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10 Maine opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Comergreen2 sentences1999For that reason, we do not utilize Tibbetts for this case, and we have no occasion for determining that Tibbetts is no longer viable in a harmless error case. [¶ 24] We have defined obvious error as error that is “so highly prejudicial that it taints the proceedings and virtually deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” State *1238 v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 9 (Me.1994). 1999For that reason, we do not utilize Tibbetts for this case, and we have no occasion for determining that Tibbetts is no longer viable in a harmless error case. [¶ 24] We have defined obvious error as error that is “so highly prejudicial that it taints the proceedings and virtually deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” State *1238 v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 9 (Me.1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Turnergreen2 sentences1998See State v. Tibbetts, 299 A.2d 883, 889 (Me.1973); State v. Turner, 433 A.2d 397, 400-01 (Me.1981); Ingalls, 544 A.2d at 1275-76 . [¶ 7] Under the Tibbetts rule, an unambiguous comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, whether direct or indirect, constitutes per se reversible error and can never be deemed harmless error, as a matter of law. 1998See State v. Tibbetts, 299 A.2d 883, 889 (Me.1973); State v. Turner, 433 A.2d 397, 400-01 (Me.1981); Ingalls, 544 A.2d at 1275-76 . [¶ 7] Under the Tibbetts rule, an unambiguous comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, whether direct or indirect, constitutes per se reversible error and can never be deemed harmless error, as a matter of law. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ingallsgreen2 sentences1998See State v. Tibbetts, 299 A.2d 883, 889 (Me.1973); State v. Turner, 433 A.2d 397, 400-01 (Me.1981); Ingalls, 544 A.2d at 1275-76 . [¶ 7] Under the Tibbetts rule, an unambiguous comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, whether direct or indirect, constitutes per se reversible error and can never be deemed harmless error, as a matter of law. 1998See State v. Tibbetts, 299 A.2d 883, 889 (Me.1973); State v. Turner, 433 A.2d 397, 400-01 (Me.1981); Ingalls, 544 A.2d at 1275-76 . [¶ 7] Under the Tibbetts rule, an unambiguous comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, whether direct or indirect, constitutes per se reversible error and can never be deemed harmless error, as a matter of law. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tibbettsgreen2 sentences1998See State v. Tibbetts, 299 A.2d 883, 889 (Me.1973); State v. Turner, 433 A.2d 397, 400-01 (Me.1981); Ingalls, 544 A.2d at 1275-76 . [¶ 7] Under the Tibbetts rule, an unambiguous comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, whether direct or indirect, constitutes per se reversible error and can never be deemed harmless error, as a matter of law. 1998See State v. Tibbetts, 299 A.2d 883, 889 (Me.1973); State v. Turner, 433 A.2d 397, 400-01 (Me.1981); Ingalls, 544 A.2d at 1275-76 . [¶ 7] Under the Tibbetts rule, an unambiguous comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, whether direct or indirect, constitutes per se reversible error and can never be deemed harmless error, as a matter of law. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Prudenzanogreen2 sentences1980The fact that the constitutionally impermissible interpretation is merely one of several possible interpretations of the prosecutor’s comment is not adequate under the Tibbetts rule. 5 Traditionally, the decision upon a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling “will not be disturbed absent a clear showing by the appellant of abuse of that discretion.” State v. Prudenzano, Me., 365 A.2d 418, 420 (1976). 1980The fact that the constitutionally impermissible interpretation is merely one of several possible interpretations of the prosecutor’s comment is not adequate under the Tibbetts rule. 5 Traditionally, the decision upon a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling “will not be disturbed absent a clear showing by the appellant of abuse of that discretion.” State v. Prudenzano, Me., 365 A.2d 418, 420 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Tad R. Knowles v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1980The First Circuit has recently stated the test as follows: “[Wjhether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 389 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 , 98 S.Ct. 171 , 54 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977), quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). 1980The First Circuit has recently stated the test as follows: “[Wjhether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 389 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 , 98 S.Ct. 171 , 54 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977), quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). | 1 | 1 |
Alan Lloyd Lussier v. Frank O. Guntergreen2 sentences1980The First Circuit has recently stated the test as follows: “[Wjhether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 389 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 , 98 S.Ct. 171 , 54 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977), quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). 1980The First Circuit has recently stated the test as follows: “[Wjhether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 389 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 , 98 S.Ct. 171 , 54 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977), quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Tibbetts
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 21-22 . 2017Id. at 21-22 . | 4 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Clarke
green
2 sentences2017“Obvious error,” including as applicable in the context of the type of prosecutorial misconduct at issue here, means “error that is so highly prejudicial that it taints the proceedings and virtually deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” Clarke, 1999 ME 141, ¶ 24 , 738 A.2d 1233 . 2017“Obvious error,” including as applicable in the context of the type of prosecutorial misconduct at issue here, means “error that is so highly prejudicial that it taints the proceedings and virtually deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” Clarke, 1999 ME 141, ¶ 24 , 738 A.2d 1233 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Roberts
green
2 sentences2017The Tibbetts analysis is applicable only in cases in which an objection has been made and the harmless error standard of review is appropriate.” See also Roberts, 2008 ME 112, ¶ 46 , 951 A.2d 803 . 2017The Tibbetts analysis is applicable only in cases in which an objection has been made and the harmless error standard of review is appropriate.” See also Roberts, 2008 ME 112, ¶ 46 , 951 A.2d 803 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Libby
green
2 sentences1981Although this Court has repeatedly applied the Tibbetts analysis to prosecutorial comment in closing argument to the jury, see, e.g., State v. Libby, Me., 410 A.2d 562 (1980), we have not had occasion until now to consider whether that analysis must also be applied to a prosecutor’s remarks during opening statement. 1981Although this Court has repeatedly applied the Tibbetts analysis to prosecutorial comment in closing argument to the jury, see, e.g., State v. Libby, Me., 410 A.2d 562 (1980), we have not had occasion until now to consider whether that analysis must also be applied to a prosecutor’s remarks during opening statement. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Weaver v. Carson
green
2 sentences1980The First Circuit has recently stated the test as follows: “[Wjhether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 389 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 , 98 S.Ct. 171 , 54 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977), quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). 1980The First Circuit has recently stated the test as follows: “[Wjhether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 389 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 , 98 S.Ct. 171 , 54 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977), quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Easterling v. Odom
green
2 sentences1980The First Circuit has recently stated the test as follows: “[Wjhether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 389 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 , 98 S.Ct. 171 , 54 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977), quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). 1980The First Circuit has recently stated the test as follows: “[Wjhether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 389 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 , 98 S.Ct. 171 , 54 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977), quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.