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10 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Similarly, in Scott v. State, 265 N.J.Super. 591 , 628 A.2d 379 (App.Div.1993), likening the situation to one involving a Woolley claim, we determined that the State had bound itself to the terms of an indemnity program for foster parents described in a DYFS brochure, which terms the plaintiff had accepted by commencing or continuing her duties as a foster parent. 1997Similarly, in Scott v. State, 265 N.J.Super. 591 , 628 A.2d 379 (App.Div.1993), likening the situation to one involving a Woolley claim, we determined that the State had bound itself to the terms of an indemnity program for foster parents described in a DYFS brochure, which terms the plaintiff had accepted by commencing or continuing her duties as a foster parent. | 1 | 2 |
Wade v. Kessler Institutegreen2 sentences2004See Wade v. Kessler Institute, supra, 172 N.J. at 342-46 , 798 A. 2d 1251 (involving Woolley claim and alleged breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 2004See Wade v. Kessler Institute, supra, 172 N.J. at 342-46 , 798 A. 2d 1251 (involving Woolley claim and alleged breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing). | 1 | 1 |
House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.green2 sentences1994The court reasoned *395 that although the company’s policies did not “expressly declare that employees will be fired only for just cause,” such a contract was created because of the existence of several Woolley factors: the handbook was widely distributed; employees were required to read and sign employee handbook “acknowledgement form”; the manual contained a four-step progressive-discipline procedure and enumerated “types of prohibited conduct”; and the handbook made various representations of “maximum job security.” Ibid.; see House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 42, 55 , 556 A.2d 1994The court reasoned *395 that although the company’s policies did not “expressly declare that employees will be fired only for just cause,” such a contract was created because of the existence of several Woolley factors: the handbook was widely distributed; employees were required to read and sign employee handbook “acknowledgement form”; the manual contained a four-step progressive-discipline procedure and enumerated “types of prohibited conduct”; and the handbook made various representations of “maximum job security.” Ibid.; see House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 42, 55 , 556 A.2d | 1 | 1 |
Schwartz v. Leasametric, Inc.green2 sentences1994The court reasoned *395 that although the company’s policies did not “expressly declare that employees will be fired only for just cause,” such a contract was created because of the existence of several Woolley factors: the handbook was widely distributed; employees were required to read and sign employee handbook “acknowledgement form”; the manual contained a four-step progressive-discipline procedure and enumerated “types of prohibited conduct”; and the handbook made various representations of “maximum job security.” Ibid.; see House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 42, 55 , 556 A.2d 1994The court reasoned *395 that although the company’s policies did not “expressly declare that employees will be fired only for just cause,” such a contract was created because of the existence of several Woolley factors: the handbook was widely distributed; employees were required to read and sign employee handbook “acknowledgement form”; the manual contained a four-step progressive-discipline procedure and enumerated “types of prohibited conduct”; and the handbook made various representations of “maximum job security.” Ibid.; see House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 42, 55 , 556 A.2d | 1 | 1 |
Moses Radwan v. Beecham Laboratories, a Division of Beecham, Incgreen1 sentence1994The court reasoned *395 that although the company’s policies did not “expressly declare that employees will be fired only for just cause,” such a contract was created because of the existence of several Woolley factors: the handbook was widely distributed; employees were required to read and sign employee handbook “acknowledgement form”; the manual contained a four-step progressive-discipline procedure and enumerated “types of prohibited conduct”; and the handbook made various representations of “maximum job security.” Ibid.; see House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 42, 55 , 556 A.2d | 1 | 1 |
House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.green2 sentences1994The court reasoned *395 that although the company’s policies did not “expressly declare that employees will be fired only for just cause,” such a contract was created because of the existence of several Woolley factors: the handbook was widely distributed; employees were required to read and sign employee handbook “acknowledgement form”; the manual contained a four-step progressive-discipline procedure and enumerated “types of prohibited conduct”; and the handbook made various representations of “maximum job security.” Ibid.; see House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 42, 55 , 556 A.2d 1994The court reasoned *395 that although the company’s policies did not “expressly declare that employees will be fired only for just cause,” such a contract was created because of the existence of several Woolley factors: the handbook was widely distributed; employees were required to read and sign employee handbook “acknowledgement form”; the manual contained a four-step progressive-discipline procedure and enumerated “types of prohibited conduct”; and the handbook made various representations of “maximum job security.” Ibid.; see House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 42, 55 , 556 A.2d | 1 | 1 |
Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jetsgreen1 sentence1994See Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F.Supp. 940, 953 (D.N.J.1991) (noting that Woolley claim cannot rely on only portion of manual without being held accountable for all manual provisions: “Woolley stands for the proposition that a binding contract can be implied from provisions contained in an employee handbook. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000This lawsuit has been filed by the administratrix for the Estate of Michael Malone (Malone died of causes unrelated to this litigation), alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, asserting a Woolley claim under Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 99 N.J. 284 , 491 A. 2d 1257 , as modified, 101 N.J. 10 , 499 A. 2d 515 (1985), and claiming wrongful retaliation in violation of the workers' compensation law. 2000This lawsuit has been filed by the administratrix for the Estate of Michael Malone (Malone died of causes unrelated to this litigation), alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, asserting a Woolley claim under Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 99 N.J. 284 , 491 A. 2d 1257 , as modified, 101 N.J. 10 , 499 A. 2d 515 (1985), and claiming wrongful retaliation in violation of the workers' compensation law. | 4 | 1988–2000 |
