public trial right violation in Washington

2016Restraint of Morris. 176 Wn.2d 157, 166 , 288 P.3d 1140 (2012), the court held that it would presume prejudice where the petitioner alleged a public trial right violation by way of an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim because "[h]ad Morris's appellate counsel raised this issue on direct appeal, Morris would have received a new trial.

2016Morris, 176 Wn.2d at 166 . "[Wjhere appellate counsel fails to raise a public trial right claim, where prejudice would have been presumed on direct review, a petitioner is entitled to relief on collateral review." Morris, 176Wn.2dat161.

2018Restraint ofOrange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 814 , 100 P.3d 291 (2004))). '"[Wjhere appellate counsel fails to raise a public trial right claim, where prejudice would have been presumed on direct review, a petitioner is entitled to relief on collateral review.'" Id.(emphasis added)(alteration in original)(quoting Morrw, 176 Wn.2d at 161 ("reaffirm[ing] Orange'^)).

2018Restraint of Orange , 152 Wash.2d 795 , 801-02, 100 P.3d 291 (2004) (entire voir dire process closed to the public); State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d 254 , 256-57, 906 P.2d 325 (1995) (pretrial suppression hearing closed). ¶54 This distinction matters to the public trial right analysis.

2014Waller adopted the reasoning of several state and lower federal cases, which held that defendants need not demonstrate specific prejudice on appeal for a public trial right violation because actual prejudice is difficult to prove in that context and diminishes “ ‘the great, though intangible, societal loss that flows’ from closing the courthouse doors.” 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (quoting People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 416 , 391 N.E.2d 1335 , 418 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1979)).

2014Waller adopted the reasoning of several state and lower federal cases, which held that defendants need not demonstrate specific prejudice on appeal for a public trial right violation because actual prejudice is difficult to prove in that context and diminishes "'the great, though intangible, societal loss that flows' from closing the courthouse doors." 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (quoting People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 416 , 418 N.Y.S.2d 359 , 391 N.E.2d 1335 (1979)). -3- In re Pers.

2018Restraint ofOrange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 814 , 100 P.3d 291 (2004))). '"[Wjhere appellate counsel fails to raise a public trial right claim, where prejudice would have been presumed on direct review, a petitioner is entitled to relief on collateral review.'" Id.(emphasis added)(alteration in original)(quoting Morrw, 176 Wn.2d at 161 ("reaffirm[ing] Orange'^)).

2018Restraint of Orange , 152 Wash.2d 795 , 801-02, 100 P.3d 291 (2004) (entire voir dire process closed to the public); State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d 254 , 256-57, 906 P.2d 325 (1995) (pretrial suppression hearing closed). ¶54 This distinction matters to the public trial right analysis.

2015State v. Brightman, 155 Wn.2d 506, 514 , 122 P.3d 150 (2005).

2015State v. Brightman, 155 Wn.2d 506, 514 , 122 P.3d 150 (2005).

2015The petition was stayed pending decisions in State v. Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222 , 217 P.3d 310 (2009), and State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140 , 217 P.3d 321 (2009).

2010Similarly, our Supreme Court observed in Strode that it "`has never found a public trial right violation to be [trivial or] de minimis.'" 167 Wash.2d at 230 , 217 P.3d 310 (alterations in original) (quoting Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 180 , 137 P.3d 825 ).

2010Similarly, our Supreme Court observed in Strode that it "`has never found a public trial right violation to be [trivial or] de minimis.'" 167 Wash.2d at 230, 217 P.3d 310 (alteration in original) (quoting Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 180 , 137 P.3d 825 ); see also Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 724-25 (holding that it is the trial court's obligation to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials, and absent that court's consideration of alternatives to closure, it could not constitutionally close voir dire). ¶ 21 As we held in Paumier, " Presley, applying the federal

2010Similarly, our Supreme Court observed in Strode that it "`has never found a public trial right violation to be [trivial or] de minimis.'" 167 Wash.2d at 230 , 217 P.3d 310 (alterations in original) (quoting Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 180 , 137 P.3d 825 ).

2010Similarly, our Supreme Court observed in Strode that it "`has never found a public trial right violation to be [trivial or] de minimis.'" 167 Wash.2d at 230, 217 P.3d 310 (alteration in original) (quoting Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 180 , 137 P.3d 825 ); see also Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 724-25 (holding that it is the trial court's obligation to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials, and absent that court's consideration of alternatives to closure, it could not constitutionally close voir dire). ¶ 21 As we held in Paumier, " Presley, applying the federal

2010Similarly, our Supreme Court observed in Strode that it "`has never found a public trial right violation to be [trivial or] de minimis.'" 167 Wash.2d at 230 , 217 P.3d 310 (alterations in original) (quoting Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 180 , 137 P.3d 825 ).

