enjoyment privilege in Indiana

2004Indeed, "(ain excise tax [is] . imposed upon the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege, and that every form of tax not imposed directly upon property must constitute an excise if it is a valid tax of any description." Id. at $48-44 (citation omitted).

1995The holding in Lutz hinged on the distinguishing characteristic of an excise tax, Le., that it is "a tax imposed upon the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege. ..." Lutz, 208 Ind. at 489 , 193 N.E. at 844 (emphasis added).

2008See also State Election Bd. v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (Ind.1988) (Construing the state Constitutional requirement that a gubernatorial candidate be a “resident of the State,” the Court repeated that “for purposes of ‘the enjoyment of a privilege, or the exercise of a franchise, ... domicile and residence are deemed to be equivalent or synonymous, i.e. that the word residence is deemed to mean domicile.’ ”) (quoting Turner, 168 N.E.2d at 196 ); Matter of Evrard, 263 Ind. 435 , 333 N.E .2d 765, 768 (1975) (In regard to voting residence, “[t]he law requires that the person definitely intend

2002Finally, Bryant noted that an excise tax is imposed upon the performance of an act or the enjoyment of a privilege, but the CSET is imposed only after a taxpayer's drugs have been confiscated, and the taxpayer neither enjoys a privilege nor performs an act at the time of taxation. 660 N.E.2d at 297 .

2002Finally, Bryant noted that an excise tax is imposed upon the performance of an act or the enjoyment of a privilege, but the CSET is imposed only after a taxpayer's drugs have been confiscated, and the taxpayer neither enjoys a privilege nor performs an act at the time of taxation. 660 N.E.2d at 297 .

1960It is the general rule in construing a statute which prescribes residence as a qualification for the enjoyment of a privilege, or the exercise of a franchise, that domicile and residence are deemed to be equivalent or synonymous, i.e., that the word residence is deemed to mean domicile. 28 C.J.S., "Domicile," *80 § 2(b), pp. 5 and 7, notes 14 and 26; 19 C.J., "Domicile," §§ 2 and 3, pp. 395-397; Evans v. Evans (1940), 141 Fla. 860 , 194 So. 215 ; Minick v. Minick (1933), 111 Fla. 469 , 149 So. 483 .

1960It is the general rule in construing a statute which prescribes residence as a qualification for the enjoyment of a privilege, or the exercise of a franchise, that domicile and residence are deemed to be equivalent or synonymous, i.e., that the word residence is deemed to mean domicile. 28 C.J.S., "Domicile," *80 § 2(b), pp. 5 and 7, notes 14 and 26; 19 C.J., "Domicile," §§ 2 and 3, pp. 395-397; Evans v. Evans (1940), 141 Fla. 860 , 194 So. 215 ; Minick v. Minick (1933), 111 Fla. 469 , 149 So. 483 .

1960It is the general rule in construing a statute which prescribes residence as a qualification for the enjoyment of a privilege, or the exercise of a franchise, that domicile and residence are deemed to be equivalent or synonymous, i.e., that the word residence is deemed to mean domicile. 28 C.J.S., "Domicile," *80 § 2(b), pp. 5 and 7, notes 14 and 26; 19 C.J., "Domicile," §§ 2 and 3, pp. 395-397; Evans v. Evans (1940), 141 Fla. 860 , 194 So. 215 ; Minick v. Minick (1933), 111 Fla. 469 , 149 So. 483 .

1960It is the general rule in construing a statute which prescribes residence as a qualification for the enjoyment of a privilege, or the exercise of a franchise, that domicile and residence are deemed to be equivalent or synonymous, i.e., that the word residence is deemed to mean domicile. 28 C.J.S., "Domicile," *80 § 2(b), pp. 5 and 7, notes 14 and 26; 19 C.J., "Domicile," §§ 2 and 3, pp. 395-397; Evans v. Evans (1940), 141 Fla. 860 , 194 So. 215 ; Minick v. Minick (1933), 111 Fla. 469 , 149 So. 483 .

1904Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power.” It was said in Yick Wo. v. Hopkins (1885), 118 U. S. 356 , 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L.

1904Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power.” It was said in Yick Wo. v. Hopkins (1885), 118 U. S. 356 , 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L.