Walsh v. STATE, DEPT. OF PUBLIC ADVOCATE
green
2 sentences1998In so contending, defendants rely on Walsh v. State, 147 N.J. 595 , 689 A.2d 131 (1997), rev’g on Judge Skillman’s dissent, 290 N.J.Super. 1, 13 , 674 A.2d 988 (App.Div.1996). 1998In so contending, defendants rely on Walsh v. State, 147 N.J. 595 , 689 A.2d 131 (1997), rev’g on Judge Skillman’s dissent, 290 N.J.Super. 1, 13 , 674 A.2d 988 (App.Div.1996). | 2 | 1997–1998 |
State v. McMeekin
green
2 sentences2000This lawsuit has been filed by the administratrix for the Estate of Michael Malone (Malone died of causes unrelated to this litigation), alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, asserting a Woolley claim under Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 99 N.J. 284 , 491 A. 2d 1257 , as modified, 101 N.J. 10 , 499 A. 2d 515 (1985), and claiming wrongful retaliation in violation of the workers' compensation law. 2000This lawsuit has been filed by the administratrix for the Estate of Michael Malone (Malone died of causes unrelated to this litigation), alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, asserting a Woolley claim under Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 99 N.J. 284 , 491 A. 2d 1257 , as modified, 101 N.J. 10 , 499 A. 2d 515 (1985), and claiming wrongful retaliation in violation of the workers' compensation law. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000This lawsuit has been filed by the administratrix for the Estate of Michael Malone (Malone died of causes unrelated to this litigation), alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, asserting a Woolley claim under Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 99 N.J. 284 , 491 A. 2d 1257 , as modified, 101 N.J. 10 , 499 A. 2d 515 (1985), and claiming wrongful retaliation in violation of the workers' compensation law. 2000This lawsuit has been filed by the administratrix for the Estate of Michael Malone (Malone died of causes unrelated to this litigation), alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, asserting a Woolley claim under Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 99 N.J. 284 , 491 A. 2d 1257 , as modified, 101 N.J. 10 , 499 A. 2d 515 (1985), and claiming wrongful retaliation in violation of the workers' compensation law. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Walsh v. State
green
2 sentences1998In so contending, defendants rely on Walsh v. State, 147 N.J. 595 , 689 A.2d 131 (1997), rev’g on Judge Skillman’s dissent, 290 N.J.Super. 1, 13 , 674 A.2d 988 (App.Div.1996). 1998In so contending, defendants rely on Walsh v. State, 147 N.J. 595 , 689 A.2d 131 (1997), rev’g on Judge Skillman’s dissent, 290 N.J.Super. 1, 13 , 674 A.2d 988 (App.Div.1996). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Korostynski v. GAMING ENFORCEMENT
green
2 sentences1998See, e.g., Scott v. State, 265 N.J.Super. 591, 596 , 628 A.2d 379 (App.Div.1993); Korostynski v. State, Div. of Gaming Enforcement, 266 N.J.Super. 549 , 630 A.2d 342 (App.Div. 1993). 1998See, e.g., Scott v. State, 265 N.J.Super. 591, 596 , 628 A.2d 379 (App.Div.1993); Korostynski v. State, Div. of Gaming Enforcement, 266 N.J.Super. 549 , 630 A.2d 342 (App.Div. 1993). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino
green
2 sentences1994The Appellate Division, in Preston, supra, 231 N.J.Super. at 81 , 555 A.2d 12 , addressed the Woolley requirement for an “appropriate statement” that disclaims the binding effect of the terms and conditions set forth in an employment manual. 1994The Appellate Division, in Preston, supra, 231 N.J.Super. at 81 , 555 A.2d 12 , addressed the Woolley requirement for an “appropriate statement” that disclaims the binding effect of the terms and conditions set forth in an employment manual. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Kane v. Milikowsky
green
2 sentences1994The court reasoned *395 that although the company’s policies did not “expressly declare that employees will be fired only for just cause,” such a contract was created because of the existence of several Woolley factors: the handbook was widely distributed; employees were required to read and sign employee handbook “acknowledgement form”; the manual contained a four-step progressive-discipline procedure and enumerated “types of prohibited conduct”; and the handbook made various representations of “maximum job security.” Ibid.; see House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 42, 55 , 556 A.2d 1994The court reasoned *395 that although the company’s policies did not “expressly declare that employees will be fired only for just cause,” such a contract was created because of the existence of several Woolley factors: the handbook was widely distributed; employees were required to read and sign employee handbook “acknowledgement form”; the manual contained a four-step progressive-discipline procedure and enumerated “types of prohibited conduct”; and the handbook made various representations of “maximum job security.” Ibid.; see House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J.Super. 42, 55 , 556 A.2d | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
green
2 sentences1992When an employer chooses to establish personnel policies and practices, and makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship is "presumably enhanced." Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613 , 292 N.W. 2d at 892 . 1992When an employer chooses to establish personnel policies and practices, and makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship is "presumably enhanced." Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613 , 292 N.W. 2d at 892 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital
green
1 sentence1990The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ Woolley claims because “the operative facts giving rise to plaintiffs’ complaint[s] occurred sometime before the Woolley holding,” and Woolley should not be given “retroactive application,” citing Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 644 F.Supp. 1033 (D.N.J.1986). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Anthony v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
green
2 sentences1988In addition, the Woolley analysis replicated in detail an approach enunciated years earlier by the court in Anthony v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. 1988In addition, the Woolley analysis replicated in detail an approach enunciated years earlier by the court in Anthony v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Berry v. American Federal Savings
green
2 sentences1988Therefore, applying established principles of Fidelity Federal, supra, the court is satisfied that the Woolley doctrine does not conflict with 12 C.F.R. § 563.39 and is not preempted. 1988Therefore, applying established principles of Fidelity Federal, supra, the court is satisfied that the Woolley doctrine does not conflict with 12 C.F.R. § 563.39 and is not preempted. | 1 | 1988–1988 |