2015The petition was stayed pending decisions in State v. Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222 , 217 P.3d 310 (2009), and State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140 , 217 P.3d 321 (2009).

2014Similar to the defendant in State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140, 156 , 217 P.3d 321 (2009), Sykes here affirmatively accepted the closure, actively participated in it, and sought benefit from it.

2024App. 2d 610 , 617, 431 P.3d 1006 (2018).

2019App. 2d 610, 617, 431 P.3d 1006 (2018).

2018State v. Shearer, 181 Wn.2d 564, 569-71 , 334 P.3d 1078 (2014).

2018State v. Shearer, 181 Wn.2d 564, 569-71 , 334 P.3d 1078 (2014).

2015Our Supreme Court in Smith, 181 Wn.2d at 513 , and State v. Gomez, 183 Wn.2d 29, 33 , 347 P.3d 876 (2015), stated that the first step in the analysis of a public trial right claim is determining whether the proceedings implicate the public trial right, and the second step in that analysis is assessing whether the trial court closed the proceedings.

2015Our Supreme Court in Smith, 181 Wn.2d at 513 , and State v. Gomez, 183 Wn.2d 29, 33 , 347 P.3d 876 (2015), stated that the first step in the analysis of a public trial right claim is determining whether the proceedings implicate the public trial right, and the second step in that analysis is assessing whether the trial court closed the proceedings.

2015State v. Brightman, 155 Wn.2d 506, 514 , 122 P.3d 150 (2005).

2015State v. Brightman, 155 Wn.2d 506, 514 , 122 P.3d 150 (2005).

2015The petition was stayed pending decisions in State v. Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222 , 217 P.3d 310 (2009), and State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140 , 217 P.3d 321 (2009).

2011Strode, 167 Wash.2d at 230 , 217 P.3d 310 (quoting Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 180 , 137 P.3d 825 ). [41] Halgren, 156 Wash.2d at 807-08 , 132 P.3d 714 ("a defendant in [SVP] proceedings is entitled to due process protections that include a unanimous jury verdict") (citing Young, 122 Wash.2d at 48 , 857 P.2d 989 ). [42] See RCW 71.09.060(1).

2015Mr. Mines argues Morris is significant because it refines and reaffirms Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795 , which holds prejudice is presumed and a petitioner is entitled to relief on collateral review when appellate counsel fails to raise a public trial right violation. ¶21 Recently, the Washington Supreme Court in In re Personal Restraint of Erhart, 183 Wn.2d 144 , 351 P.3d 137 (2015), addressed what constitutes a significant change in the law.

2015Mr. Mines argues Morris is significant because it refines and reaffirms Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795 , which holds prejudice is presumed and a petitioner is entitled to relief on collateral review when appellate counsel fails to raise a public trial right violation. ¶21 Recently, the Washington Supreme Court in In re Personal Restraint of Erhart, 183 Wn.2d 144 , 351 P.3d 137 (2015), addressed what constitutes a significant change in the law.

2015Division Three of this court in State v. Love held that the exercise of for cause juror . challenges during a sidebar conference did not violate the defendant' s public trial right. 176 Wn. 911 , 919, 309 P. 3d 1209 ( 2013), in part, 340 P. 3d 228 ( 2015).

2014In State v. Love, 176 Wn.

2014I disagree and therefore dissent; but I would further hold that under the circumstances of this case the invited error doctrine bars the defendant from asserting a public trial right violation under article I, section 10. 1 Discussion Article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution provides, "Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." "We have recognized that, 'by its terms,' article I, section 10 'is not limited to trials but includes all judicial proceedings."' Mills v. W Wash. Univ., 170 Wn.2d 903, 913-14 , 246 P.3d 1254 (2011) 1 This court will

2014Wash. Univ., 170 Wn.2d 903, 913-14 , 246 P.3d 1254 (2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wn.2d 51, 60 , 615 P.2d 440 (1980)). ¶27 During the drug court staffings at issue here, a superior court judge presides over these scheduled proceedings, during which allegations and evidence of a defendant’s treatment compliance, criminal law violations, and behavior are routinely presented and discussed.

2014It cites United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) and Olson v. Haas, 43 Wn.

2014It cites United States v. Judson. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) and Olson v. Haas. 43 Wn.

2014State v. Berg, 177 Wn.

2014State v. Berg, 177 Wn.