weather immunity in New Jersey

2021Defendants claim that "[b]ecause it is undisputed that this accident occurred on a street and that weather was the sole cause, the trial court correctly found that weather immunity applies." A-4742-18 11 In our view, the parties' dispute over whether the Act's weather immunity provision is available to public employees in auto negligence cases is best understood in the context of Justice Clifford's characteristically terse and cogent concurrence in Pico v. State, 116 N.J. 55 (1989), the case relied on by the trial judge.

2009This Court held that the weather immunity provision trumped plaintiff’s claim predicated on ordinary negligence, but “even if the weather immunity did not apply, plaintiffs claim should have been evaluated not by the standard of ordinary negligence, ... but by the standard of palpably unreasonable conduct of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.” Id. at 63 , 560 A.2d 1193 .

1992In speaking of the weather immunity in Horan v. State, 212 N.J.Super. 132 , 514 A.2d 78 (App.Div.1986), Judge Fritz concluded his opinion with this simple yet precise summary: “[W]hen weather is the true culprit, government is immune.” Id. at 136 , 514 A.2d 78 .

1992In speaking of the weather immunity in Horan v. State, 212 N.J.Super. 132 , 514 A.2d 78 (App.Div.1986), Judge Fritz concluded his opinion with this simple yet precise summary: “[W]hen weather is the true culprit, government is immune.” Id. at 136 , 514 A.2d 78 .

1993In Bligen, the Supreme Court held “that the weather immunity does not apply [in a case involving a municipal housing authority] because the accident did not occur on a ‘street’ or ‘highway’ pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:4-7.” Id. at 137, 619 A.2d 575 .

1993Furthermore, JCHA's own site plan refers to the area in question several times as a "driveway." Although Justice O'Hern's dissenting opinion states that "the access drives and parking areas of every public building and every public park, of every municipality, and of every public authority would lose the weather immunity" ( post at 140, 619 A. 2d at 583 ), that conclusion is unwarranted.

1993The common law imposed the same duty on public housing authorities as it did on private property owners, namely, “[tjhe obligation to exercise reasonable care in making the premises safe for its occupants.” 249 N.J.Super. at 443 , 592 A.2d 623 .

1993The common law imposed the same duty on public housing authorities as it did on private property owners, namely, “[tjhe obligation to exercise reasonable care in making the premises safe for its occupants.” 249 N.J.Super. at 443 , 592 A.2d 623 .

1993Concerning the PBA's contention that the discretionary immunity provided to employees by section 3-2a applies, we note first our decision in Costa, supra, 83 N.J. at 54-55 , 415 A. 2d 337 , limiting such immunity to discretion exercised at the highest levels of government in matters of policy or planning.

1993Concerning the PBA's contention that the discretionary immunity provided to employees by section 3-2a applies, we note first our decision in Costa, supra, 83 N.J. at 54-55 , 415 A. 2d 337 , limiting such immunity to discretion exercised at the highest levels of government in matters of policy or planning.

1988Dept., 190 N.J.Super. 11 (App.Div.1983), certif. den. 96 N.J. 258 (1983), that, although snow removal need not be undertaken because of the weather immunity, if it is undertaken liability may attach for negligence in the performance of a ministerial duty.

1988Dept., 190 N.J.Super. 11 (App.Div.1983), certif. den. 96 N.J. 258 (1983), that, although snow removal need not be undertaken because of the weather immunity, if it is undertaken liability may attach for negligence in the performance of a ministerial duty.