sentence above standard in Washington

2025State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 339 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 8 No. 58258-9-II Moreover, defendants who receive a standard range sentence must object to unproven assertions of fact presented at sentencing to preserve error under the real facts doctrine.

2025State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 338 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005).

2021In Pillatos, we dealt with whether a new statute, which gave juries the responsibility of finding facts that could justify a sentence above the standard range, could be applied to defendants who had committed crimes before the enactment of the statute but who were tried afterward. 159 Wn.2d at 465 .

2014Thus, in an ex post facto analysis, we ask whether a new law imposes a penalty greater than the one that was authorized by statute when the defendant's The Blakely fix statutes required the State to notify the defendant before trial or entry of a guilty plea that the State intended to seek a sentence above the standard range, to state the aggravating circumstances it intended to allege, and to prove the existence of those circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. !d. § 4(1 ), (2). 3 Pillatos consolidated four defendants' cases; two of those defendants had already pleaded guilty when the legisla

2016This statute "permits the imposition of an exceptional sentence only when the State has given notice, prior to trial," or in this case, prior to entry of the guilty plea, "that it intends to seek a sentence above the standard sentencing range." State v. Womac, 160 Wn.2d 643, 663 , 160 P.3d 40 (2007).

2015State v. Womac, 160 Wn.2d 643, 649 , 160 P.3d 40 (2007). ¶12 Under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(x), a sentence above the standard range is justified if “[t]he defendant committed the offense against a public official or officer of the court in retaliation of the public official’s performance of his or her duty to the criminal justice system.” The SRA does not define the term “public official,” but the comment to the pattern jury instruction for the “public official” aggravator cites the definition of “public officer” in the criminal code. 11A Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Crim

2025State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 339 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 8 No. 58258-9-II Moreover, defendants who receive a standard range sentence must object to unproven assertions of fact presented at sentencing to preserve error under the real facts doctrine.

2025State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 338 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005).

2016This statute "permits the imposition of an exceptional sentence only when the State has given notice, prior to trial," or in this case, prior to entry of the guilty plea, "that it intends to seek a sentence above the standard sentencing range." State v. Womac, 160 Wn.2d 643, 663 , 160 P.3d 40 (2007).

2015State v. Womac, 160 Wn.2d 643, 649 , 160 P.3d 40 (2007). ¶12 Under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(x), a sentence above the standard range is justified if “[t]he defendant committed the offense against a public official or officer of the court in retaliation of the public official’s performance of his or her duty to the criminal justice system.” The SRA does not define the term “public official,” but the comment to the pattern jury instruction for the “public official” aggravator cites the definition of “public officer” in the criminal code. 11A Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Crim

2025However, “deliberate cruelty” is not an element of the underlying offense; it is an aggravating factor that supports a sentence above the standard range. 15 See State v. Gordon, 172 Wn.2d 671, 677-78 , 260 P.3d 884 (2011) (statute containing aggravating factors does not define “deliberate cruelty,” so failure to further define the term was not instructional error of constitutional magnitude).

2025However, “deliberate cruelty” is not an element of the underlying offense; it is an aggravating factor that supports a sentence above the standard range. 15 See State v. Gordon, 172 Wn.2d 671, 677-78 , 260 P.3d 884 (2011) (statute containing aggravating factors does not define “deliberate cruelty,” so failure to further define the term was not instructional error of constitutional magnitude).

2025RCW 9.94A.530(2), known as the real facts doctrine, provides, “In determining any sentence other than a sentence above the standard range, the trial court may rely on no more information than is admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, or proved in a trial or at the time of sentencing . . . .” The doctrine prevents a sentencing court from imposing “a sentence based upon the elements of a more serious crime that the State did not charge or prove.” State v. Elza, 87 Wn.

2025RCW 9.94A.530(2), known as the real facts doctrine, provides, “In determining any sentence other than a sentence above the standard range, the trial court may rely on no more information than is admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, or proved in a trial or at the time of sentencing . . . .” The doctrine prevents a sentencing court from imposing “a sentence based upon the elements of a more serious crime that the State did not charge or prove.” State v. Elza, 87 Wn.

