cross claim in Connecticut

2003Where the underlying purposes of Practice Book § [10-10], to wit, judicial economy, avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action, are thwarted rather than served by the filing of a cross claim, the cross claim may properly be expunged.” (Citations omitted.) Jackson v. Conland, 171 Conn. 161, 166-67 , 368 A.2d 3 (1976); Mechanics Savings Bank v. Townley Corp., 38 Conn. App. 571, 574-75 , 662 A.2d 815 (1995).

2003Where the underlying purposes of Practice Book § [10-10], to wit, judicial economy, avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action, are thwarted rather than served by the filing of a cross claim, the cross claim may properly be expunged.” (Citations omitted.) Jackson v. Conland, 171 Conn. 161, 166-67 , 368 A.2d 3 (1976); Mechanics Savings Bank v. Townley Corp., 38 Conn. App. 571, 574-75 , 662 A.2d 815 (1995).

1997"Where the underlying purposes of Practice Book [§ 116], to wit, judicial economy, avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action, are thwarted rather than served by the filing of a cross claim, the cross claim may properly be expunged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wallingford v. Glen Valley Associates, Inc., 190 Conn. 158 , 161 , 459 A.2d 525 (1983).

1997Practice Book § 116 provides, in pertinent part, as CT Page 530-C follows: "In any action for legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff and cross claims against any codefendant provided that each such counterclaim and cross claim arises out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint . . ." "Where the underlying purposes of Practice Book § 116, to wit, judicial economy, avoidance of multiple litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action, are thwarted rather tha

1997"Where the underlying purposes of Practice Book [§ 116], to wit, judicial economy, avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action, are thwarted rather than served by the filing of a cross claim, the cross claim may properly be expunged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wallingford v. Glen Valley Associates, Inc., 190 Conn. 158 , 161 , 459 A.2d 525 (1983).

1997Practice Book § 116 provides, in pertinent part, as CT Page 530-C follows: "In any action for legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff and cross claims against any codefendant provided that each such counterclaim and cross claim arises out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint . . ." "Where the underlying purposes of Practice Book § 116, to wit, judicial economy, avoidance of multiple litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action, are thwarted rather tha

1995Kaplan, supra. When viewed in the light most favorable to the pleader, as required in addressing a motion to strike, the cross claim herein discloses sufficiently the required element of control.

1992Westfield then filed a cross claim against Schindler seeking indemnification because of a maintenance agreement effective September 1, 1986, pursuant to which, according to Westfield, Schindler agreed to maintain the escalator and to assume liability for injuries "directly due to the negligent acts or omissions of Schindler . . . or its employees." Westfield also sought common law indemnification under the active/passive dichotomy of Kaplan v. Meerburg, 152 Conn. 405 , 412 , 207 A.2d 732 (1965).

2002As to this element, "[t]here is no dispute that, to maintain a common law action for indemnity, not based on statute or express contract, the facts alleged in [the cross claim of Bill's Service] must establish that [BHC was] in control of the situation to the exclusion of [Bill's Service]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 703 .

2002Thus, the real question here is whether, if the facts as alleged in the cross claim were proven, "any reasonable juror could find that [Bill's Service] had met its burden of establishing that [BHC was] in exclusive control of `the situation.'" Id., 705 .

2001THE INDEMNIFICATION COUNT "`[I]ndemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary liability is claimed to rest. . . .' (Emphasis omitted.) CT Page 8029 Malerba v. Cessna Aircraft Co ., 210 Conn. 189 , 194 (1989), quoting Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corporation , 152 Conn. 405 , 412 (1965).

2000Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed in Malerba v. Cessna Aircraft Co., supra, 210 Conn. 189 , the court finds that the plaintiff has standing to maintain the motion to strike.

2001The defendant relies upon Donner v. Kearse , 234 Conn. 660 , 662 A.2d 1269 (1995), in arguing that a cross claim for apportionment against Joseph Rubbak should be allowed.

2001The defendant relies upon Donner v. Kearse , 234 Conn. 660 , 662 A.2d 1269 (1995), in arguing that a cross claim for apportionment against Joseph Rubbak should be allowed.

1995CT Page 10060 Our Appellate Court in Atkinson v. Berloni, 23 Conn. App. 325 (1990), has held that in order to maintain an action for indemnification, there must exist an independent legal relationship between the parties.

1993A party seeking indemnification based on tortious conduct "must establish that the alleged indemnitor owed that party a duty based on an independent legal relationship." Atkinson v. Berloni, 23 Conn. App. 325 , 328 (1990).

