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10 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gulick v. Stategreen2 sentences1993Although we have noted in the past that “[t]he cases universally recognize the exception to the nondisclosure privilege where the informer was a participant, accessory or witness to the crime,” Gulick v. State, 252 Md. 348, 354 , 249 A.2d 702, 706 (1969), we have also explained that the degree of participation of the informant is not necessarily dispositive of the need to disclose. 1993Although we have noted in the past that “[t]he cases universally recognize the exception to the nondisclosure privilege where the informer was a participant, accessory or witness to the crime,” Gulick v. State, 252 Md. 348, 354 , 249 A.2d 702, 706 (1969), we have also explained that the degree of participation of the informant is not necessarily dispositive of the need to disclose. | 2 | 4 |
McCoy v. Stategreen2 sentences1992In so holding, it noted that the informer’s “possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense,” id. 353 U.S. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629 , in part because he was the “only witness [other than the accused] in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.” Id. at 64 , 77 S.Ct. at 630 . 1 Relying on Roviaro , we have interpreted the nondisclosure privilege to be inapplicable “whenever the informer was an integral part of the illegal transaction.” McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 337 , 140 A.2d 689 (1958), cert, denied sub nom., McCoy v. Pep 1992In so holding, it noted that the informer’s “possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense,” id. 353 U.S. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629 , in part because he was the “only witness [other than the accused] in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.” Id. at 64 , 77 S.Ct. at 630 . 1 Relying on Roviaro , we have interpreted the nondisclosure privilege to be inapplicable “whenever the informer was an integral part of the illegal transaction.” McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 337 , 140 A.2d 689 (1958), cert, denied sub nom., McCoy v. Pep | 2 | 4 |
Winmark Ltd. Partnership v. Miles & Stockbridgegreen2 sentences2003See also Winmark Limited P’ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 109 Md.App. 149, 170-71 , 674 A.2d 73 (1996) (“[Clases outside of the unique context of a debtor’s nondisclosure of a claim in bankruptcy support the proposition that the application of judicial estoppel depends on the deliberate manner in which the party assumes two inconsistent positions.”), rev’d on other grounds, 345 Md. 614 , 693 A.2d 824 (1997). 2003See also Winmark Limited P’ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 109 Md.App. 149, 170-71 , 674 A.2d 73 (1996) (“[Clases outside of the unique context of a debtor’s nondisclosure of a claim in bankruptcy support the proposition that the application of judicial estoppel depends on the deliberate manner in which the party assumes two inconsistent positions.”), rev’d on other grounds, 345 Md. 614 , 693 A.2d 824 (1997). | 1 | 2 |
Winmark Ltd. P'ship v. Miles & Stockbridgegreen2 sentences2003See also Winmark Limited P’ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 109 Md.App. 149, 170-71 , 674 A.2d 73 (1996) (“[Clases outside of the unique context of a debtor’s nondisclosure of a claim in bankruptcy support the proposition that the application of judicial estoppel depends on the deliberate manner in which the party assumes two inconsistent positions.”), rev’d on other grounds, 345 Md. 614 , 693 A.2d 824 (1997). 2003See also Winmark Limited P’ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 109 Md.App. 149, 170-71 , 674 A.2d 73 (1996) (“[Clases outside of the unique context of a debtor’s nondisclosure of a claim in bankruptcy support the proposition that the application of judicial estoppel depends on the deliberate manner in which the party assumes two inconsistent positions.”), rev’d on other grounds, 345 Md. 614 , 693 A.2d 824 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
John S. Clark Company v. Faggert & Frieden, P.C.green1 sentence1996See, e.g., John S. Clark Co. v. Faggert & Frieden, P.C., 65 F.3d 26, 29 (4th Cir.1995) (judicial estoppel should not be applied when a party’s prior position was based on mistake or inadvertence); Levinson v. U.S., 969 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir.1992) (judicial estoppel protects courts from being “manipulated by chameleonic litigants who seek to prevail, twice, on opposite theories.”); Tenneco Chem., Inc. v. William T. | 1 | 1 |
Melvin E. Levinson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1996See, e.g., John S. Clark Co. v. Faggert & Frieden, P.C., 65 F.3d 26, 29 (4th Cir.1995) (judicial estoppel should not be applied when a party’s prior position was based on mistake or inadvertence); Levinson v. U.S., 969 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir.1992) (judicial estoppel protects courts from being “manipulated by chameleonic litigants who seek to prevail, twice, on opposite theories.”); Tenneco Chem., Inc. v. William T. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nutter v. State
green