2021State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117 , 123 n.5, 240 P.3d 143 (2010).

2013In sentencing Duncalf, the trial court relied on a jury finding that Ketchum’s injuries substantially exceeded the level of bodily harm necessary to satisfy the elements of second degree assault, that level of harm being “substantial bodily harm.” 3 ¶9 In State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117 , 240 P.3d 143 (2010), we reviewed an exceptional sentence imposed for a first degree assault conviction analyzing the same aggravating fact determination by the jury here, i.e., that the injuries inflicted substantially exceeded those necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense.

2021State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117 , 123 n.5, 240 P.3d 143 (2010).

2013In sentencing Duncalf, the trial court relied on a jury finding that Ketchum’s injuries substantially exceeded the level of bodily harm necessary to satisfy the elements of second degree assault, that level of harm being “substantial bodily harm.” 3 ¶9 In State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117 , 240 P.3d 143 (2010), we reviewed an exceptional sentence imposed for a first degree assault conviction analyzing the same aggravating fact determination by the jury here, i.e., that the injuries inflicted substantially exceeded those necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense.

2018Degraffe 1 “Under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(w), a finding that a defendant committed an ‘offense against a victim who was acting as a good [S]amaritan’ is an aggravating factor that can support a sentence above the standard range.” State v. Siers, 174 Wn.2d 269 , 272 n.1, 274 P.3d 358 (2012). 2 No. 49791-3-II did not present any evidence, did not cross-examine the State’s witnesses, and did not present any argument on the special interrogatory.

2018Degraffe 1 “Under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(w), a finding that a defendant committed an ‘offense against a victim who was acting as a good [S]amaritan’ is an aggravating factor that can support a sentence above the standard range.” State v. Siers, 174 Wn.2d 269 , 272 n.1, 274 P.3d 358 (2012). 2 No. 49791-3-II did not present any evidence, did not cross-examine the State’s witnesses, and did not present any argument on the special interrogatory.

2018“A sentence is clearly excessive if it is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons, or an action no reasonable judge would have taken.” State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635, 649-50 , 919 P.2d 1228 (1996).

2015Yet he also claims that his circumstances "were not sufficiently 'exceptional' to distinguish him from others committing the crime of stalking." He identifies three factors supporting this contention: (1) the sentence imposed is four times the low end of the standard range and three times the high end, (2) he has only one prior felony conviction, and (3) he has never been sentenced to a prison range term of confinement. 2 State v. Branch. 129 Wn.2d 635, 649 , 919 P.2d 1228 (1996). 3 RCW 9.94A.585(4). 4 State v. Tili, 148 Wn.2d 350, 369 , 60 P.3d 1192 (2003). 5 RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t).

2018“A sentence is clearly excessive if it is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons, or an action no reasonable judge would have taken.” State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635, 649-50 , 919 P.2d 1228 (1996).

2015Yet he also claims that his circumstances "were not sufficiently 'exceptional' to distinguish him from others committing the crime of stalking." He identifies three factors supporting this contention: (1) the sentence imposed is four times the low end of the standard range and three times the high end, (2) he has only one prior felony conviction, and (3) he has never been sentenced to a prison range term of confinement. 2 State v. Branch. 129 Wn.2d 635, 649 , 919 P.2d 1228 (1996). 3 RCW 9.94A.585(4). 4 State v. Tili, 148 Wn.2d 350, 369 , 60 P.3d 1192 (2003). 5 RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t).

2013App. 885, 901 , 866 P.2d 677 (1994) did not address whether a single aggravating factor could support consecutive sentences and a sentence above the standard range.

2013App. 885, 901 , 866 P.2d 677 (1994) did not address whether a single aggravating factor could support consecutive sentences and a sentence above the standard range.

