Brantley test in Mississippi

2022Wilcher, 243 So. 3d at 183-85 , overruling Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, 152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014).

2019In overruling the test applied by the trial court in this case, the Supreme Court lamented that it had led to a complexity of pleadings and proof because “[p]arties are now citing Brantley to bring actions based solely on violations of statutes and/or local ordinances or regulations, which they argue impose ‘ministerial’ duties.” Wilcher, 243 So. 3d at 184 (¶17).

2019Wilcher overruled Brantley, noting how tedious and scattered the Brantley analysis had become, stating that the Brantley test “overcomplicates the process of litigating a claim and places the success of a claim on the ability of the injured party’s attorney to sift through myriad and sometimes arcane regulations—creating extra layers of proof, which may have little or no practical effect on the actual negligent act.” Crum v. City of Corinth, 183 So. 3d 847, 854 (Miss. 2016) (Randolph, P.J., concurring in result only).

2019Wilcher overruled Brantley, noting how tedious and scattered the Brantley analysis had become, stating that the Brantley test “overcomplicates the process of litigating a claim and places the success of a claim on the ability of the injured party’s attorney to sift through myriad and sometimes arcane regulations—creating extra layers of proof, which may have little or no practical effect on the actual negligent act.” Crum v. City of Corinth, 183 So. 3d 847, 854 (Miss. 2016) (Randolph, P.J., concurring in result only).

2018Comm’n v. Adams, 197 So. 3d 406, 416-18 (Miss. 2016) (Maxwell, J., concurring in result only). 7 to hunt for other regulations and ordinances to see if the narrower duty in question has somehow been “rendered ministerial.”10 This tedious and scattered quest exemplifies one of the major criticisms of Brantley analysis—that “it overcomplicates the process of litigating a claim and places the success of a claim on the ability of the injured party’s attorney to sift through myriad and sometimes arcane regulations—creating extra layers of proof, which may have little or no practical effect on the a

2016Most recently, in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. Adams, “I join[ed the] other voices from this court that disagree with the recent break from precedent.” Adams, 2014-IA-01419-SCT, 2016 WL 3091194, at *9 (Miss.

2023See Est. of Hudson v. Yazoo City, 246 So. 3d 872, 880 (¶51) (Miss. 2018) (reversing and remanding when MTCA precedent changed while case was pending, and holding “out of fairness to the Estate, we find the Estate should be allowed the opportunity to fully present its negligence claim, beyond its reliance on the overruled Brantley test”); Reverie Boutique LLC v. City of Waynesboro, 282 So. 3d 1273 , 1277 (¶24) (Miss.

2019“Given that the Estate’s case was still pending when Wilcher handed down, overruling the Brantley test and reinstituting the public-policy function test for purposes of Section 11-46-9(1)(d), the applicability of subsection (d) must be decided under the reinstituted public-policy function test.” Id. at (¶51).

2018As mentioned, this Court recently overruled the Brantley test for determining when a claim against a governmental entity enjoys discretionary-function immunity under Section 11-46-9(1)(d), and restored the two-part, public-policy function test adopted by this Court in Jones v. Mississippi Department of Transportation , 744 So.2d 256 (Miss. 1999), for making that determination.

2018As mentioned, this Court recently overruled the Brantley test for determining when a claim against a governmental entity enjoys discretionary-function immunity under Section 11-46-9(1)(d), and restored the two-part, public-policy function test adopted by this Court in Jones v. Mississippi Department of Transportation , 744 So.2d 256 (Miss. 1999), for making that determination.

2018And if a regulation was 11 This “Court will not find a private cause of action when there is no apparent legislative intent to establish one,” and “the party asserting a right of action . . . [bears] the burden of establishing the required legislative intent.” Hill v. City of Horn Lake, 160 So. 3d 671, 681 (Miss. 2015). 9 “ministerial,” this Court began to presume that the alleged violation of that regulation or ordinance, itself, established a viable cause of action without even questioning if a claim would exist without the regulation. ¶19.

2016The proponents of the Brantley test have yet to justify why such a break with precedent was warranted or necessary, notwithstanding Chief Justice Waller’s arguments to the contrary. [E]ven where this Court determines a prior interpretation of a statute to be incorrect, “we will nevertheless continue to apply the previous interpretation, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, upon finding the Legislature amended or reenacted the statute without correcting the prior interpretation.” Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So. 2d 142, 154 (Miss. 2008) (holding that stare decisis required adherence to a judic

2016The proponents of the Brantley test have yet to justify why such a break with precedent was warranted or necessary, notwithstanding Chief Justice Waller’s arguments to the contrary. [E]ven where this Court determines a prior interpretation of a statute to be incorrect, “we will nevertheless continue to apply' the previous interpretation, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, upon finding the Legislature amended or reenacted the statute without correcting the prior interpretation.” Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So.2d 142, 154 (Miss. 2008) (holding that stare decisis required adherence to a judic

2016See Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville, 158 So. 3d 1106, 1115-17 (Waller, C.J., dissenting).

2016See Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville, 158 So. 3d 1106, 1115-17 (Waller, C.J., dissenting).

2016And when the Brantley test was applied in City of Magee v. Jones, 161 So. 3d 1047 (Miss. 2015), Justice Pierce criticized the majority for “fail[ing] to appreciate the purpose” of discretionary- function immunity is “to limit judicial ‘second-guessing’ of the state Legislature.” City of Magee, 161 So. 3d at 1052 (Pierce, J., dissenting).

2016And when the Brantley test was applied in City of Magee v. Jones, 161 So. 3d 1047 (Miss. 2015), Justice Pierce criticized the majority for “fail[ing] to appreciate the purpose” of discretionary- function immunity is “to limit judicial ‘second-guessing’ of the state Legislature.” City of Magee, 161 So. 3d at 1052 (Pierce, J., dissenting).