10 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, and ACE INA Insurance Company Canada, Defendants/Respondents.green2 sentences2014Family Support Division v. Stovall-Reid, 163 S.W.3d 519, 521-22 (Mo.App.E.D.2005) ("[r ]es judi-cata prevents a party from re-litigating issues judicially determined in a previous action, even when the judgment was entered by default,” and notice of the default judgment hearing is not relevant where the default judgment has not been set aside and remains in effect) (italics added, and internal citation omitted); and Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, 447 S.W.3d 680, 690-91 (Mo.App.E.D.2014) (res judicata "applies to the parties and their privies," and ”[f]or privity to exist, ... the interests of the pa 2014E.D. 2005) (“[r]es judicata prevents a party from re-litigating issues judicially determined in a previous action, even when the judgment was entered by default,” and notice of the default judgment hearing is not relevant where the default judgment has not been set aside and remains in effect) (italics added, and internal citation omitted); and Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, No. ED100001, 2014 WL 3728710, at *8 (Mo.App. | 2 | 2 |
Crouch v. Crouchgreen2 sentences2001LEGAL ANALYSIS We recognize that “a personal judgment rendered by a court without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void and may be attacked collaterally” and that “a defendant ⅛ always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.’” Crouch v. Crouch, 641 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. banc 1982) (quoting Ins. 2000As to Point Five (positing error based on lack of personal jurisdiction over Husband by the dissolution court), we are constrained to point out that we recognize that a “personal judgment rendered by a court without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void and may be attacked collaterally,” Crouch v. Crouch, 641 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. banc 1982); and that a defendant “ % always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.’ ” /¿.(quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Baux | 2 | 2 |
Lindsey v. Lindseygreen1 sentence2019Id. “‘Rule 74.05 is inapplicable where a trial court strikes a party’s pleadings and enters judgment as a sanction for the party’s failure to comply with a discovery order.’” Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Lindsey, 336 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Stine v. Warfordgreen1 sentence2014Family Support Division v. Stovall-Reid, 163 S.W.3d 519, 521-22 (Mo.App.E.D.2005) ("[r ]es judi-cata prevents a party from re-litigating issues judicially determined in a previous action, even when the judgment was entered by default,” and notice of the default judgment hearing is not relevant where the default judgment has not been set aside and remains in effect) (italics added, and internal citation omitted); and Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, 447 S.W.3d 680, 690-91 (Mo.App.E.D.2014) (res judicata "applies to the parties and their privies," and ”[f]or privity to exist, ... the interests of the pa | 1 | 1 |
NATIONAL TAX ASSISTANCE CORPORATION v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2014Family Support Division v. Stovall-Reid, 163 S.W.3d 519, 521-22 (Mo.App.E.D.2005) ("[r ]es judi-cata prevents a party from re-litigating issues judicially determined in a previous action, even when the judgment was entered by default,” and notice of the default judgment hearing is not relevant where the default judgment has not been set aside and remains in effect) (italics added, and internal citation omitted); and Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, 447 S.W.3d 680, 690-91 (Mo.App.E.D.2014) (res judicata "applies to the parties and their privies," and ”[f]or privity to exist, ... the interests of the pa | 1 | 1 |
Angle v. Owsleygreen1 sentence2000However, “the onus rests on petitioner to show lack of jurisdiction ... [by referencing] the record itself or ... in any way that is both proper and convincing.” Angle v. Owsley, 332 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Mo.App.1959). | 1 | 1 |
Gibson Ex Rel. Woodall v. Elleygreen1 sentence1991See Gibson v. Elley, 778 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo.App.1989) (discussing the meaning of “recklessness” within the context of Rule 74.05). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee
green
2 sentences2000As to Point Five (positing error based on lack of personal jurisdiction over Husband by the dissolution court), we are constrained to point out that we recognize that a “personal judgment rendered by a court without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void and may be attacked collaterally,” Crouch v. Crouch, 641 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. banc 1982); and that a defendant “ % always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.’ ” /¿.(quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Baux 2000As to Point Five (positing error based on lack of personal jurisdiction over Husband by the dissolution court), we are constrained to point out that we recognize that a “personal judgment rendered by a court without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void and may be attacked collaterally,” Crouch v. Crouch, 641 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. banc 1982); and that a defendant “ % always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.’ ” /¿.(quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Baux | 3 | 1982–2001 |
Erica Hollins v. Capital Solutions Investments I, Inc., d/b/a Loan Express Co.
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 22 . 3 $729.90 in interest from the date the debtor defaulted until the date of the default judgment is in violation of the statute. 2022Id. at 29 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Greasel Conversions, Inc. v. Massa
green
2 sentences2019Id. “‘Rule 74.05 is inapplicable where a trial court strikes a party’s pleadings and enters judgment as a sanction for the party’s failure to comply with a discovery order.’” Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Lindsey, 336 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Mo.App. 2019Id. “‘Rule 74.05 is inapplicable where a trial court strikes a party’s pleadings and enters judgment as a sanction for the party’s failure to comply with a discovery order.’” Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Lindsey, 336 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Mo.App. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989If the problems in Sprung I, 727 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. banc 1987), and Barney v. Suggs, 688 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. banc 1985), could have been resolved by a petition in equity, there would have been no need to adopt a new default judgment rule. 1989If the problems in Sprung I, 727 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. banc 1987), and Barney v. Suggs, 688 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. banc 1985), could have been resolved by a petition in equity, there would have been no need to adopt a new default judgment rule. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Barney v. Suggs
green
2 sentences1989If the problems in Sprung I, 727 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. banc 1987), and Barney v. Suggs, 688 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. banc 1985), could have been resolved by a petition in equity, there would have been no need to adopt a new default judgment rule. 1989If the problems in Sprung I, 727 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. banc 1987), and Barney v. Suggs, 688 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. banc 1985), could have been resolved by a petition in equity, there would have been no need to adopt a new default judgment rule. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
JR Watkins Company v. Hubbard
green
1 sentence1977Watkins Company v. Hubbard, 343 S.W.2d 189 (Mo.App.1961), and other cases cited by the respondent, petitioner’s counsel obtained the default judgment in violation of an agreement not to do so; again, the record clearly shows the contrary is true. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.