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10 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1994–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co.green2 sentences2025On a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true; "[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see also 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002] ["Dismissal under CPLR 3211 [a] [1] is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law"] [i 2025On a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true; "[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see also 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002] ["Dismissal under CPLR 3211 [a] [1] is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law"] [i | 1 | 1 |
EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.green2 sentences2025On a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true; "[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see also 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002] ["Dismissal under CPLR 3211 [a] [1] is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law"] [i 2025On a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true; "[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see also 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002] ["Dismissal under CPLR 3211 [a] [1] is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law"] [i | 1 | 1 |
City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits. Com, Inc.green2 sentences2016The Second Circuit has held that “allegations of third-party reliance . . . are insufficient to make out a common law fraud claim under New York law” (City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F3d 425, 454 [2d Cir 2008], certified question answered 12 NY3d 616 [2009], revd and remanded on other grounds 559 US 1 [2010]; see Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. 2016The Second Circuit has held that "allegations of third-party reliance . . . are insufficient to make out a common law fraud claim under New York law" (City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F3d 425, 454 [2d Cir - 13 - - 14 - No. 112 2008], certified question answered 12 NY3d 616 [2009], revd and remanded on other grounds 559 US 1 [2010]; see Cement and Concrete Workers Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Shaw v. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc.green1 sentence2016Council Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Legal Services Fund and Annuity Fund v Lollo, 148 F3d 194, 196 [2d Cir 1998]; Shaw v Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc., 673 F Supp 674, 682 [SD NY 1987]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. American Motor Club, Inc.green1 sentence2016Further, one decision from this Court has held that fraud under section 63 (12) may be established without proof of scienter or reliance (People v American Motor Club, 179 AD2d 277, 283 [1st Dept 1992], appeal dismissed 80 NY2d 893 [1992] [reinstating a section 63 (12) claim “as a cause of action,” where the AG had pleaded facts amounting to fraud under that provision, as under the statute, “scienter is not required and false promises are sufficient”]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Apple Health & Sports Clubs, Ltd.green1 sentence2016Servs., Inc., 62 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 166 [2011] [dismissing cause of action for fraud under § 63 (12) because complaint failed to state it with sufficient particularity, not because no such claim is allowed]; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009] [finding that a “cause of action” under § 63 (12) was “sufficiently stated” even though the elements of common-law fraud “need not be alleged,” where case also involved a separate common law fraud claim]; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 267 [1st Dept 1994], lv dism | 1 | 1 |
Pens. Plan Guide (Cch) P 23943u v. Lollogreen1 sentence2016Council Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Legal Services Fund and Annuity Fund v Lollo, 148 F3d 194, 196 [2d Cir 1998]; Shaw v Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc., 673 F Supp 674, 682 [SD NY 1987]). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Greccogreen1 sentence2016Servs., Inc., 62 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 166 [2011] [dismissing cause of action for fraud under § 63 (12) because complaint failed to state it with sufficient particularity, not because no such claim is allowed]; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009] [finding that a “cause of action” under § 63 (12) was “sufficiently stated” even though the elements of common-law fraud “need not be alleged,” where case also involved a separate common law fraud claim]; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 267 [1st Dept 1994], lv dism | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coventry First LLCgreen1 sentence2016Servs., Inc., 62 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 166 [2011] [dismissing cause of action for fraud under § 63 (12) because complaint failed to state it with sufficient particularity, not because no such claim is allowed]; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009] [finding that a “cause of action” under § 63 (12) was “sufficiently