jury for further instruction in New York

1991In reversing the resulting judgments of conviction, the Court of Appeals explained its reasoning in the following manner: "[The] submission of only a portion of a charge—particularly in the absence of any request from the jury for further instruction—creates a risk that the jury will perceive the writing as embodying the more important instructions, inviting greater attention to the principles that are repeated in writing than those simply recited orally (see, People v Townsend, 67 NY2d 815, 817 ).

1987Not unlike the submission of the text of a statute to the jury (CPL 310.30), when portions of the charge are distributed, questions may arise concerning which portions should be given to the jury. * As defense counsel in both cases convinc ingly urge, submission of only a portion of a charge — particularly in the absence of any request from the jury for further instruction — creates a risk that the jury will perceive the writing as embodying the more important instructions, inviting greater attention to the principles that are repeated in writing than those simply recited orally (see, People v

1987We recently held in People v Owens ( 69 NY2d 585, 587-588 ) that "[w]hen defense counsel objects, it is improper for a trial court, after reciting its instructions orally, to distribute only certain portions of that charge in writing to the jury for use in its deliberations” (see, e.g., CPL 310.30 [jury may be sup plied with copy of actual text of a statute only upon consent of the parties]). "[SJubmission of only a portion of a charge— particularly in the absence of any request from the jury for further instruction — creates a risk that the jury will perceive the writing as embodying the more

1987We recently held in People v Owens ( 69 NY2d 585, 587-588 ) that "[w]hen defense counsel objects, it is improper for a trial court, after reciting its instructions orally, to distribute only certain portions of that charge in writing to the jury for use in its deliberations” (see, e.g., CPL 310.30 [jury may be sup plied with copy of actual text of a statute only upon consent of the parties]). "[SJubmission of only a portion of a charge— particularly in the absence of any request from the jury for further instruction — creates a risk that the jury will perceive the writing as embodying the more

2008Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court violated CPL 310.30 in responding to the request by the jury for further instruction during its deliberations (see People v Peller, 8 AD3d 1123 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 679 [2004]), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).

2008Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court violated CPL 310.30 in responding to the request by the jury for further instruction during its deliberations (see People v Peller, 8 AD3d 1123 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 679 [2004]), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).

2002CPL 310.30 provides that upon the jury’s request for further instruction, “the court must direct that the jury be returned to the courtroom and, after notice to both the people and counsel for the defendant, and in the presence of the defendant, must give such requested information or instruction as the court deems proper.” While the trial court possesses some discretion in framing its answer, “it must respond meaningfully to the jury’s inquiries” (People v Almodovar, 62 NY2d 126, 131 ).

1989With the consent of the parties and upon the request of the jury for further instruction with respect to a statute, the court may also give to the jury copies of the text of any statute which, in its discretion, the court deems proper.” The Court of Appeals held, in People v Mehmedi ( 69 NY2d 759, 760 [1987], rearg denied 69 NY2d 985 [1987]), that under the provisions of CPL 310.30, "[a] defendant has a fundamental right to be present at all material stages of a trial”.

1989Judgments of conviction have been reversed, upon the basis that defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of a trial was violated, where a trial court, without recalling the jury to the courtroom, and in the absence of the defendant, instructed the court clerk to, in substance, read certain testimony, requested by the jury, and after having done so, the "Clerk then imparted it, in paraphrase, to a court attendant who, in turn, relayed it to the jury” (People v Tyler, 14 AD2d 609, 610 [1961]); and, where a trial court, sua sponte, provided a jury with a written portion of the charg

1988(CPL 310.30.) In People v Owens (supra), barely one year old, we concluded that it was per se reversible error for a Trial Judge to give a deliberating jury, over defense objection, written excerpts from the charge (see also, People v Brooks, 70 NY2d 896, 898 , supra).