approach would entail analysis in New Jersey

2013In Davis, supra, the Court noted that [s]uch an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed. [ 68 N.J. at 81 , 342 A.2d 841 .] In Diaz, supra, the Court addressed the issue of “whether a conviction for possession of a firearm for

2013In Davis, supra, the Court noted that [s]uch an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed. [ 68 N.J. at 81 , 342 A.2d 841 .] In Diaz, supra, the Court addressed the issue of “whether a conviction for possession of a firearm for

2013In Davis, supra, the Court noted that [s]uch an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed. [ 68 N.J. at 81 , 342 A.2d 841 .] In Diaz, supra, the Court addressed the issue of “whether a conviction for possession of a firearm for

2013In Davis, supra, the Court noted that [s]uch an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed. [ 68 N.J. at 81 , 342 A.2d 841 .] In Diaz, supra, the Court addressed the issue of “whether a conviction for possession of a firearm for

1996Such an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed. [ State v. Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 81 , 342 A. 2d 841 .] See, also, State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 518-522 , 480 A. 2d 912 (1984).

1996Such an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed. [ State v. Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 81 , 342 A. 2d 841 .] See, also, State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 518-522 , 480 A. 2d 912 (1984).

1984This represents a more mechanical approach to merger than the flexible course formulated in State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69 (1975), and followed thereafter, see, e.g., State v. Mirault, supra, 92 N.J. 492 ; State v. Best, supra, 70 N.J. 56 : Such an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; a

1984This represents a more mechanical approach to merger than the flexible course formulated in State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69 (1975), and followed thereafter, see, e.g., State v. Mirault, supra, 92 N.J. 492 ; State v. Best, supra, 70 N.J. 56 : Such an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; a

1986Certainly there are other factors to be considered and, along with the above, accorded greater or lesser weight depending on the circumstances of the particular case. [ Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 81 ]. *568 See also, State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 518-522 (1984); State v. Mirault, 92 N.J. 492, 501-504 (1983); Best, supra, 70 N.J. at 61-63.

1984This represents a more mechanical approach to merger than the flexible course formulated in State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69 (1975), and followed thereafter, see, e.g., State v. Mirault, supra, 92 N.J. 492 ; State v. Best, supra, 70 N.J. 56 : Such an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; a

2005State v. Davis [, 68 N.J. 69, 81 , 342 A.2d 841, 847 (1975)],” must be tempered by the injunction that, particularly in its application to felony murder, “when there is sufficient evidence to support two or more alternative felony theories, a jury need not designate which felony theory it relies on to convict one of felony murder so long as there is sufficient evidence to sustain each felony” and “jurors need not always be unanimous on the theory of guilt, provided they are unanimous in the finding of guilt of the offense charged.” State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 562 , 662 A.2d 333, 352 (1995)

2005State v. Davis [, 68 N.J. 69, 81 , 342 A.2d 841, 847 (1975)],” must be tempered by the injunction that, particularly in its application to felony murder, “when there is sufficient evidence to support two or more alternative felony theories, a jury need not designate which felony theory it relies on to convict one of felony murder so long as there is sufficient evidence to sustain each felony” and “jurors need not always be unanimous on the theory of guilt, provided they are unanimous in the finding of guilt of the offense charged.” State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 562 , 662 A.2d 333, 352 (1995)