2013The other facts recited by the court in its findings and conclusions were properly considered in determining the length of Bell's sentence.6 4 RCW 9.94A.585(4); State v. Hale, 146 Wn.

2013The other facts recited by the court in its findings and conclusions were properly considered in determining the length of Bell's sentence.6 Bell contends he lacked notice that the court would consider his criminal history and other facts, that these facts were not found by a jury, and that they inhere in the verdict and therefore do not support an exceptional sentence.7 The State correctly 4 RCW 9.94A.585(4); State v. Hale, 146 Wn.

2010Majority at 146-48, 149 (citing Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d at 1 , 914 P.2d 57 ; State v. Armstrong, 106 Wash.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986); State v. Nordby, 106 Wash.2d 514 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986); State v. Bourgeois, 72 Wash.App. 650 , 866 P.2d 43 (1994); State v. George, 67 Wash.App. 217 , 834 P.2d 664 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388 , 894 P.2d 1308 (1995)). ¶ 29 I disagree with the majority's characterization of these cases.

2010Majority at 146-48, 149 (citing Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d at 1 , 914 P.2d 57 ; State v. Armstrong, 106 Wash.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986); State v. Nordby, 106 Wash.2d 514 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986); State v. Bourgeois, 72 Wash.App. 650 , 866 P.2d 43 (1994); State v. George, 67 Wash.App. 217 , 834 P.2d 664 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388 , 894 P.2d 1308 (1995)). ¶ 29 I disagree with the majority's characterization of these cases.

2010At the time, vehicular assault required the infliction of “serious bodily injury,” defined as “ ‘bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body/ ” Id. (quoting former RCW 46.61.522(2) (1983)). 7 We concluded that the victim’s injuries (two broken legs, a broken arm, and a coma that lasted several days) fit squarely within that definition. ¶11 Similarly, in State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986), we determined that the first and second degree burns infl

2010At the time, vehicular assault required the infliction of “serious bodily injury,” defined as “ ‘bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body/ ” Id. (quoting former RCW 46.61.522(2) (1983)). 7 We concluded that the victim’s injuries (two broken legs, a broken arm, and a coma that lasted several days) fit squarely within that definition. ¶11 Similarly, in State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986), we determined that the first and second degree burns infl

2010Majority at 146-48, 149 (citing Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d at 1 , 914 P.2d 57 ; State v. Armstrong, 106 Wash.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986); State v. Nordby, 106 Wash.2d 514 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986); State v. Bourgeois, 72 Wash.App. 650 , 866 P.2d 43 (1994); State v. George, 67 Wash.App. 217 , 834 P.2d 664 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388 , 894 P.2d 1308 (1995)). ¶ 29 I disagree with the majority's characterization of these cases.

2010Majority at 124-29, 130-31 (citing Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1 ; State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986); State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986); State v. Bourgeois, 72 Wn.

2010Majority at 146-48, 149 (citing Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d at 1 , 914 P.2d 57 ; State v. Armstrong, 106 Wash.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986); State v. Nordby, 106 Wash.2d 514 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986); State v. Bourgeois, 72 Wash.App. 650 , 866 P.2d 43 (1994); State v. George, 67 Wash.App. 217 , 834 P.2d 664 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388 , 894 P.2d 1308 (1995)). ¶ 29 I disagree with the majority's characterization of these cases.

2010Majority at 124-29, 130-31 (citing Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1 ; State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986); State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986); State v. Bourgeois, 72 Wn.

2010The court, without further analysis, quoted RCW 9.94A.537(1) stating that "[t]he State must give notice at any time prior to trial ... that it is seeking a sentence above the standard range [and] ... must set out any aggravating factors alleged." Bobenhouse, 143 Wash.App. at 331 , 177 P.3d 209 .

2010The court, without further analysis, quoted RCW 9.94A.537(1), stating that “[t]he State must give notice at any time prior to trial . . . that it is seeking a sentence above the standard range [and] must set out any aggravating factors alleged.” Bobenhouse, 143 Wn.

