at a retrospective hearing violates due process, is as follows: "The Medina decision was based upon the long-standing principle that state legislatures, not federal courts, should establish state rules of criminal procedure. [( Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 445-446.)] Because we believe that this principle applies with equal force to post-conviction competency hearings, we decline to accept Rhode's narrow reading of Medina. " ( Rhode v. Olk-Long ,

2009The court's analysis commences with the observation that "there remains no settled view of where the burden of proof should lie" at a contemporaneous hearing. ( Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 447 .) While California and courts in some other states place the burden of proof on the defendant to show current incompetency, [11] the majority of state courts that have addressed the issue have held that the burden of proving present competency rests with the prosecution. [12] (Miller & Germain, The Retrospective Evaluation of *93 Competency to Stand Trial (1988) 11 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 113, 121 ["b

2009The unarticulated assumption of Moran and the few other courts that have specifically held that the burden of proof lies with the defendant at a retrospective hearing (see, e.g., cases cited and briefly discussed, ante, at p. 100, fn. 19) is that a retrospective competency hearing is no different from the contemporaneous hearing discussed in Medina, supra, 505 U.S. 437 , *101 because a retrospective hearing cannot be conducted unless the People have first shown that a meaningful nunc pro tunc hearing can be held despite the passage of years.

2009In Rhode v. Olk-Long (8th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 284 , the court's entire answer to the petitioner's argument that applying a presumption of competence at a retrospective hearing violates due process, is as follows: "The Medina decision was based upon the long-standing principle that state legislatures, not federal courts, should establish state rules of criminal procedure. [( Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 445-446.)] Because we believe that this principle applies with equal force to post-conviction competency hearings, we decline to accept Rhode's narrow reading of Medina. " ( Rhode v. Olk-Long ,

2009For these reasons, the theory that, because it has been deemed feasible, a retrospective competency hearing is no different from a contemporaneous hearing is manifestly untenable. (7) As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state." ( Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 427 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 323 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ]; accord, Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 .) Given the well known "difficulty of retrospective

2009For these reasons, the theory that, because it has been deemed feasible, a retrospective competency hearing is no different from a contemporaneous hearing is manifestly untenable. (7) As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state." ( Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 427 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 323 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ]; accord, Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 .) Given the well known "difficulty of retrospective

2009In Rhode v. Olk-Long (8th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 284 , the court's entire answer to the petitioner's argument that applying a presumption of competence at a retrospective hearing violates due process, is as follows: "The Medina decision was based upon the long-standing principle that state legislatures, not federal courts, should establish state rules of criminal procedure. [( Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 445-446.)] Because we believe that this principle applies with equal force to post-conviction competency hearings, we decline to accept Rhode's narrow reading of Medina. " ( Rhode v. Olk-Long ,

2009The proposition was stated explicitly in Tate v. State (1995) 1995 OKCR 24 [ 896 P.2d 1182 ], as follows: "A retrospective competency determination is only feasible in those cases where credible and competent evidence still exists.

1999In Salter , we suggested that because Civil Code section 2953 prohibits a contemporaneous waiver of Code of Civil Procedure section 726, implicitly it does permit such a waiver after the sale. ( 22 Cal.2d at p. 267 , 138 P.2d 7 .) From that premise, Russell v. Roberts, supra , concluded that section 580b also may be waived following a sale. ( 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 305 .) Palm decided, however, that because the terms of section 580b run counter to the notion of waiver, no matter when a purchaser might seek it, there was no need for the Legislature to mention that statute in Ci

1999In Salter , we suggested that because Civil Code section 2953 prohibits a contemporaneous waiver of Code of Civil Procedure section 726, implicitly it does permit such a waiver after the sale. ( 22 Cal.2d at p. 267 , 138 P.2d 7 .) From that premise, Russell v. Roberts, supra , concluded that section 580b also may be waived following a sale. ( 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 305 .) Palm decided, however, that because the terms of section 580b run counter to the notion of waiver, no matter when a purchaser might seek it, there was no need for the Legislature to mention that statute in Ci

