intelligible principle in New York

1975Corp., 281 NY 187, 194 ; Matter of Small v Moss, 279 NY 288, 295, 298-299 ; Panama Refining Co. v Ryan, 293 US 388 ; see, also, 1 Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication [1942], p 294.) That does not, however, mean that a precise or specific formula must be furnished in a field 'where flexibility and the adaptation of the [legislative] policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program.’ (Lichter v United States, 334 US 742, 785 .) It is enough if the Legislature lays down 'an intelligible principle’, specifying the standards or guides in as detailed a fashion as is r

1968Corp., 281 N. Y. 187, 194 ; Matter of Small v. Moss, 279 N. Y. 288, 295, 298-299 ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 ; see, also, 1 Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication [1942], p. 294.) That does not, however, mean that a precise or specific formula must he furnished in a field ‘ where flexibility and the adaptation of the [legislative] policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program. ’ (Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 785 .) It is enough if the Legislature lays down ‘ an intelligible principle ’, specifying the standards or guides in as detail

1975Corp., 281 NY 187, 194 ; Matter of Small v Moss, 279 NY 288, 295, 298-299 ; Panama Refining Co. v Ryan, 293 US 388 ; see, also, 1 Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication [1942], p 294.) That does not, however, mean that a precise or specific formula must be furnished in a field 'where flexibility and the adaptation of the [legislative] policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program.’ (Lichter v United States, 334 US 742, 785 .) It is enough if the Legislature lays down 'an intelligible principle’, specifying the standards or guides in as detailed a fashion as is r

1968Corp., 281 N. Y. 187, 194 ; Matter of Small v. Moss, 279 N. Y. 288, 295, 298-299 ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 ; see, also, 1 Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication [1942], p. 294.) That does not, however, mean that a precise or specific formula must he furnished in a field ‘ where flexibility and the adaptation of the [legislative] policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program. ’ (Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 785 .) It is enough if the Legislature lays down ‘ an intelligible principle ’, specifying the standards or guides in as detail

1980While the plaintiff correctly sets forth the general principle enunciated in City of Utica (supra, p 168 ) that "[t]he Legislature may constitutionally confer discretion upon an administrative agency only if it limits the field in which that discretion is to operate and provides standards to govern its exercise”, it omits the two sentences immediately following, to wit: "That does not, however, mean that a precise or specific formula must be furnished in a field 'where flexibility and the adaptation of the [legislative] policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the pro

1980(Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510, 516 .) The court then went on to cite numerous cases, both Federal and New York, where statutory standards, such as "public interest, convenience, or necessity”, "public peace, safety and good order”, "public health, safety and general welfare”, were upheld as being sufficiently specific and clear.

1973(See Grimm v. City of New York, 56 Misc 2d 525 , supra; Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N Y 2d 164; Martin v. State Liq.

1973It is a peculiarly legislative power to define and declare crimes and public offenses but the Legislature may delegate the power to make reasonable rules and regulations to an administrator or administrative agency (People v. Grant, 242 App. Div. 310 ).

1968(See Lichter v. United States, supra, 334 U. S. 742, 785 ; American Power Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U. S. 90, 105 ; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 496 ; Texas Co. v. Montgomery [U. S. Dist.

1968(See Lichter v. United States, supra, 334 U. S. 742, 785 ; American Power Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U. S. 90, 105 ; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 496 ; Texas Co. v. Montgomery [U. S. Dist.

1968(People v. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121 .) ” Another good statement of the general rule as to the right of a legislative body to confer discretion is contained in Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd. (5 N Y 2d 164, 168-169): “ The Legislature may constitutionally confer discretion upon an administrative agency only if it limits the field in which that discretion is to operate and provides standards to govern its exercise. [Citations.] That does not, however, mean that a precise or specific formula must he furnished in a field ‘ where flexibility and the adaptation of the

1961The ordinance lays down ‘ ‘ an intelligible principle ” (Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N Y 2d 164, 169 ; see Matter of Marburg v. Cole, 286 N. Y. 202, 211-212 ; and Matter of Aloe v. Dassler, 278 App. Div. 975 , affd. 303 N. Y. 878 ).

1961The ordinance lays down ‘ ‘ an intelligible principle ” (Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N Y 2d 164, 169 ; see Matter of Marburg v. Cole, 286 N. Y. 202, 211-212 ; and Matter of Aloe v. Dassler, 278 App. Div. 975 , affd. 303 N. Y. 878 ).

1959That 'does not, however, mean that a precise or specific formula must be furnished in a field ‘ where flexibility and the adaptation of the [legislative] policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program.’ (Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 785 .) It is enough if the Legislature lays down ‘ an intelligible principle ’, specifying the standards or guides in as detailed a fashion as is reasonably practicable in the light of the complexities of the particular area to be regulated.” (Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N Y 2d 164, 168-169.)

1886(People v. Stevens, 5 Hill, 616 ; People v. Vail, 20 Wend. 12 ; People v. Ferris, 76 N. Y. 326 ; People v. Lane, 55 id. 217.) These cases proceed upon an intelligible principle.

1886(People v. Stevens, 5 Hill, 616 ; People v. Vail, 20 Wend. 12 ; People v. Ferris, 76 N. Y. 326 ; People v. Lane, 55 id. 217.) These cases proceed upon an intelligible principle.