1997Inc., 224 Conn. 210 , 215 , 618 A.2d 25 (1992); the complete absence of any allegation of notice in the cross claim renders the complaint subject to a motion to strike.

1997Inc., 224 Conn. 210 , 215 , 618 A.2d 25 (1992); the complete absence of any allegation of notice in the cross claim renders the complaint subject to a motion to strike.

2001The cross claim cannot be amended to plead facts establishing the requisite elements for common law indemnification." DISCUSSION Contribution In Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc ., 249 Conn. 634 (1999), the court stated: Contribution is a payment made by each, or by any, CT Page 4495 of several having a common interest or liability of his share in the loss suffered, or in the money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf of the others. . . .

2000Regardless of the proper interpretation of the Supreme CT Page 2496 Court's holding in Malerba , the cross claim defendants do not state a legally sufficient cause of action for indemnification. "[I]ndemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary liability is claimed to rest . . . ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc. , 249 Conn. 634 , 641-42 , 732 A.2d 767 (1999).

1994CT Page 372 "The purpose of a motion to strike is to challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161 , 170 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988); Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 , 108 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985).

1990If construction of the cross claim in the manner most favorable to the pleader reveals that "the facts provable under its allegations would support a cause of action," Mingachos, 196 Conn. at 108 , the motion to strike should be denied.

1993In the first count of its cross claim Walden contends that Trusthouse's counterclaim was brought without probable cause and constitutes "a vexatious suit." The second count asserts that the counterclaim "is an abuse of process in that it is a misuse of process regularly issued, to accomplish an unlawful ulterior purpose." Trusthouse has filed a motion (#125) to strike both counts of the cross claim by Walden on the basis that neither states a cause of action in vexatious litigation of abuse of process. 1 The function of a motion to strike was recently summarized by our Supreme Court in Westpor

1993Where "facts provable under the allegations [of the cross claim] would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail." Westport Bank Trust v. Corcoran, Mallin Aresco, 221 Conn. 490 , 496 (1992).

2018This court noted that the jury reasonably could have determined that the cross claim defendant's "failure to decline the conditions [set forth in the letter] was an implied acceptance of its conditions." Id., at 220 , 729 A.2d 813 .

2018This court noted that the jury reasonably could have determined that the cross claim defendant's "failure to decline the conditions [set forth in the letter] was an implied acceptance of its conditions." Id., at 220 , 729 A.2d 813 .

2005The airport defendants argue that the sixth count of the land trust defendants’ cross claim was duplicative of the first count of the commissioner of environmental protection’s complaint in the companion case of Rocque v. Mellon, 275 Conn. 161, 167-69 , 881 A.2d 972 (2005), in which the commissioner alleged that the airport defendants had violated § 22a-16 by failing to obtain a permit as required by § 22a-42a (c) (1).

2005The airport defendants argue that the sixth count of the land trust defendants’ cross claim was duplicative of the first count of the commissioner of environmental protection’s complaint in the companion case of Rocque v. Mellon, 275 Conn. 161, 167-69 , 881 A.2d 972 (2005), in which the commissioner alleged that the airport defendants had violated § 22a-16 by failing to obtain a permit as required by § 22a-42a (c) (1).

2003Where the underlying purposes of Practice Book § [10-10], to wit, judicial economy, avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action, are thwarted rather than served by the filing of a cross claim, the cross claim may properly be expunged.” (Citations omitted.) Jackson v. Conland, 171 Conn. 161, 166-67 , 368 A.2d 3 (1976); Mechanics Savings Bank v. Townley Corp., 38 Conn. App. 571, 574-75 , 662 A.2d 815 (1995).

2003Where the underlying purposes of Practice Book § [10-10], to wit, judicial economy, avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action, are thwarted rather than served by the filing of a cross claim, the cross claim may properly be expunged.” (Citations omitted.) Jackson v. Conland, 171 Conn. 161, 166-67 , 368 A.2d 3 (1976); Mechanics Savings Bank v. Townley Corp., 38 Conn. App. 571, 574-75 , 662 A.2d 815 (1995).

2003“The term [counterclaim] itself is a general and comprehensive one, naturally including within its meaning all manner of permissible counter-demands. . . . [T]he word ‘counterclaim’ was intended to be a generic term for all cross demands other than setoffs, whether in law or equity.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gattoni v. Zaccaro, 52 Conn. App. 274, 280 , 727 A.2d 706 (1999).

