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10 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Knesegreen2 sentences2002See State v. Knese, 985 S.W.2d 759, 766 (Mo. banc 1999). “[A] deficient mental condition, whether manifested by delusional behavior or a positive drug test, does not by itself render a statement unin-tebigent. 2002A defendant does not have the constitutional right 'to confess to his crime only when totaby rational and properly motivated.’ ” Id. at 766 . | 1 | 2 |
Clevenger v. Nevada Employment Security Departmentgreen2 sentences2001Off-the-job conduct which resulted in a positive drug test in violation of an employer’s rule or policy was held by the Nevada Supreme Court to constitute “misconduct connected with his work” under Nevada law, where the employer’s rule or policy “has a reasonable relationship to the work to be performed” and where there has been an “intentional violation or willful disregard of that rule or policy.” Clevenger v. Nevada Employment Security Department, 105 Nev. 145 , 770 P.2d 866, 868 (1989). 2001Off-the-job conduct which resulted in a positive drug test in violation of an employer’s rule or policy was held by the Nevada Supreme Court to constitute “misconduct connected with his work” under Nevada law, where the employer’s rule or policy “has a reasonable relationship to the work to be performed” and where there has been an “intentional violation or willful disregard of that rule or policy.” Clevenger v. Nevada Employment Security Department, 105 Nev. 145 , 770 P.2d 866, 868 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Grace Drilling Co. v. Director of Laborgreen2 sentences2001Grace Drilling Company v. Director of Labor, et al, 31 Ark.App. 81 , 790 S.W.2d 907, 909 (1990). 2001Grace Drilling Company v. Director of Labor, et al, 31 Ark.App. 81 , 790 S.W.2d 907, 909 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCoygreen2 sentences2000See State v. McCoy, 116 N.M. 491 , 864 P.2d 307, 312 (N.M.App.1993), rev’d on other grounds by State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410 , 882 P.2d 1 (N.M.1994) (adopting the majority view that a positive drug test alone does not prove knowledge or intent; additional proof of intentional or knowing possession is required). 2000See State v. McCoy, 116 N.M. 491 , 864 P.2d 307, 312 (N.M.App.1993), rev’d on other grounds by State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410 , 882 P.2d 1 (N.M.1994) (adopting the majority view that a positive drug test alone does not prove knowledge or intent; additional proof of intentional or knowing possession is required). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hodgegreen2 sentences2000See State v. McCoy, 116 N.M. 491 , 864 P.2d 307, 312 (N.M.App.1993), rev’d on other grounds by State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410 , 882 P.2d 1 (N.M.1994) (adopting the majority view that a positive drug test alone does not prove knowledge or intent; additional proof of intentional or knowing possession is required). 2000See State v. McCoy, 116 N.M. 491 , 864 P.2d 307, 312 (N.M.App.1993), rev’d on other grounds by State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410 , 882 P.2d 1 (N.M.1994) (adopting the majority view that a positive drug test alone does not prove knowledge or intent; additional proof of intentional or knowing possession is required). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lyonsgreen1 sentence1999The deficient mental condition of a defendant, “whether manifested by delusional behavior or a positive drug test,” State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. banc 1998), does not by itself render a confession involuntary, “as there is no constitutional right to confess, only when totally rational and properly motivated.” State v. Lyons, 951 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Mo. banc 1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bucklewgreen2 sentences1999The deficient mental condition of a defendant, “whether manifested by delusional behavior or a positive drug test,” State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. banc 1998), does not by itself render a confession involuntary, “as there is no constitutional right to confess, only when totally rational and properly motivated.” State v. Lyons, 951 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Mo. banc 1997). 1999“If one is informed of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and understands his right to remain silent under Miranda, and thereafter makes voluntary statements, it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent.” State v. Buck-lew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. banc 1998). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence1998A defendant does not have the constitutional right “‘to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated.’” State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 911 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 377 , 139 L.Ed.2d 294 (1977); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Colorado v. Connelly
green
2 sentences1998A defendant does not have the constitutional right “‘to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated.’” State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 911 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 377 , 139 L.Ed.2d 294 (1977); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). 1998A defendant does not have the constitutional right “‘to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated.’” State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 911 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 377 , 139 L.Ed.2d 294 (1977); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Secrist v. Treadstone, LLC
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Marshall
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Riley
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Powell v. Nevada
green
1 sentence1998A defendant does not have the constitutional right “‘to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated.’” State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 911 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 377 , 139 L.Ed.2d 294 (1977); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.