Levin analysis in Michigan

2016Justice Levin’s analysis did not flow from the plain text of the statute, but rather, in his words, from “the spirit of the legislative purpose.” Lewis, 415 Mich at 453-454 .

1991Furthermore, in response to Justice Levin’s claim that ambiguity exists, and his reliance on rules of contract construction for such proposition, the majority cites Wozniak v John Hancock Mutual Life Ins Co, 288 Mich 612, 616 ; 286 NW 99 (1939), which states: "An insurance policy is a contract and should be interpreted according to its plain meaning.

1991Furthermore, in response to Justice Levin’s claim that ambiguity exists, and his reliance on rules of contract construction for such proposition, the majority cites Wozniak v John Hancock Mutual Life Ins Co, 288 Mich 612, 616 ; 286 NW 99 (1939), which states: "An insurance policy is a contract and should be interpreted according to its plain meaning.

1981The problem we confronted was expressed in Judge Levin’s analysis in People v Otis Adams, 34 Mich App 546, 560-561 ; 192 NW2d 19 (1971): "It is obvious that virtually any assault, any battery, any rape, or any robbery involves some 'intentional confinement’ of the person of the victim.

1981The problem we confronted was expressed in Judge Levin’s analysis in People v Otis Adams, 34 Mich App 546, 560-561 ; 192 NW2d 19 (1971): "It is obvious that virtually any assault, any battery, any rape, or any robbery involves some 'intentional confinement’ of the person of the victim.

1977Justice Levin states (at page 24 of his opinion) that: "While warrantless 'protective* searches may be justified when 'reasonably * * * necessary to prevent the dangers that [a] suspect at large in the house may resist or escape’, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v Hayden, 387 US 294, 299 ; 87 S Ct 1642 ; 18 L Ed 2d 782 (1967), once all persons occupying the residence are under supervision and control and there is no reason to believe that anyone else is present, the rationale for a 'protective’ search no longer obtains and a further search may not be conducted.” (Emphasis added.) As I understand

1977Justice Levin states (at page 24 of his opinion) that: "While warrantless 'protective* searches may be justified when 'reasonably * * * necessary to prevent the dangers that [a] suspect at large in the house may resist or escape’, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v Hayden, 387 US 294, 299 ; 87 S Ct 1642 ; 18 L Ed 2d 782 (1967), once all persons occupying the residence are under supervision and control and there is no reason to believe that anyone else is present, the rationale for a 'protective’ search no longer obtains and a further search may not be conducted.” (Emphasis added.) As I understand

1975As stated in People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 170 ; 205 NW2d 461 (1973): "The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the Court must agree on a ground for decision in order to make that binding precedent for future cases.

1975As stated in People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 170 ; 205 NW2d 461 (1973): "The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the Court must agree on a ground for decision in order to make that binding precedent for future cases.

1975In addition, we note that in this case there was a contractual employment relationship between the board and the teachers during the fall of 1974, though the specific terms of that contractual relationship were court-ordered, and that the teachers had actually been working on the job. 16 School Dist for the City of Holland v Holland Education Association, 380 Mich 314 ; 157 NW2d 206 (1968) (Opinions of O’Hara, Souris and Kelly, JJ.).

1975In addition, we note that in this case there was a contractual employment relationship between the board and the teachers during the fall of 1974, though the specific terms of that contractual relationship were court-ordered, and that the teachers had actually been working on the job. 16 School Dist for the City of Holland v Holland Education Association, 380 Mich 314 ; 157 NW2d 206 (1968) (Opinions of O’Hara, Souris and Kelly, JJ.).

1975In re Curzenski Estate, 384 Mich 334, 335 ; 183 NW2d 220 (1971).” Ettinger also noted that until the Supreme Court clarifies the matter further it remains uncertain whether the Levin standard would require proof of the reasonableness of the proposed use alone, or would it require proof that the proposed use is more reasonable than the existing use.

1975In re Curzenski Estate, 384 Mich 334, 335 ; 183 NW2d 220 (1971).” Ettinger also noted that until the Supreme Court clarifies the matter further it remains uncertain whether the Levin standard would require proof of the reasonableness of the proposed use alone, or would it require proof that the proposed use is more reasonable than the existing use.