2 sentences1991Judge Orth, in Nutter v. State, 8 Md.App. 635 [ 262 A.2d 80 ] (1970), clarified the disclosure requirement in regard to an informer who witnesses the unlawful transaction: “ ‘[Witness’ as used in Gulick means a material witness, in the sense that his testimony is important to a fair determination of the cause. 1977So, although an eyewitness to a crime is clearly a ‘material’ witness as that word is ordinarily used, if he is an informer, simply observing an illegal transaction but not participating in it, the fact that he observes the transaction does not necessarily make his possible testimony so important as to compel disclosure of his identity in the face of the rationale of the nondisclosure privilege.” 8 Md. | 3 | 1977–1991 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences1992In so holding, it noted that the informer’s “possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense,” id. 353 U.S. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629 , in part because he was the “only witness [other than the accused] in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.” Id. at 64 , 77 S.Ct. at 630 . 1 Relying on Roviaro , we have interpreted the nondisclosure privilege to be inapplicable “whenever the informer was an integral part of the illegal transaction.” McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 337 , 140 A.2d 689 (1958), cert, denied sub nom., McCoy v. Pep 1992In so holding, it noted that the informer’s “possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense,” id. 353 U.S. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629 , in part because he was the “only witness [other than the accused] in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.” Id. at 64 , 77 S.Ct. at 630 . 1 Relying on Roviaro , we have interpreted the nondisclosure privilege to be inapplicable “whenever the informer was an integral part of the illegal transaction.” McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 337 , 140 A.2d 689 (1958), cert, denied sub nom., McCoy v. Pep | 2 | 1990–1992 |
Moore v. Smyth
neutral
2 sentences1992In so holding, it noted that the informer’s “possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense,” id. 353 U.S. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629 , in part because he was the “only witness [other than the accused] in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.” Id. at 64 , 77 S.Ct. at 630 . 1 Relying on Roviaro , we have interpreted the nondisclosure privilege to be inapplicable “whenever the informer was an integral part of the illegal transaction.” McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 337 , 140 A.2d 689 (1958), cert, denied sub nom., McCoy v. Pep 1990In so holding, it noted that the informer’s “possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense,” id. 353 U.S. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629-630 , in *524 part because he was the “only witness [other than the accused] in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.” Id. 353 U.S. at 64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629 . 2 Relying on Roviaro , we interpreted the nondisclosure privilege to be inapplicable “whenever the informer was an integral part of the illegal transaction.” McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 337 , 140 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, sub nom., McCo | 2 | 1990–1992 |
Spangler v. Daily
green
2 sentences1992In so holding, it noted that the informer’s “possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense,” id. 353 U.S. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629 , in part because he was the “only witness [other than the accused] in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.” Id. at 64 , 77 S.Ct. at 630 . 1 Relying on Roviaro , we have interpreted the nondisclosure privilege to be inapplicable “whenever the informer was an integral part of the illegal transaction.” McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 337 , 140 A.2d 689 (1958), cert, denied sub nom., McCoy v. Pep 1990In so holding, it noted that the informer’s “possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense,” id. 353 U.S. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629-630 , in *524 part because he was the “only witness [other than the accused] in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.” Id. 353 U.S. at 64 , 77 S.Ct. at 629 . 2 Relying on Roviaro , we interpreted the nondisclosure privilege to be inapplicable “whenever the informer was an integral part of the illegal transaction.” McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 337 , 140 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, sub nom., McCo | 2 | 1990–1992 |
cluster 750710
green
1 sentence2003In Sedlack, 134 F.3d 219 , the Fourth Circuit recognized intent to mislead the court as an element in the judicial estoppel analysis. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Brooks v. State
green
2 sentences1992While the informer was present throughout the transaction in Brooks , it is not entirely clear from the record in this case whether the informer was present during the actual exchange of drugs for money. 3 We expressly rejected the State’s contention in Brooks “that the nondisclosure privilege applies when an informer merely points out or introduces a defendant to an undercover officer and is only a witness to, not a participant in, the illegal transaction.” 320 Md. at 525 , 578 A.2d at 788 . 1992While the informer was present throughout the transaction in Brooks , it is not entirely clear from the record in this case whether the informer was present during the actual exchange of drugs for money. 3 We expressly rejected the State’s contention in Brooks “that the nondisclosure privilege applies when an informer merely points out or introduces a defendant to an undercover officer and is only a witness to, not a participant in, the illegal transaction.” 320 Md. at 525 , 578 A.2d at 788 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.