makes inquiry in Montana

2013No particular sort of questioning or inquiry is required before a trial court allows a defendant to represent himself or herself, so long as the court is satisfied that the defendant is “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that ... ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ’’State v. Langford, 267 Mont. 95, 99 , 882 P.2d 490, 492 (1994), quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S. Ct. at 2541 . ‘In applying the Faretta standard, we have repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant specifically of the dangers and di

2013No particular sort of questioning or inquiry is required before a trial court allows a defendant to represent himself or herself, so long as the court is satisfied that the defendant is “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that ... ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ’’State v. Langford, 267 Mont. 95, 99 , 882 P.2d 490, 492 (1994), quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S. Ct. at 2541 . ‘In applying the Faretta standard, we have repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant specifically of the dangers and di

2017See State v. Insua, 2004 MT 14, ¶ 19 , 319 Mont. 254 , 84 P.3d 11 (“[i]n applying the Faretta standard, we have repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant specifically of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation as long as the court makes inquiry of the defendant to the extent it deems necessary to ensure *364 that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”). 5 While we have cautioned about the use of Gillham proceedings outside of the postconviction context, State v. Cheetham, 2016 MT 151, ¶ 29 , 384 Mont. 1 , 373 P.3d

2017See State v. Insua, 2004 MT 14, ¶ 19 , 319 Mont. 254 , 84 P.3d 11 (“[i]n applying the Faretta standard, we have repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant specifically of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation as long as the court makes inquiry of the defendant to the extent it deems necessary to ensure *364 that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”). 5 While we have cautioned about the use of Gillham proceedings outside of the postconviction context, State v. Cheetham, 2016 MT 151, ¶ 29 , 384 Mont. 1 , 373 P.3d

2017See State v. Insua, 2004 MT 14, ¶ 19 , 319 Mont. 254 , 84 P.3d 11 (“[i]n applying the Faretta standard, we have repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant specifically of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation as long as the court makes inquiry of the defendant to the extent it deems necessary to ensure *364 that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”). 5 While we have cautioned about the use of Gillham proceedings outside of the postconviction context, State v. Cheetham, 2016 MT 151, ¶ 29 , 384 Mont. 1 , 373 P.3d

2017See State v. Insua, 2004 MT 14, ¶ 19 , 319 Mont. 254 , 84 P.3d 11 (“[i]n applying the Faretta standard, we have repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant specifically of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation as long as the court makes inquiry of the defendant to the extent it deems necessary to ensure *364 that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”). 5 While we have cautioned about the use of Gillham proceedings outside of the postconviction context, State v. Cheetham, 2016 MT 151, ¶ 29 , 384 Mont. 1 , 373 P.3d

2017See State v. Insua, 2004 MT 14, ¶ 19 , 319 Mont. 254 , 84 P.3d 11 (“[i]n applying the Faretta standard, we have repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant specifically of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation as long as the court makes inquiry of the defendant to the extent it deems necessary to ensure *364 that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”). 5 While we have cautioned about the use of Gillham proceedings outside of the postconviction context, State v. Cheetham, 2016 MT 151, ¶ 29 , 384 Mont. 1 , 373 P.3d

2017See State v. Insua, 2004 MT 14, ¶ 19 , 319 Mont. 254 , 84 P.3d 11 (“[i]n applying the Faretta standard, we have repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant specifically of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation as long as the court makes inquiry of the defendant to the extent it deems necessary to ensure *364 that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”). 5 While we have cautioned about the use of Gillham proceedings outside of the postconviction context, State v. Cheetham, 2016 MT 151, ¶ 29 , 384 Mont. 1 , 373 P.3d

2015See Renner v. Nemitz, 2001 MT 202, ¶ 28 , 306 Mont. 292 , 33 P.3d 255 (“When the trial court makes an error, but sufficient facts are otherwise established by independent evidence and substantial justice has been done such that the error is harmless, this Court will not disturb the ruling of the lower court.”) (citations omitted).

2015See Renner v. Nemitz, 2001 MT 202, ¶ 28 , 306 Mont. 292 , 33 P.3d 255 (“When the trial court makes an error, but sufficient facts are otherwise established by independent evidence and substantial justice has been done such that the error is harmless, this Court will not disturb the ruling of the lower court.”) (citations omitted).

2013United States v. Gerritsen, 571 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009).

2013United States v. Gerritsen, 571 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009).

2004State v. Markuson, 2003 MT 206, ¶ 13 , 317 Mont. 43, ¶ 13 , 75 P.3d 298, ¶ 13 ; see also, Colt, 255 Mont. at 404 , 843 P.2d at 747 ; State v. Woods (1997), 283 Mont. 359, 375 , 942 P.2d 88, 97 ; State v. Langford (1994), 267 Mont. 95, 99 , 882 P.2d 490, 492 . ¶20 Our test, instead of merely requiring a court to recite a litany of dangers about self-representation that may or may not inform a *261 defendant about all relevant concerns, requires that a court receive sufficient evidence to support a finding that a defendant’s decision to waive the right to counsel and exercise his right to repres

2004State v. Markuson, 2003 MT 206, ¶ 13 , 317 Mont. 43, ¶ 13 , 75 P.3d 298, ¶ 13 ; see also, Colt, 255 Mont. at 404 , 843 P.2d at 747 ; State v. Woods (1997), 283 Mont. 359, 375 , 942 P.2d 88, 97 ; State v. Langford (1994), 267 Mont. 95, 99 , 882 P.2d 490, 492 . ¶20 Our test, instead of merely requiring a court to recite a litany of dangers about self-representation that may or may not inform a *261 defendant about all relevant concerns, requires that a court receive sufficient evidence to support a finding that a defendant’s decision to waive the right to counsel and exercise his right to repres

2002Rule 14, M.R.App.P.; Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P.; Thiel v. Johnson (1985), 219 Mont. 271, 277 , 711 P.2d 829, 833 (awarding tort damages instead of contract damages harmless because amount would have been the same); Farmers State Bank v. Imperial Cattle Co. (1985), 218 Mont. 89, 96 , 708 P.2d 223, 227 (slight variation in damages from proof at trial is harmless).

2002Rule 14, M.R.App.P.; Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P.; Thiel v. Johnson (1985), 219 Mont. 271, 277 , 711 P.2d 829, 833 (awarding tort damages instead of contract damages harmless because amount would have been the same); Farmers State Bank v. Imperial Cattle Co. (1985), 218 Mont. 89, 96 , 708 P.2d 223, 227 (slight variation in damages from proof at trial is harmless).

2002Rule 14, M.R.App.P.; Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P.; Thiel v. Johnson (1985), 219 Mont. 271, 277 , 711 P.2d 829, 833 (awarding tort damages instead of contract damages harmless because amount would have been the same); Farmers State Bank v. Imperial Cattle Co. (1985), 218 Mont. 89, 96 , 708 P.2d 223, 227 (slight variation in damages from proof at trial is harmless).

2002Rule 14, M.R.App.P.; Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P.; Thiel v. Johnson (1985), 219 Mont. 271, 277 , 711 P.2d 829, 833 (awarding tort damages instead of contract damages harmless because amount would have been the same); Farmers State Bank v. Imperial Cattle Co. (1985), 218 Mont. 89, 96 , 708 P.2d 223, 227 (slight variation in damages from proof at trial is harmless).