stated” even though the elements of common-law fraud “need not be alleged,” where case also involved a separate common law fraud claim]; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 267 [1st Dept 1994], lv dism | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Frink America, Inc.green1 sentence2016Servs., Inc., 62 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 166 [2011] [dismissing cause of action for fraud under § 63 (12) because complaint failed to state it with sufficient particularity, not because no such claim is allowed]; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009] [finding that a “cause of action” under § 63 (12) was “sufficiently stated” even though the elements of common-law fraud “need not be alleged,” where case also involved a separate common law fraud claim]; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 267 [1st Dept 1994], lv dism | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thornton v. Baron
green
2 sentences2024Of Rent Admin. , 15 NY3d 358 (2010), petitioner cites to Thornton v Baron , 5 NY3d 175 (2005), and argues that in Thornton "the Court of Appeals created the one and only exception to the 4-Year Interrelated Rule, i.e., a common law fraud exception where a fraudulent scheme to deregulate an apartment can be established." ( Id. , ¶ 27.) Petitioner also cites to Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as creating the standard for piercing the base date. 2024Of Rent Admin. , 15 NY3d 358 (2010), petitioner cites to Thornton v Baron , 5 NY3d 175 (2005), and argues that in Thornton "the Court of Appeals created the one and only exception to the 4-Year Interrelated Rule, i.e., a common law fraud exception where a fraudulent scheme to deregulate an apartment can be established." ( Id. , ¶ 27.) Petitioner also cites to Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as creating the standard for piercing the base date. | 3 | 2024–2024 |
Grimm v. State
green
2 sentences2024Of Rent Admin. , 15 NY3d 358 (2010), petitioner cites to Thornton v Baron , 5 NY3d 175 (2005), and argues that in Thornton "the Court of Appeals created the one and only exception to the 4-Year Interrelated Rule, i.e., a common law fraud exception where a fraudulent scheme to deregulate an apartment can be established." ( Id. , ¶ 27.) Petitioner also cites to Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as creating the standard for piercing the base date. 2024Of Rent Admin. , 15 NY3d 358 (2010), petitioner cites to Thornton v Baron , 5 NY3d 175 (2005), and argues that in Thornton "the Court of Appeals created the one and only exception to the 4-Year Interrelated Rule, i.e., a common law fraud exception where a fraudulent scheme to deregulate an apartment can be established." ( Id. , ¶ 27.) Petitioner also cites to Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as creating the standard for piercing the base date. | 3 | 2024–2024 |
Conason v. Megan Holding, LLC
green
2 sentences2024Of Rent Admin. , 15 NY3d 358 (2010), petitioner cites to Thornton v Baron , 5 NY3d 175 (2005), and argues that in Thornton "the Court of Appeals created the one and only exception to the 4-Year Interrelated Rule, i.e., a common law fraud exception where a fraudulent scheme to deregulate an apartment can be established." ( Id. , ¶ 27.) Petitioner also cites to Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as creating the standard for piercing the base date. 2024Of Rent Admin. , 15 NY3d 358 (2010), petitioner cites to Thornton v Baron , 5 NY3d 175 (2005), and argues that in Thornton "the Court of Appeals created the one and only exception to the 4-Year Interrelated Rule, i.e., a common law fraud exception where a fraudulent scheme to deregulate an apartment can be established." ( Id. , ¶ 27.) Petitioner also cites to Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as creating the standard for piercing the base date. | 3 | 2024–2024 |
Boyd v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal
green
1 sentence2025Nor would application of the recent Chapter Amendments (L 2024, ch 95, § 4) requiring a “totality of circumstances” analysis in assessing a common law fraud claim change the result, as the apartment indisputably remains subject to rent-regulation and the overcharge involves a single disputed increase (see Matter of Boyd v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 23 NY3d 999 [2014]). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2016The Second Circuit has held that “allegations of third-party reliance . . . are insufficient to make out a common law fraud claim under New York law” (City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F3d 425, 454 [2d Cir 2008], certified question answered 12 NY3d 616 [2009], revd and remanded on other grounds 559 US 1 [2010]; see Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. 2016The Second Circuit has held that "allegations of third-party reliance . . . are insufficient to make out a common law fraud claim under New York law" (City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F3d 425, 454 [2d Cir - 13 - - 14 - No. 112 2008], certified question answered 12 NY3d 616 [2009], revd and remanded on other grounds 559 US 1 [2010]; see Cement and Concrete Workers Dist. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Myrick A. v. Lorna G.
