defendant seeks challenge in New York

2018When a defendant seeks to challenge his guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel under the federal standard, he must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him ( see Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668, 687 [1984]).

2018When a defendant seeks to challenge his guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel under the federal standard, he must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him ( see Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668, 687 [1984]).

2018The first prong of the Strickland test requires a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ( see Strickland , 466 US at 687-688 ).The second prong, also known as the prejudice prong, "focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process" ( Hill v Lockhart , 474 US 52, 59 [1985]).

2018The first prong of the Strickland test requires a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ( see Strickland , 466 US at 687-688 ).The second prong, also known as the prejudice prong, "focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process" ( Hill v Lockhart , 474 US 52, 59 [1985]).

2020In all eight of these cases, the defendant’s written waiver included the right to challenge the sentence imposed—in six of the eight, the oral colloquy reinforced this specific waiver (see Thomas, 34 NY3d at 583 [Garcia, J., dissenting] [pointing out that defendant Green’s specific acknowledgment of his waiver of right to raise excessive sentence issue on appeal was not enough to prevent reversal and remand to Appellate Division for consideration of whether sentence was excessive]; see also Barrales, 179 AD3d at 1314 ).

2017When a defendant seeks to challenge his or her guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel under the United States Constitution, he or she must meet the two-part standard set forth in Strickland v Washington ( 466 US 668, 688 [1984]; see People v McDonald, 1 NY3d 109, 113 [2003]; People v Picca, 97 AD3d 170 [2012]).

2014We have exercised our power of review in the following instances: where the defendant challenges the lower courts’ denial of his CPL 440.10 motion seeking a hearing on his claim that the judgment was procured by fraud, duress or misrepresentation (see CPL 440.10 [1] [b]; People v Friedgood, 58 NY2d 467, 470 [1983]); where the defendant seeks a hearing claiming that material evidence adduced at trial resulting in the judgment was false (see CPL 440.10 [1] [c]; People v Brown, 56 NY2d 242, 246 [1982], rearg denied 57 NY2d 673 [1982]); where the defendant claims that improper and prejudicial cond

2014We have exercised our power of review in the following instances: where the defendant challenges the lower courts' denial of his CPL 440.10 motion seeking a hearing on his claim that the judgment was procured by fraud, duress or misrepresentation (see CPL 440.10 [1] [b]; People v Friedgood, 58 NY2d 467, 470 [1983]); where the defendant seeks a hearing claiming that material evidence adduced - 6 - - 7 - No. 219 at trial resulting in the judgment was false (see CPL 440.10 [1] [c]; People v Brown, 56 NY2d 242, 246 [1982], rearg denied 57 NY2d 673 [1982]); where the defendant claims that improper

2014We have exercised our power of review in the following instances: where the defendant challenges the lower courts’ denial of his CPL 440.10 motion seeking a hearing on his claim that the judgment was procured by fraud, duress or misrepresentation (see CPL 440.10 [1] [b]; People v Friedgood, 58 NY2d 467, 470 [1983]); where the defendant seeks a hearing claiming that material evidence adduced at trial resulting in the judgment was false (see CPL 440.10 [1] [c]; People v Brown, 56 NY2d 242, 246 [1982], rearg denied 57 NY2d 673 [1982]); where the defendant claims that improper and prejudicial cond

2014We have exercised our power of review in the following instances: where the defendant challenges the lower courts' denial of his CPL 440.10 motion seeking a hearing on his claim that the judgment was procured by fraud, duress or misrepresentation (see CPL 440.10 [1] [b]; People v Friedgood, 58 NY2d 467, 470 [1983]); where the defendant seeks a hearing claiming that material evidence adduced - 6 - - 7 - No. 219 at trial resulting in the judgment was false (see CPL 440.10 [1] [c]; People v Brown, 56 NY2d 242, 246 [1982], rearg denied 57 NY2d 673 [1982]); where the defendant claims that improper

2014We have exercised our power of review in the following instances: where the defendant challenges the lower courts’ denial of his CPL 440.10 motion seeking a hearing on his claim that the judgment was procured by fraud, duress or misrepresentation (see CPL 440.10 [1] [b]; People v Friedgood, 58 NY2d 467, 470 [1983]); where the defendant seeks a hearing claiming that material evidence adduced at trial resulting in the judgment was false (see CPL 440.10 [1] [c]; People v Brown, 56 NY2d 242, 246 [1982], rearg denied 57 NY2d 673 [1982]); where the defendant claims that improper and prejudicial cond

2014We have exercised our power of review in the following instances: where the defendant challenges the lower courts' denial of his CPL 440.10 motion seeking a hearing on his claim that the judgment was procured by fraud, duress or misrepresentation (see CPL 440.10 [1] [b]; People v Friedgood, 58 NY2d 467, 470 [1983]); where the defendant seeks a hearing claiming that material evidence adduced - 6 - - 7 - No. 219 at trial resulting in the judgment was false (see CPL 440.10 [1] [c]; People v Brown, 56 NY2d 242, 246 [1982], rearg denied 57 NY2d 673 [1982]); where the defendant claims that improper

2010Although the defendant’s cross-appeal must be dismissed on the ground that it is not aggrieved by the order vacating its default, the contentions raised by the defendant can be considered as alternative grounds for affirmance (see Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 545-546 [1983]; Matter of Allstate Ins.