cross claim in Maryland

2014Beverage, 172 Md.App. 139 , 151 n. 3, 913 A.2d 654 (2006) (stating that where a motion for contribution is filed under Rule 2-614, “the status of the alleged tort[-]feasors was determined before the motion was made, or in the event of a cross claim, tort[-]feasor status, for purposes of the cross claim as well as the plaintiffs claims, was determined as part of the same proceeding” (emphasis added)).

2014Beverage, 172 Md.App. 139 , 151 n. 3, 913 A.2d 654 (2006) (stating that where a motion for contribution is filed under Rule 2-614, “the status of the alleged tort[-]feasors was determined before the motion was made, or in the event of a cross claim, tort[-]feasor status, for purposes of the cross claim as well as the plaintiffs claims, was determined as part of the same proceeding” (emphasis added)).

1981In A & P Co. v. Royal Crown, 243 Md. 280, 285 , 220 A.2d 598 (1966), Judge Hammond said for the Court, "The fact that the cross claim was not filed within fifteen days from the expiration of the last day for filing the responsive pleading to the claim to which the cross claim is addressed, as Rule 314 d 2 requires, would not prevent it being filed later by permission of the trial judge.” See also Rule 309 b.

1981In A & P Co. v. Royal Crown, 243 Md. 280, 285 , 220 A.2d 598 (1966), Judge Hammond said for the Court, "The fact that the cross claim was not filed within fifteen days from the expiration of the last day for filing the responsive pleading to the claim to which the cross claim is addressed, as Rule 314 d 2 requires, would not prevent it being filed later by permission of the trial judge.” See also Rule 309 b.

2015Accordingly, under Swigert v. Welk [, 213 Md. 613 , 133 A.2d 428 (1957)], and its progeny, the [Board is] not entitled to a credit, pro tanto, pro rata or otherwise.” We agree.

2015Accordingly, under Swigert v. Welk [, 213 Md. 613 , 133 A.2d 428 (1957)], and its progeny, the [Board is] not entitled to a credit, pro tanto, pro rata or otherwise.” We agree.

2007In Dixon , we noted that “[although Dixon was not personally served with process,” id. at 310 , 604 A.2d 502 , a Kentucky attorney answered the complaint and filed a cross claim and a counterclaim “on behalf of all of the defendants.” Id.

2007In Dixon , we noted that “[although Dixon was not personally served with process,” id. at 310 , 604 A.2d 502 , a Kentucky attorney answered the complaint and filed a cross claim and a counterclaim “on behalf of all of the defendants.” Id.

2006We observed that the cross claim requested contribution or indemnification, in the alternative, on the ground that the parties were joint tortfeasors, whereas on appeal, the dealer relied on a different theory. 77 Md.App. at 309 , 550 A.2d 389 .

2006We observed that the cross claim requested contribution or indemnification, in the alternative, on the ground that the parties were joint tortfeasors, whereas on appeal, the dealer relied on a different theory. 77 Md.App. at 309 , 550 A.2d 389 .

1966It said (p. 845) : “* * * even though the judgment was not on the merits in that it purported to be without prejudice as to the ultimate rights as between the two defendants, it was final as far as this proceeding was concerned in that it deprived the Railroad of its right, recognized by Rule 13 (g), to have its cross-claim against the Drill Company adjudicated in the same proceeding.” See also Concannon v. State Roads Comm,, 230 Md. 118, 125 ; City of Baltimore v. Moore, 209 Md. 516 .

1966The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F. 2d 842 , where the trial court dismissed the cross claim of one defendant in a tort action seeking to recover from a codefendant all or part of the claim of the plaintiff, on the basis of an implied indemnity, that the order of dismissal was an appealable order.

1966It said (p. 845) : “* * * even though the judgment was not on the merits in that it purported to be without prejudice as to the ultimate rights as between the two defendants, it was final as far as this proceeding was concerned in that it deprived the Railroad of its right, recognized by Rule 13 (g), to have its cross-claim against the Drill Company adjudicated in the same proceeding.” See also Concannon v. State Roads Comm,, 230 Md. 118, 125 ; City of Baltimore v. Moore, 209 Md. 516 .

1966In Allen & Whalen, supra, in speaking of a third party claim under Rule 315 a, which, like a cross claim under Rule 314 b, must be for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant seeking help from a codefendant, Chief Judge Brune said for the Court (pp. 587-88 of 229 Md.): “The usual basis for third-party impleader is that the third-party defendant is or may be secondarily liable for all or some part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant as in the case of an indemnitor, guarantor, surety or insurer or a joint tortfeasor obligated by substantive law to make cont

1966(See 3 Moore's Federal Practice (2nd Ed.), §§ 14.10, 14.11, 14.12; United States v. Jollimore, 2 F.R.D. 148 (D.

1962Pa.), although in Simodejka v. Williams, 62 A. 2d 17 (Pa.), cited in Keitz v. National Paving Co., 214 Md. 479, 496 , it was held that where the original defendant filed a cross claim against the co-defendant, the plea was well founded.

1962Pa.), although in Simodejka v. Williams, 62 A. 2d 17 (Pa.), cited in Keitz v. National Paving Co., 214 Md. 479, 496 , it was held that where the original defendant filed a cross claim against the co-defendant, the plea was well founded.