purpose of making inquiry in New York

1983It does not profit him before this court to rely upon technical defenses or employ sophistry in argument in an attempt to establish a superficial justification.’ (Matter of Feinstein, 233 App. Div. 541, 542-543 .)” We hold that respondent Detsky’s retainer arrangement with undercover Officer Cafferty and his massage parlor partners was improper not only because it dealt with providing representation for crimes to be committed in the future, but also because Detsky was to represent persons, i.e., the prostitute-employees, who had never retained him as their attorney.

1965It does not profit him before this court to rely upon technical defenses or employ sophistry in argument in an attempt to establish a superficial justification.” (Matter of Feinstein, 233 App. Div. 541, 542-543 .) The candor and fairness, or lack thereof, of the attorney in his testimony and conduct in such proceeding is a factor to be considered in fixing the appropriate sanction.

2010Our determination is without prejudice to any pending or future Surrogate’s Court proceeding for the probate or administration of the estate of the decedent, in which the surviving petitioner may allege and submit proof tending to show an equitable adoption of her children for the purpose of making a claim to a portion of the decedent’s estate (see Matter of Baby Boy C., 84 NY2d 91, 102 [1994]; Matter of Mazzeo, 95 AD2d at 93 ).

2006The observations of Detective Gramarossa justified at the very least a common-law right of inquiry based upon a founded suspicion of criminal activity ( People v. DeBour , at 221-223 ; People v. Jenkins , 209 AD2d 164, 165 ; People v. Smith , 267 AD2d 98 , lv. denied 95 NY2d 804 ; People v. Pines , 281 AD2d 311 , aff'd 99 NY2d 525 ; People v. Hernandez , 3 AD3d 325 , lv. denied 2 NY3d 741 ; Matter of Jamaal C. , at 145), and justified the officers' pulling their vehicle alongside respondent for the purpose of making inquiry.

2006The observations of Detective Gramarossa justified at the very least a common-law right of inquiry based upon a founded suspicion of criminal activity ( People v. DeBour , at 221-223 ; People v. Jenkins , 209 AD2d 164, 165 ; People v. Smith , 267 AD2d 98 , lv. denied 95 NY2d 804 ; People v. Pines , 281 AD2d 311 , aff'd 99 NY2d 525 ; People v. Hernandez , 3 AD3d 325 , lv. denied 2 NY3d 741 ; Matter of Jamaal C. , at 145), and justified the officers' pulling their vehicle alongside respondent for the purpose of making inquiry.

2006The observations of Detective Gramarossa justified at the very least a common-law right of inquiry based upon a founded suspicion of criminal activity ( People v. DeBour , at 221-223 ; People v. Jenkins , 209 AD2d 164, 165 ; People v. Smith , 267 AD2d 98 , lv. denied 95 NY2d 804 ; People v. Pines , 281 AD2d 311 , aff'd 99 NY2d 525 ; People v. Hernandez , 3 AD3d 325 , lv. denied 2 NY3d 741 ; Matter of Jamaal C. , at 145), and justified the officers' pulling their vehicle alongside respondent for the purpose of making inquiry.

2006The observations of Detective Gramarossa justified at the very least a common-law right of inquiry based upon a founded suspicion of criminal activity ( People v. DeBour , at 221-223 ; People v. Jenkins , 209 AD2d 164, 165 ; People v. Smith , 267 AD2d 98 , lv. denied 95 NY2d 804 ; People v. Pines , 281 AD2d 311 , aff'd 99 NY2d 525 ; People v. Hernandez , 3 AD3d 325 , lv. denied 2 NY3d 741 ; Matter of Jamaal C. , at 145), and justified the officers' pulling their vehicle alongside respondent for the purpose of making inquiry.

2006The observations of Detective Gramarossa justified at the very least a common-law right of inquiry based upon a founded suspicion of criminal activity ( People v. DeBour , at 221-223 ; People v. Jenkins , 209 AD2d 164, 165 ; People v. Smith , 267 AD2d 98 , lv. denied 95 NY2d 804 ; People v. Pines , 281 AD2d 311 , aff'd 99 NY2d 525 ; People v. Hernandez , 3 AD3d 325 , lv. denied 2 NY3d 741 ; Matter of Jamaal C. , at 145), and justified the officers' pulling their vehicle alongside respondent for the purpose of making inquiry.