2010At the time, vehicular assault required the infliction of “serious bodily injury,” defined as “ ‘bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body/ ” Id. (quoting former RCW 46.61.522(2) (1983)). 7 We concluded that the victim’s injuries (two broken legs, a broken arm, and a coma that lasted several days) fit squarely within that definition. ¶11 Similarly, in State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986), we determined that the first and second degree burns infl

2010At the time, vehicular assault required the infliction of “serious bodily injury,” defined as “ ‘bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body/ ” Id. (quoting former RCW 46.61.522(2) (1983)). 7 We concluded that the victim’s injuries (two broken legs, a broken arm, and a coma that lasted several days) fit squarely within that definition. ¶11 Similarly, in State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986), we determined that the first and second degree burns infl

2010At the time, vehicular assault required the infliction of "serious bodily injury," defined as "`bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body.'" Id. (quoting former RCW 46.61.522(2) (1983)). [7] We concluded that the victim's injuries (two broken legs, a broken arm, and a coma that lasted several days) fit squarely within that definition. ¶ 11 Similarly, in State v. Armstrong, 106 Wash.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986), we determined that the first and second degree burns

2010At the time, vehicular assault required the infliction of “serious bodily injury,” defined as “ ‘bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body/ ” Id. (quoting former RCW 46.61.522(2) (1983)). 7 We concluded that the victim’s injuries (two broken legs, a broken arm, and a coma that lasted several days) fit squarely within that definition. ¶11 Similarly, in State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986), we determined that the first and second degree burns infl

2009Fowler, 114 Wn.2d at 69-70 . ¶40 However, Gordon contends that, after Apprendi 7 aggravating factors used to impose a sentence above the standard range are elements of the aggravated version of the crime. 530 U.S. at 494 n.19.

2009Fowler, 114 Wash.2d at 69-70 , 785 P.2d 808 . *529 ¶ 40 However, Gordon contends that, after Apprendi , [7] aggravating factors used to impose a sentence above the standard range are elements of the aggravated version of the crime. 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348 .

2009State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136, 171 , 892 P.2d 29 (1995). ¶31 Both factors at issue here are listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3), which provides a list of aggravating circumstances to be considered by a jury that will support a sentence above the standard range.

2009State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136, 171 , 892 P.2d 29 (1995). ¶31 Both factors at issue here are listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3), which provides a list of aggravating circumstances to be considered by a jury that will support a sentence above the standard range.

2008“If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, then [the] inquiry is at an end” and “[t]he statute is to be enforced in accordance with its plain meaning.” State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110 , 156 P.3d 201 (2007). ¶18 Here, the current and former versions of RCW 9.94A.537(1) both provide that [a]t any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing range.

2008"If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, then [the] inquiry is at an end" and "[t]he statute is to be enforced in accordance with its plain meaning." State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110 , 156 P.3d 201 (2007). *1069 ¶ 18 Here, the current and former versions of RCW 9.94A.537 both provide that [a]t any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing range.

2008“If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, then [the] inquiry is at an end” and “[t]he statute is to be enforced in accordance with its plain meaning.” State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110 , 156 P.3d 201 (2007). ¶18 Here, the current and former versions of RCW 9.94A.537(1) both provide that [a]t any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing range.

2008"If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, then [the] inquiry is at an end" and "[t]he statute is to be enforced in accordance with its plain meaning." State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110 , 156 P.3d 201 (2007). *1069 ¶ 18 Here, the current and former versions of RCW 9.94A.537 both provide that [a]t any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing range.

2008We held in State v. Pillatos, 159 Wash.2d 459 , 150 P.3d 1130 (2007), that these provisions did not apply to cases in which trial had not begun before April 15, 2005, and that courts do not have inherent authority to empanel sentencing juries.

2008We held in State v. Pillatos, 159 Wn.2d 459 , 150 P.3d 1130 (2007), that these provisions did not apply to cases in which trial had not begun before April 15, 2005, and that courts do not have inherent authority to impanel sentencing juries.