Cleveland motion in Ohio

2025Order Bypassing Mediation, ¶ B (setting deadline), Schaffer v. Ohio State Univ., 2024-Ohio-2185, ¶ 12 , adopted 2024-Ohio-2625 (Ct. of Cl.) (collecting cases). {¶14} Although a production claim is not mooted if the records produced were improperly redacted, and although some records produced in response to this request were redacted, those redactions do not keep Ms. Dye’s production claim alive.

2025Order Bypassing Mediation, ¶ B (setting deadline), Schaffer v. Ohio State Univ., 2024-Ohio-2185, ¶ 12 , adopted 2024-Ohio-2625 (Ct. of Cl.) (collecting cases). {¶14} Although a production claim is not mooted if the records produced were improperly redacted, and although some records produced in response to this request were redacted, those redactions do not keep Ms. Dye’s production claim alive.

2025In Anderson v. Massillon, 2012-Ohio-5711 , the Ohio Supreme Court clarified the definitions of these two terms as follows: Willful misconduct implies an intentional deviation from a clear duty or from a definite rule of conduct, a deliberate purpose not to discharge some duty necessary to safety, or purposefully doing wrongful acts with knowledge or appreciation of the likelihood of resulting injury.

2023Cleveland’s claim that equities require a grant of summary judgment in its favor appears to be based on mere allegations and not supported by evidence existing in the record before the trial court.3 “‘Claims for equitable relief typically require the trial court to balance the equities of the parties’ based on the facts of each case.” Michael v. Miller, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4543, ¶ 33 , quoting Blue View Corp. v. Rhynes, 9th Dist.

2023Cleveland’s motion to dismiss lacks merit. “‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits’ and ‘defines the competency of a court to render a valid judgment in a particular action.’” Cheap Escape Co. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493 , 2008-Ohio-6323 , 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 6 , quoting Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 , 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972).

2023Cleveland’s motion to dismiss lacks merit. “‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits’ and ‘defines the competency of a court to render a valid judgment in a particular action.’” Cheap Escape Co. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493 , 2008-Ohio-6323 , 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 6 , quoting Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 , 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972).

2023Cleveland’s motion to dismiss lacks merit. “‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits’ and ‘defines the competency of a court to render a valid judgment in a particular action.’” Cheap Escape Co. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493 , 2008-Ohio-6323 , 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 6 , quoting Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 , 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972).

2023Cleveland’s motion to dismiss lacks merit. “‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits’ and ‘defines the competency of a court to render a valid judgment in a particular action.’” Cheap Escape Co. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493 , 2008-Ohio-6323 , 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 6 , quoting Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 , 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972).

2023Summit No. 23034, 2006-Ohio-4084, ¶ 14 .

2020Based on Santos, 101 Ohio St.3d 74 , 2004-Ohio-28 , 801 N.E.2d 441 , I conclude that Cleveland’s claim is in equity.

2020Based on Santos, 101 Ohio St.3d 74 , 2004-Ohio-28 , 801 N.E.2d 441 , I conclude that Cleveland’s claim is in equity.

2019Thus, “an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.” Id. at syllabus. {¶11} In Westlake II, this court held that following the Westlake I remand, a hearing on the merits had commenced, so Westlake’s “notice of [voluntary] dismissal was ineffective and [the trial court] has jurisdiction to rule on Cleveland’s motion to strike, and to conduct the hearing mandated by this court.” Westlake II, 2018-Ohio-4797 , ¶ 20-21.

2017Without conceding that its argument could result in a perpetual contract, Cleveland nonetheless maintains that “the Agreement should continue year to year unless the five-year notice provision is triggered.” Id. at 24. {¶34} Cleveland’s argument tries to have it both ways: while being careful not to characterize the agreement as perpetual (that would run afoul of the Westlake charter limiting non-exclusive franchises to 25 years), it essentially claims that the contract continues indefinitely unless a party opts out or the agreement is renegotiated (“the expiration date of the Agreement is not

2017Without conceding that its argument could result in a perpetual contract, Cleveland nonetheless maintains that “the Agreement should continue year to year unless the five-year notice provision is triggered.” Id. at 24. {¶34} Cleveland’s argument tries to have it both ways: while being careful not to characterize the agreement as perpetual (that would run afoul of the Westlake charter limiting non-exclusive franchises to 25 years), it essentially claims that the contract continues indefinitely unless a party opts out or the agreement is renegotiated (“the expiration date of the Agreement is not

2012“As a general proposition, it is not for courts to second-guess the wisdom of discretionary governmental choices, troubling though they may sometimes seem in the glaring clarity of hindsight.” Yvonne Haddock v. New York, 75 N.Y.2d 478, 486 , 553 N.E.2d 987 (1990). {¶35} Accordingly, the City retained its immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and the trial court did not err by granting the City’s motion to dismiss. {¶36} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. {¶37} Appellant’s third and final assignment of error states: “The trial court erred when it granted the City of Clevelan

2012“As a general proposition, it is not for courts to second-guess the wisdom of discretionary governmental choices, troubling though they may sometimes seem in the glaring clarity of hindsight.” Yvonne Haddock v. New York, 75 N.Y.2d 478, 486 , 553 N.E.2d 987 (1990). {¶35} Accordingly, the City retained its immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and the trial court did not err by granting the City’s motion to dismiss. {¶36} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. {¶37} Appellant’s third and final assignment of error states: “The trial court erred when it granted the City of Clevelan

2009R. 33 will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Herb , 167 Ohio App.3d 333 , 2006-Ohio-2412 , at ¶ 6 , citing State v. Haddix (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 470 , 480 .

2009R. 33 will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Herb , 167 Ohio App.3d 333 , 2006-Ohio-2412 , at ¶ 6 , citing State v. Haddix (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 470 , 480 .

2009R. 33 will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Herb , 167 Ohio App.3d 333 , 2006-Ohio-2412 , at ¶ 6 , citing State v. Haddix (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 470 , 480 .

1997In Nungester v. Cincinnati (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 561 , 654 N.E.2d 423 , the court held that even the ratification of a single incident by a city was insufficient to impose liability under Section 1983.

1997In Nungester v. Cincinnati (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 561 , 654 N.E.2d 423 , the court held that even the ratification of a single incident by a city was insufficient to impose liability under Section 1983.