1999In Salter , we suggested that because Civil Code section 2953 prohibits a contemporaneous waiver of Code of Civil Procedure section 726, implicitly it does permit such a waiver after the sale. ( 22 Cal.2d at p. 267 , 138 P.2d 7 .) From that premise, Russell v. Roberts, supra , concluded that section 580b also may be waived following a sale. ( 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 305 .) Palm decided, however, that because the terms of section 580b run counter to the notion of waiver, no matter when a purchaser might seek it, there was no need for the Legislature to mention that statute in Ci

1999In Salter , we suggested that because Civil Code section 2953 prohibits a contemporaneous waiver of Code of Civil Procedure section 726, implicitly it does permit such a waiver after the sale. ( 22 Cal.2d at p. 267 , 138 P.2d 7 .) From that premise, Russell v. Roberts, supra , concluded that section 580b also may be waived following a sale. ( 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 305 .) Palm decided, however, that because the terms of section 580b run counter to the notion of waiver, no matter when a purchaser might seek it, there was no need for the Legislature to mention that statute in Ci

1999"There would be no need to include section 580b in section 2953's list of permissible waivers[,] because there never can be a `subsequent' contractual waiver of section 580b." ( Palm v. Schilling, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 76 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 600 .) The interplay between section 580b and Civil Code section 2953 is complicated and susceptible of differing interpretations (see Riesenfeld, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments (1960) 48 Cal. L.Rev. 705, 717-718), but we do not believe that the Legislature's failure to cite section 580b in Civil Code section 2953 permits a post-sale

1999"There would be no need to include section 580b in section 2953's list of permissible waivers[,] because there never can be a `subsequent' contractual waiver of section 580b." ( Palm v. Schilling, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 76 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 600 .) The interplay between section 580b and Civil Code section 2953 is complicated and susceptible of differing interpretations (see Riesenfeld, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments (1960) 48 Cal. L.Rev. 705, 717-718), but we do not believe that the Legislature's failure to cite section 580b in Civil Code section 2953 permits a post-sale

1973(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ]; People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ].) Defendant initially asserts a contemporaneous warning is required under Miranda at the outset of each interrogation, citing People v. Matthews, 264 Cal.App.2d 557 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 756 ].

1973(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ]; People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ].) Defendant initially asserts a contemporaneous warning is required under Miranda at the outset of each interrogation, citing People v. Matthews, 264 Cal.App.2d 557 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 756 ].

1973(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ]; People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ].) Defendant initially asserts a contemporaneous warning is required under Miranda at the outset of each interrogation, citing People v. Matthews, 264 Cal.App.2d 557 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 756 ].

1973(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ]; People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ].) Defendant initially asserts a contemporaneous warning is required under Miranda at the outset of each interrogation, citing People v. Matthews, 264 Cal.App.2d 557 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 756 ].

1973(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ]; People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ].) Defendant initially asserts a contemporaneous warning is required under Miranda at the outset of each interrogation, citing People v. Matthews, 264 Cal.App.2d 557 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 756 ].

1973(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ]; People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ].) Defendant initially asserts a contemporaneous warning is required under Miranda at the outset of each interrogation, citing People v. Matthews, 264 Cal.App.2d 557 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 756 ].

1973Since the record does not reflect the defendant was warned prior to each separate episode of interrogation, he asserts that much of the evidence admitted at trial was improperly admitted. (3) The law does not require that a defendant be readvised of his rights prior to each separate interrogation. ( People v. Brockman, 2 Cal. App.3d 1002, 1006 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 70 ]; People v. Long, 263 Cal. App.2d 540, 545 [ 69 Cal. Rptr. 698 ]; People v. Sievers, 255 Cal. App.2d 34, 37-38 [ 62 Cal. Rptr. 841 ]; People v. Perrin, 247 Cal. App.2d 838 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 847 ].) Subsequent interrogations without Mira

1973Since the record does not reflect the defendant was warned prior to each separate episode of interrogation, he asserts that much of the evidence admitted at trial was improperly admitted. (3) The law does not require that a defendant be readvised of his rights prior to each separate interrogation. ( People v. Brockman, 2 Cal. App.3d 1002, 1006 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 70 ]; People v. Long, 263 Cal. App.2d 540, 545 [ 69 Cal. Rptr. 698 ]; People v. Sievers, 255 Cal. App.2d 34, 37-38 [ 62 Cal. Rptr. 841 ]; People v. Perrin, 247 Cal. App.2d 838 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 847 ].) Subsequent interrogations without Mira