passenger challenge in Kansas

2021State v. Maybin, 27 Kan.

2021State v. Maybin, 27 Kan.

2020Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148 ; Gilbert, 292 Kan. at 435 .

2020Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148 ; Gilbert, 292 Kan. at 435 .

2015The key is thus the existence of an agreement, and the subject of the agreement must be “equal privilege and right to direct and control [the vehicle’s] operations.” 240 Kan. at 25 ; see also Schmid, 181 Kan. at 1003 (stating it is “clear that in the ordinary and accepted affairs of men, tire ‘control’ of an automobile which is ascribed to a passenger in applying the doctrine of joint enterprise, often is too obviously a fiction upon which is erected a second fiction that the driver is his agent”).

2011Wis. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (Brendlin did not hold a passenger’s ability to challenge the constitutionality of a traffic stop extends to the subsequent vehicle search if the passenger does not claim a possessory or property interest in vehicle); People v. Bowles, 226 P.3d 1125, 1129, n.2 (Colo. App. 2009) (Brendlin leaves intact rule that passenger without possessory interest in vehicle lacks standing to challenge vehicle’s search); Atkins v. Com., 57 Va. App. 2, 12 , 698 S.E. 2d 249 (2010) (Brendlin addresses a defendant passenger’s right to challenge the traffic stop, not the right to c

2011Wis. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (Brendlin did not hold a passenger’s ability to challenge the constitutionality of a traffic stop extends to the subsequent vehicle search if the passenger does not claim a possessory or property interest in vehicle); People v. Bowles, 226 P.3d 1125, 1129, n.2 (Colo. App. 2009) (Brendlin leaves intact rule that passenger without possessory interest in vehicle lacks standing to challenge vehicle’s search); Atkins v. Com., 57 Va. App. 2, 12 , 698 S.E. 2d 249 (2010) (Brendlin addresses a defendant passenger’s right to challenge the traffic stop, not the right to c

2009See United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1031 (2007); see also United States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1123 (2008) (although the passenger can challenge the initial detention and the search of his or her person, Brendlin is unclear concerning the degree to which the passenger can challenge a search of the vehicle); United States v. Martinez, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (D.

2009See United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1031 (2007); see also United States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1123 (2008) (although the passenger can challenge the initial detention and the search of his or her person, Brendlin is unclear concerning the degree to which the passenger can challenge a search of the vehicle); United States v. Martinez, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (D.

2000State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 717-18 , 703 P.2d 761 (1985).

2000State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 717-18 , 703 P.2d 761 (1985).

1979In Morris v. District of Columbia, 31 A.2d 652 (D.C. 1943), the municipal court of appeals held that a taxi was a “public place” under the code, but it also noted that the fact the complaining witness to the driver’s indecent and obscene remarks was the only passenger was no defense.

1971(Becker v. Rupp, 187 Kan. 104 , 353 P. 2d 961 ; PIK 4.04.) Any negligence on the part of the driver of a vehicle is not chargeable to a passenger and will not bar recovery for an injury to a passenger received as a direct result of negligence of the defendant.

1971(Becker v. Rupp, 187 Kan. 104 , 353 P. 2d 961 ; PIK 4.04.) Any negligence on the part of the driver of a vehicle is not chargeable to a passenger and will not bar recovery for an injury to a passenger received as a direct result of negligence of the defendant.

1957(Bedenbender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 531, 537 , 280 P. 2d 630 .) We think it clear that in the ordinary and accepted affairs of men, the “control” of an automobile which is ascribed to a passenger in applying the doctrine of joint enterprise, often is too obviously a fiction upon which is erected a second fiction that the driver is his agent.

1957(Bedenbender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 531, 537 , 280 P. 2d 630 .) We think it clear that in the ordinary and accepted affairs of men, the “control” of an automobile which is ascribed to a passenger in applying the doctrine of joint enterprise, often is too obviously a fiction upon which is erected a second fiction that the driver is his agent.