2006The observations of Detective Gramarossa justified at the very least a common-law right of inquiry based upon a founded suspicion of criminal activity ( People v. DeBour , at 221-223 ; People v. Jenkins , 209 AD2d 164, 165 ; People v. Smith , 267 AD2d 98 , lv. denied 95 NY2d 804 ; People v. Pines , 281 AD2d 311 , aff'd 99 NY2d 525 ; People v. Hernandez , 3 AD3d 325 , lv. denied 2 NY3d 741 ; Matter of Jamaal C. , at 145), and justified the officers' pulling their vehicle alongside respondent for the purpose of making inquiry.

1995The conduct of defendant in discarding a paper bag upon seeing the police officer approaching him heightened the level of suspicion to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was, or had been, engaged in criminal activity and justified the officer’s detention of defendant (see, People v Sierra, supra; People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444 ; see, People v Terry, 190 AD2d 1064, 1065 , lv denied 81 NY2d 1081 ; People v Hall, 152 AD2d 905 , affd 75 NY2d 826 ).

1995Those facts furnished the police with an objective, credible reason to approach defendant for the purpose of making inquiry (see, People v Sierra, 83 NY2d 928, 930 ; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 ).

1995The conduct of defendant in discarding a paper bag upon seeing the police officer approaching him heightened the level of suspicion to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was, or had been, engaged in criminal activity and justified the officer’s detention of defendant (see, People v Sierra, supra; People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444 ; see, People v Terry, 190 AD2d 1064, 1065 , lv denied 81 NY2d 1081 ; People v Hall, 152 AD2d 905 , affd 75 NY2d 826 ).

1995The conduct of defendant in discarding a paper bag upon seeing the police officer approaching him heightened the level of suspicion to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was, or had been, engaged in criminal activity and justified the officer’s detention of defendant (see, People v Sierra, supra; People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444 ; see, People v Terry, 190 AD2d 1064, 1065 , lv denied 81 NY2d 1081 ; People v Hall, 152 AD2d 905 , affd 75 NY2d 826 ).

1995The conduct of defendant in discarding a paper bag upon seeing the police officer approaching him heightened the level of suspicion to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was, or had been, engaged in criminal activity and justified the officer’s detention of defendant (see, People v Sierra, supra; People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444 ; see, People v Terry, 190 AD2d 1064, 1065 , lv denied 81 NY2d 1081 ; People v Hall, 152 AD2d 905 , affd 75 NY2d 826 ).

1995Those facts furnished the police with an objective, credible reason to approach defendant for the purpose of making inquiry (see, People v Sierra, 83 NY2d 928, 930 ; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 ).

1989In People v Tratch ( 104 AD2d 503 ), it was held that the reasonable suspicion possessed by a police officer who stopped the defendant and then frisked him for weapons to protect himself, also warranted the precautionary measure of frisking the shopping bag carried by the defendant which could have contained a gun.

1983In the Matter of Schildhaus ( 23 AD2d 152, 157 ), we said: “The lawyer’s duty of candor and fairness is not suspended for the purpose of making a defense to a disciplinary proceeding. ‘Where a member of the bar is charged with delinquencies, as in this case, there is but one course open to him — to come forward frankly and make such truthful explanations as he may, and with equal frankness admit his mistakes.

1982The proper basis for suppression in such an instance, which argument was neither made to the trial court nor set forth in appellant’s brief, is that though a stop predicated upon reasonable suspicion may be just and proper, the use of excessive force may transform a simple momentary detention for the purpose of making inquiry, into an arrest on less than probable cause (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14,19-21 , cert den 449 US 1018 ; People v Finlayson, supra, at pp 678-679).

1982The proper basis for suppression in such an instance, which argument was neither made to the trial court nor set forth in appellant’s brief, is that though a stop predicated upon reasonable suspicion may be just and proper, the use of excessive force may transform a simple momentary detention for the purpose of making inquiry, into an arrest on less than probable cause (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14,19-21 , cert den 449 US 1018 ; People v Finlayson, supra, at pp 678-679).