neutral
1 sentence2016Servs., Inc., 62 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 166 [2011] [dismissing cause of action for fraud under § 63 (12) because complaint failed to state it with sufficient particularity, not because no such claim is allowed]; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009] [finding that a “cause of action” under § 63 (12) was “sufficiently stated” even though the elements of common-law fraud “need not be alleged,” where case also involved a separate common law fraud claim]; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 267 [1st Dept 1994], lv dism | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Wells Fargo Insurance Services Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2016Servs., Inc., 62 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 166 [2011] [dismissing cause of action for fraud under § 63 (12) because complaint failed to state it with sufficient particularity, not because no such claim is allowed]; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009] [finding that a “cause of action” under § 63 (12) was “sufficiently stated” even though the elements of common-law fraud “need not be alleged,” where case also involved a separate common law fraud claim]; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 267 [1st Dept 1994], lv dism | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.Com, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016The Second Circuit has held that “allegations of third-party reliance . . . are insufficient to make out a common law fraud claim under New York law” (City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F3d 425, 454 [2d Cir 2008], certified question answered 12 NY3d 616 [2009], revd and remanded on other grounds 559 US 1 [2010]; see Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. 2016The Second Circuit has held that "allegations of third-party reliance . . . are insufficient to make out a common law fraud claim under New York law" (City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F3d 425, 454 [2d Cir - 13 - - 14 - No. 112 2008], certified question answered 12 NY3d 616 [2009], revd and remanded on other grounds 559 US 1 [2010]; see Cement and Concrete Workers Dist. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Jag NY, LLC
green
1 sentence2016Servs., Inc., 62 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 166 [2011] [dismissing cause of action for fraud under § 63 (12) because complaint failed to state it with sufficient particularity, not because no such claim is allowed]; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009] [finding that a “cause of action” under § 63 (12) was “sufficiently stated” even though the elements of common-law fraud “need not be alleged,” where case also involved a separate common law fraud claim]; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 267 [1st Dept 1994], lv dism | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Coventry First LLC
green
1 sentence2016Servs., Inc., 62 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 166 [2011] [dismissing cause of action for fraud under § 63 (12) because complaint failed to state it with sufficient particularity, not because no such claim is allowed]; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009] [finding that a “cause of action” under § 63 (12) was “sufficiently stated” even though the elements of common-law fraud “need not be alleged,” where case also involved a separate common law fraud claim]; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 267 [1st Dept 1994], lv dism | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Wells Fargo Insurance Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016Servs., Inc., 62 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 166 [2011] [dismissing cause of action for fraud under § 63 (12) because complaint failed to state it with sufficient particularity, not because no such claim is allowed]; People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009] [finding that a “cause of action” under § 63 (12) was “sufficiently stated” even though the elements of common-law fraud “need not be alleged,” where case also involved a separate common law fraud claim]; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 267 [1st Dept 1994], lv dism | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Emergent Capital Investment Management, LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013Mgt., LLC v Stonepath Group, Inc., 165 F Supp 2d 615 , 627 n 2 [SD NY 2001] [holding that “(t)he absence of adequate causation is . . . fatal to a common law fraud claim under New York law,” and therefore rejecting plaintiffs contention that “it should be able to proceed with its common law fraud claim because New York law does not require proof of loss causation where only rescission is sought”].) . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Camillo v. Geer
green
1 sentence2004Imputing punitive damages for the acts of the Agency Sellers is legally unsupportable absent a showing of direct participation by defendants in the alleged conduct. ( See, Camillo v. Geer , 185 AD2d 192 [1st Dep't 1992]). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Roe v. CATHOLIC CHARITIES, DIOCESE OF SPRINGFIELD, ILL.
green
1 sentence1994This is how the common law grows; it responds to the needs of the society it serves” (Roe v Catholic Charities, supra, 255 Ill App 3d, at 524, 588 NE2d, at 357 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.