action falls within exception in New York

2025Here, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that this action was commenced beyond the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations for the causes of action alleging violations of General Business Law § 349 ( see CPLR 214[2]; Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc. , 18 NY3d 777, 789 ; Bennett v State Farm Fire & Cas.

2024When a loan is payable in installments, there are separate causes of action for each installment accrued, and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date each installment becomes due and is defaulted upon, unless the debt is accelerated ( see Morrison v Zaglool , 88 AD3d 856, 858 ; Sce v Ach , 56 AD3d 457 , 458).

2024Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that so much of the complaint as sought an accounting and to recover damages for breach of the partnership agreement as was based on the development and sale of the four subject properties was untimely through submission of his affidavit, which demonstrated that the parties entered into separate partnership agreements for each of the four subject properties, which dissolved more than six years prior to the commencement of this action ( see Partnership Law § 74; CPLR 213[1]; Gelman v Buehler , 20 NY3d 534, 537 ; Mashihi v 166-25 Hillside Partners ,

2024Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that so much of the complaint as sought an accounting and to recover damages for breach of the partnership agreement as was based on the development and sale of the four subject properties was untimely through submission of his affidavit, which demonstrated that the parties entered into separate partnership agreements for each of the four subject properties, which dissolved more than six years prior to the commencement of this action ( see Partnership Law § 74; CPLR 213[1]; Gelman v Buehler , 20 NY3d 534, 537 ; Mashihi v 166-25 Hillside Partners ,

2018Here, although Arthur met her prima facie burden of showing that the action was commenced more than 2½ years after her last consultation with the plaintiff ( see id. at 973 ; Udell v Naghavi , 82 AD3d 960, 962 ), the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the time from which the statute of limitations started to run to the date when the plaintiff's continuous course of postoperative care and treatment at the Practice ended.

2018The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the action falls within an exception to the statute of limitations or whether the continuous treatment doctrine applies to toll the statute of limitations ( see Schwelnus v Urological Assoc. of L.I., P.C. , 94 AD3d 971, 973 ).

2018Here, although Arthur met her prima facie burden of showing that the action was commenced more than 2½ years after her last consultation with the plaintiff ( see id. at 973 ; Udell v Naghavi , 82 AD3d 960, 962 ), the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the time from which the statute of limitations started to run to the date when the plaintiff's continuous course of postoperative care and treatment at the Practice ended.

1993In this Court, plaintiff argues additionally that the Appellate Division erred in rejecting her argument pertaining to General Municipal Law § 205-e. However, because the General Municipal Law § 205-e theory was not submitted to the jury for its consideration and was thus unpreserved, that theory is not available to plaintiff in this Court as a basis for reversal ( see , Lichtman v Grossbard , 73 N.Y.2d 792, 794-795 ; Gordon v American Museum of Natural History , 67 N.Y.2d 836, 837 , n).

1993In this Court, plaintiff argues additionally that the Appellate Division erred in rejecting her argument pertaining to General Municipal Law § 205-e. However, because the General Municipal Law § 205-e theory was not submitted to the jury for its consideration and was thus unpreserved, that theory is not available to plaintiff in this Court as a basis for reversal (see, Lichtman v Grossbard, 73 NY2d 792, 794-795 ; Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 , n).

1993In this Court, plaintiff argues additionally that the Appellate Division erred in rejecting her argument pertaining to General Municipal Law § 205-e. However, because the General Municipal Law § 205-e theory was not submitted to the jury for its consideration and was thus unpreserved, that theory is not available to plaintiff in this Court as a basis for reversal ( see , Lichtman v Grossbard , 73 N.Y.2d 792, 794-795 ; Gordon v American Museum of Natural History , 67 N.Y.2d 836, 837 , n).

1993In this Court, plaintiff argues additionally that the Appellate Division erred in rejecting her argument pertaining to General Municipal Law § 205-e. However, because the General Municipal Law § 205-e theory was not submitted to the jury for its consideration and was thus unpreserved, that theory is not available to plaintiff in this Court as a basis for reversal (see, Lichtman v Grossbard, 73 NY2d 792, 794-795 ; Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 , n).