9 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Perrygreen2 sentences2006Even so, section 562.076.3 states the obvious, namely, the jury is to be instructed on this subject only “when evidence that a person was in a voluntarily intoxicated or drugged condition has been received into evidence.” 7 This comports with the general rule regarding any instruction in a criminal case, i.e., “[ijnstructions must be based on substantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” State v. Perry, 35 S.W.3d 397, 398 [2] (Mo.App.2000). 2006Even so, section 562.076.3 states the obvious, namely, the jury is to be instructed on this subject only “when evidence that a person was in a voluntarily intoxicated or drugged condition has been received into evidence.” 7 This comports with the general rule regarding any instruction in a criminal case, i.e., “[ijnstructions must be based on substantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” State v. Perry, 35 S.W.3d 397, 398 [2] (Mo.App.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Allied Mutual Casualty Company v. Longgreen2 sentences1980In a prior case, Allied Mutual Casu *214 alty Company v. Long, 252 Iowa 829 , 107 N.W.2d 682, 684 (1961), a petition for contribution filed by one who settled a claim against an alleged tortfeasor was held insufficient because “the plaintiff did not plead that its insured was in fact negligent; only that the trier of fact might have found it to be so.” In Fane , in holding the cross-claim sufficient the court observed: “The defendant then says if it is found by the trier of facts that we are concurring tort-feasors then in that event there is a right to contribution. 1980In a prior case, Allied Mutual Casu *214 alty Company v. Long, 252 Iowa 829 , 107 N.W.2d 682, 684 (1961), a petition for contribution filed by one who settled a claim against an alleged tortfeasor was held insufficient because “the plaintiff did not plead that its insured was in fact negligent; only that the trier of fact might have found it to be so.” In Fane , in holding the cross-claim sufficient the court observed: “The defendant then says if it is found by the trier of facts that we are concurring tort-feasors then in that event there is a right to contribution. | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Jensengreen1 sentence1957Snyder v. Jensen, Mo., 281 S.W.2d 819, 822 [3, 4], It must follow that no question pertaining to the cross claim is involved in or should be considered on this appeal. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Erwin
green
2 sentences2006As the Erwin court explained, “[t]he rule in Cross was rooted in the common law and in society’s reproach toward persons who are voluntarily intoxicated” and the Cross rule “merely treats a sober person and a voluntarily intoxicated person as equally responsible for conduct.” Erwin, 848 S.W.2d at 482 . 2006As the Erwin court explained, “[t]he rule in Cross was rooted in the common law and in society’s reproach toward persons who are voluntarily intoxicated” and the Cross rule “merely treats a sober person and a voluntarily intoxicated person as equally responsible for conduct.” Erwin, 848 S.W.2d at 482 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Bielski v. Schulze
green
2 sentences1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq 1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.
green
2 sentences1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq 1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Best v. Yerkes
green
2 sentences1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq 1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Packard v. Whitten
green
1 sentence1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.
red
2 sentences1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq 1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co.
green
2 sentences1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq 1978For other jurisdictions which have adopted this view, see, e. g., Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800 , 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (equitable distribution applied to active but unintentional negligence of drivers of two other vehicles colliding with plaintiffs vehicle); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971) (relative fault among two defendant automobile drivers and a taxicab company against which the two defendants had filed a cross claim, plaintiffs being passengers in the taxicab); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977) (relative culpability of the manufacturer of defective eq | 1 | 1978–1978 |
McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co.
green
1 sentence1977Comparing the facts of this case to those in Barb v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, Inc., supra, the court held that C.E.S. would be entitled to a cross claim for indemnity if it could prove the alleged negligence of Home Service and that those acts were done “without the knowledge, acquis-cence [sic] or consent of C.E.S. . even though plaintiff had theretofore recovered against both defendants under res ipsa.” In McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo.1959), Hartman, plaintiff’s employer, contracted with McDonnell to paint its plant. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Shell Oil Co.
green
1 sentence1974In most instances, a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a necessary predicate to a cross claim for indemnity, although in some cases the claim for indemnity follows a settlement with the plaintiff rather than a final judgment, as for example in Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 413 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. App.1967). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Hunter v. De Luxe Drive-In Theaters
green
2 sentences1967Beaumont states the question as whether “(i)n an action for common law or non-contractual indemnity, such as the cause of action stated by the cross claim in this case, can the indemnitee recover his attorneys’ fees and expenses even though he was not held to be liable to the original plaintiff?” Beaumont concedes that there are no precisely applicable Missouri cases but argues that the basic theory of “an implied contract of indemnity,” as expounded in the excellent opinion in Hunter v. De Luxe Drive-In Theaters, Mo.App., 257 S.W.2d 255 , should be extended to permit recovery, as here, “by su 1967Beaumont states the question as whether “(i)n an action for common law or non-contractual indemnity, such as the cause of action stated by the cross claim in this case, can the indemnitee recover his attorneys’ fees and expenses even though he was not held to be liable to the original plaintiff?” Beaumont concedes that there are no precisely applicable Missouri cases but argues that the basic theory of “an implied contract of indemnity,” as expounded in the excellent opinion in Hunter v. De Luxe Drive-In Theaters, Mo.App., 257 S.W.2d 255 , should be extended to permit recovery, as here, “by su | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Levin v. Caldwell
green
1 sentence1957Levin v. Caldwell, Mo. Sup., 285 S.W.2d 655 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
State v. Roberts
green
1 sentence1957An instruction in all material respects identical with instruction 14 given in the instant case was approved in State v. Roberts, Mo., 272 S.W.2d 190 , where, at page 192, the court said: “Admonitions of the character as used by the trial court set forth supra have been held to be proper in many cases.” In State v. Baker, Mo., 293 S.W.2d *100 900, inquiring of a jury prior to verdict how the jury stood numerically, then inquiring whether the jurors thought there was a chance of arriving at a verdict, and then ordering the jury returned to their jury room for further deliberations, was approved | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Grindstaff v. J. Goldberg & Sons Structural Steel Co.
green
1 sentence1936Goldberg & Son, supra.] It is claimed that there are other- possible causes of the casualty other than the defect in the machine, that is, that it could have been caused by the vibration of the machine; that plaintiff might have touched the cross bar which led from, the clutch lever to the clutch (there was evidence on the part off the defendant that the machine was easily thrown into gear and that contact with the cross bar might cause it to start) and defendant klso says it might have started up by reason of the clutch rolling with the motor or that, in fact, plaintiff may have left the -clu | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.