reenactment rule in Michigan

2010I continue to adhere to my stated position that "[i]n the absence of a clear indication that the Legislature intended to either adopt or repudiate this Court's prior construction, there is no reason to subordinate our primary principle of construction—to ascertain the Legislature's intent by first examining the statute's language—to the reenactment rule." Hawkins, 468 Mich. at 508-509 , 668 N.W.2d 602 (majority opinion). [34] See 2006 PA 564 , 2008 PA 341 , 2008 PA 462 , 2008 PA 463 . [35] MCL 257.625(8). [36] MCL 333.7106(3) (emphasis added). [37] MCL 257.625(8) (emphasis added).

2006Although, where statutory language is ambiguous, the reenactment doctrine may be a more useful tool of construction, "in the absence of a clear indication that the Legislature intended to either adopt or repudiate this Court's prior construction, there is no reason to subordinate our primary principle of construction—to ascertain the Legislature's intent by first examining the statute's language—to the reenactment rule." Id. at 508-509, 668 N.W.2d 602 . [Emphasis in original.] Because MCL 257.625a(6)(d) omits a remedy for a violation of the right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent

2005The Legislature “is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it [reenacts] a statute without change ....” Lorillard, a Div of Loew’s Theatres, Inc v Pons, 434 US 575, 580 ; 98 S Ct 866 ; 55 L Ed 2d 40 (1978).

2005The Legislature “is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it [reenacts] a statute without change ....” Lorillard, a Div of Loew’s Theatres, Inc v Pons, 434 US 575, 580 ; 98 S Ct 866 ; 55 L Ed 2d 40 (1978).

2003As explained by Justice Boyle in her dissent in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 202-203 ; 538 NW2d 380 (1995), in which I joined: The [Sloan] majority’s assertion of legislative acquiescence in the decision in Sherbine,[ 1 ] to use of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained in alleged violation of the statute before us is wholly mistaken.

2003As explained by Justice Boyle in her dissent in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 202-203 ; 538 NW2d 380 (1995), in which I joined: The [Sloan] majority’s assertion of legislative acquiescence in the decision in Sherbine,[ 1 ] to use of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained in alleged violation of the statute before us is wholly mistaken.

2006Central Bank of Denver, NA v First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA, 511 US 164, 185 ; 114 S Ct 1439 ; 128 L Ed 2d 119 (1994) (“When Congress reenacts statutory language that has been given a consistent judicial construction, we often adhere to that construction in interpreting the reenacted statutory language.

2006Central Bank of Denver, NA v First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA, 511 US 164, 185 ; 114 S Ct 1439 ; 128 L Ed 2d 119 (1994) (“When Congress reenacts statutory language that has been given a consistent judicial construction, we often adhere to that construction in interpreting the reenacted statutory language.

2005However, as we recently explained: [N]either “legislative acquiescence” nor the “reenactment doctrine” may “be utilized to subordinate the plain language of a statute.” [People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 507-510 ; 668 NW2d 602 (2003).] “Legislative acquiescence” has been repeatedly rejected by this Court because “Michigan courts [must] determine the Legislature’s intent from its words, not from its silence.” Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261 ; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).. . . “[I]n the absence of a clear indication that the Legislature intended to either adopt or repudiate this Court’s p

2005However, as we recently explained: [N]either “legislative acquiescence” nor the “reenactment doctrine” may “be utilized to subordinate the plain language of a statute.” [People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 507-510 ; 668 NW2d 602 (2003).] “Legislative acquiescence” has been repeatedly rejected by this Court because “Michigan courts [must] determine the Legislature’s intent from its words, not from its silence.” Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261 ; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).. . . “[I]n the absence of a clear indication that the Legislature intended to either adopt or repudiate this Court’s p

2005Affirmed. 1 MCL 600.2912b(8) provides that an action may be filed 154 days after a notice of intent is issued if defendants fail to respond to the notice ■within 154 days. 2 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 3 MCL 600.5805(5) was renumbered as MCL 600.5805(6) by 2002 PA 715 , effective March 31, 2003. 4 Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 ; 677 NW2d 813 (2004). 5 We note that the defendants in Waltz raised other issues of error with the plaintiffs claim.

2005Affirmed. 1 MCL 600.2912b(8) provides that an action may be filed 154 days after a notice of intent is issued if defendants fail to respond to the notice ■within 154 days. 2 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 3 MCL 600.5805(5) was renumbered as MCL 600.5805(6) by 2002 PA 715 , effective March 31, 2003. 4 Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 ; 677 NW2d 813 (2004). 5 We note that the defendants in Waltz raised other issues of error with the plaintiffs claim.

2005However, as we recently explained: [N]either “legislative acquiescence” nor the “reenactment doctrine” may “be utilized to subordinate the plain language of a statute.” [People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 507-510 ; 668 NW2d 602 (2003).] “Legislative acquiescence” has been repeatedly rejected by this Court because “Michigan courts [must] determine the Legislature’s intent from its words, not from its silence.” Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261 ; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).. . . “[I]n the absence of a clear indication that the Legislature intended to either adopt or repudiate this Court’s p

2005However, as we recently explained: [N]either “legislative acquiescence” nor the “reenactment doctrine” may “be utilized to subordinate the plain language of a statute.” [People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 507-510 ; 668 NW2d 602 (2003).] “Legislative acquiescence” has been repeatedly rejected by this Court because “Michigan courts [must] determine the Legislature’s intent from its words, not from its silence.” Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261 ; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).. . . “[I]n the absence of a clear indication that the Legislature intended to either adopt or repudiate this Court’s p

2005Affirmed. 1 MCL 600.2912b(8) provides that an action may be filed 154 days after a notice of intent is issued if defendants fail to respond to the notice ■within 154 days. 2 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 3 MCL 600.5805(5) was renumbered as MCL 600.5805(6) by 2002 PA 715 , effective March 31, 2003. 4 Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 ; 677 NW2d 813 (2004). 5 We note that the defendants in Waltz raised other issues of error with the plaintiffs claim.

2005Affirmed. 1 MCL 600.2912b(8) provides that an action may be filed 154 days after a notice of intent is issued if defendants fail to respond to the notice ■within 154 days. 2 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 3 MCL 600.5805(5) was renumbered as MCL 600.5805(6) by 2002 PA 715 , effective March 31, 2003. 4 Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 ; 677 NW2d 813 (2004). 5 We note that the defendants in Waltz raised other issues of error with the plaintiffs claim.

2003Elizabeth A. Weaver 1 People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502 ; 364 NW2d 658 (1984). 2 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 120437 CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellee. ___________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 121698 MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF, Defendant-Appellee. ___________________________________ CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).

2003Elizabeth A. Weaver 1 People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502 ; 364 NW2d 658 (1984). 2 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 120437 CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellee. ___________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 121698 MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF, Defendant-Appellee. ___________________________________ CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).