2003“The term [counterclaim] itself is a general and comprehensive one, naturally including within its meaning all manner of permissible counter-demands. . . . [T]he word ‘counterclaim’ was intended to be a generic term for all cross demands other than setoffs, whether in law or equity.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gattoni v. Zaccaro, 52 Conn. App. 274, 280 , 727 A.2d 706 (1999).

2002See Lackard v. Vandecar , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, at Hartford, Docket No. CV 01 0806605 (January 7, 2002, Rittenband , J.T.R.); Rubbak v. Thompson , Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk, at Stamford, Docket No. CV 00 0180009, (April 6, 2001, Lewis, J .) ( 29 Conn.L.Rptr. 316 ); Apicelli v. Indian Nations , Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 119305 (December 11, 2000, Martin, J .); Cullen v. Czaikowski , Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 417339 (April 12, 1999, Jones, J .) ( 24 Conn

2001The Votto defendants contend that the principles of common law indemnification do not apply here because the Votto defendants were not in exclusive control of the situation. "[I]f a claim for indemnification is grounded in tort, reimbursement is warranted only upon proof that the injury resulted from the `active or primary negligence' of the party against whom reimbursement is sought." Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc ., 216 Conn. 65 , 74 , 579 A.2d 26 (1990).

2001The Votto defendants contend that the principles of common law indemnification do not apply here because the Votto defendants were not in exclusive control of the situation. "[I]f a claim for indemnification is grounded in tort, reimbursement is warranted only upon proof that the injury resulted from the `active or primary negligence' of the party against whom reimbursement is sought." Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc ., 216 Conn. 65 , 74 , 579 A.2d 26 (1990).

2001"In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp. , 240 Conn. 576 , 580 , 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

2001"In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp. , 240 Conn. 576 , 580 , 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

2001Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the "[party's cross claim] in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." Gazo v. City of Stamford , 255 Conn. 245 , 260 (2001). "[I]f facts provable in [the cross claim] would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." Id.

2001Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the "[party's cross claim] in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." Gazo v. City of Stamford , 255 Conn. 245 , 260 (2001). "[I]f facts provable in [the cross claim] would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." Id.

2001STANDARD FOR MOTION TO STRIKE "The function of a motion to strike is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading." Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company , 242 Conn. 375 , 378 (1997).

2001In Tweedie v. Hughes , Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. 068800 (September 15, 2000, Grogins, J .) ( 28 Conn. L.

2001Id.

2000Cross-claims are litigated by parties on the same side of the main litigation, while counterclaims are litigated, as here, between the opposing parties to the principal action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Dumais, 34 Conn. Sup. 247 , 250 , 385 A.2d 686 (1977).

2000Cross-claims are litigated by parties on the same side of the main litigation, while counterclaims are litigated, as here, between the opposing parties to the principal action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Dumais, 34 Conn. Sup. 247 , 250 , 385 A.2d 686 (1977).

1995We choose to do exactly what the trial court and the parties did, i.e., recognize that discretion may be the better part of valor and ignore the faulty nomenclature “in the spirit of the purpose of our rules, namely, to facilitate business and advance justice.” O’Bymachow v. O’Bymachow, 10 Conn. App. 76, 78 , 521 A.2d 599 (1987).

1995We choose to do exactly what the trial court and the parties did, i.e., recognize that discretion may be the better part of valor and ignore the faulty nomenclature “in the spirit of the purpose of our rules, namely, to facilitate business and advance justice.” O’Bymachow v. O’Bymachow, 10 Conn. App. 76, 78 , 521 A.2d 599 (1987).

1995"What is necessarily implied need not be expressly alleged." Wexler Construction Company v. Housing Authority, 144 Conn. 187 , 193 (1956); Trichilo v. Trichilo, 190 Conn. 774 , 779 (1983).

1995The intent of Cross in making these contributions is a question of fact, Halisey v. Howard, 148 Conn. 466 , 469 (1901).

1995The intent of Cross in making these contributions is a question of fact, Halisey v. Howard, 148 Conn. 466 , 469 (1901).

1995"What is necessarily implied need not be expressly alleged." Wexler Construction Company v. Housing Authority, 144 Conn. 187 , 193 (1956); Trichilo v. Trichilo, 190 Conn. 774 , 779 (1983).

1995When a motion to strike attacks an entire pleading "it will fail if any part of the pleading is legally sufficient." Grier v. West Haven Police Dept., 40 Conn. Sup. 221 , 222 (1984).