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10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Darner v. Colbygreen2 sentences1992Darner v. Colby (1941), 375 Ill. 558, 560, 566-67 ; Gomien v. Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 19, 21 ; [citations]. ‘No precise definition has been accorded the term “scope of employment” ’ (Sunseri v. Puccia (1981), 97 Ill. 1989Darner v. Colby (1941), 375 Ill. 558, 560, 566-67 ; Gomien v. Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 19, 21 ; see generally W. | 2 | 2 |
Pyne v. Witmergreen2 sentences1992(Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 360 , 543 N.E.2d at 1308 (and cases cited therein).) No precise definition has been accorded the phrase “scope of employment,” but broad criteria have been enunciated: “ ‘(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, *** * * * (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the 1992(Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 360 , 543 N.E.2d at 1308 (and cases cited therein).) No precise definition has been accorded the phrase “scope of employment,” but broad criteria have been enunciated: “ ‘(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, *** * * * (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Chicago Flood Litigation
green
2 sentences2016Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 208 . ¶ 27 Moreover, appellate court cases decided after Clark have adopted the section 520 Restatement (Second) of Torts factors in analyzing whether an activity is abnormally dangerous. 2015Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 208 . &27 Moreover, appellate court cases decided after Clark have adopted the section 520 Restatement (Second) of Torts factors in analyzing whether an activity is abnormally dangerous. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Continental Building Corp. v. Union Oil Co. of California
green
2 sentences2016Continental Building Corp., 152 Ill. 2015Continental Building Corp., 152 Ill. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
green
2 sentences2005As such, I would continue to follow our statement in Hansen that, “[w]e do not foreclose the consideration of the Restatement (Third) of Torts standard in another case where it is raised at trial and is appropriately briefed and argued.” Hansen, 198 Ill. 2d at 438 . 2005As such, I would continue to follow our statement in Hansen that, "[w]e do not foreclose the consideration of the Restatement (Third) of Torts standard in another case where it is raised at trial and is appropriately briefed and argued." Hansen, 198 Ill.2d at 438 , 261 Ill.Dec. 744 , 764 N.E.2d 35 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Gomien v. Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Darner v. Colby (1941), 375 Ill. 558, 560, 566-67 ; Gomien v. Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 19, 21 ; [citations]. ‘No precise definition has been accorded the term “scope of employment” ’ (Sunseri v. Puccia (1981), 97 Ill. 1989Darner v. Colby (1941), 375 Ill. 558, 560, 566-67 ; Gomien v. Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 19, 21 ; see generally W. | 2 | 1989–1992 |
ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott
green
2 sentences1986Moreover, it incorrectly assumes that to find the existence of a protectable trade secret each factor in the Restatement of Torts test adopted by the court in ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 88, 93 , 273 N.E.2d 393 , must be treated independently and without regard to the other facts of the particular case. 1986Moreover, it incorrectly assumes that to find the existence of a protectable trade secret each factor in the Restatement of Torts test adopted by the court in ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 88, 93 , 273 N.E.2d 393 , must be treated independently and without regard to the other facts of the particular case. | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Keller v. Mols
green
1 sentence1995For example, the court observed that whether children are playing "floor hockey” on a neighbor’s patio (see Keller, 156 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Sunseri v. Puccia
green
1 sentence1992Darner v. Colby (1941), 375 Ill. 558, 560, 566-67 ; Gomien v. Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 19, 21 ; [citations]. ‘No precise definition has been accorded the term “scope of employment” ’ (Sunseri v. Puccia (1981), 97 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.