regarding doctrine in Ohio

2019With that said, the motion to vacate the plea is denied.” Upon review, we find the following regarding the factors courts should consider when ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea as stated in Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211 , 428 N.E.2d 863 and Heisa, 8th Dist.

2019With that said, the motion to vacate the plea is denied.” Upon review, we find the following regarding the factors courts should consider when ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea as stated in Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211 , 428 N.E.2d 863 and Heisa, 8th Dist.

2017Montgomery No. 26926, 2016-Ohio-8366 , 2016 WL 7496642 , we stated the following regarding the factors in Neil : We have previously noted that several factors identified in Neil may bear reconsideration in light of the significant advancement of scientific understanding of memory.

2014Nevertheless, there are other events besides the issuance of a capias which may toll the period of community control. {¶10} R.C. 2951.07 states, in pertinent part: “If the offender under community control absconds * * *, the period of community control ceases to run until the time that the offender is brought before the court for its further action.” In concluding that it retained jurisdiction to address the community control violation and sanction Meyer, the trial court relied on In re Townsend, 51 Ohio St.3d 136 (1990).

2014“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” Id. at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93 , 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996), syllabus. {¶ 11} In other words, “any issue that could have been raised on direct appeal and was not is re

2014“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” Id. at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93 , 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996), syllabus. {¶ 11} In other words, “any issue that could have been raised on direct appeal and was not is re

2014“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” Id. at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93 , 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996), syllabus. {¶ 11} In other words, “any issue that could have been raised on direct appeal and was not is re

2014Montgomery Nos. 24789, 24980, 2012-Ohio-3392 , we stated the following regarding the doctrine of res judicata.

2008FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR "The prosecution failed to provide the appellant with discovery required by Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83 prior to the commencement of trial." {¶ 44} West argues that the State failed to provide him with exculpatory evidence prior to trial as required by Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83 .

2008FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR "The prosecution failed to provide the appellant with discovery required by Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83 prior to the commencement of trial." {¶ 44} West argues that the State failed to provide him with exculpatory evidence prior to trial as required by Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83 .

2008Chapter 2950 are civil in nature, a trial court's determination in a sex-offender-classification hearing must be reviewed under a civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard and may not be disturbed when the judge's findings are supported by competent, credible evidence." State v. Wilson , 113 Ohio St.3d 382 , 2007-Ohio-2202 , syllabus. {¶ 84} A trial court has to determine by clear and convincing evidence that the offender is a sexual predator.

2006State v. Falkenstein, Cuyahoga App. No. 83316, 2004-Ohio-2561 . {¶ 58} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held the following regarding an instruction on gross sexual imposition when the basis for the rape charge is cunnilingus: {¶ 59} "Even assuming that the jury might reasonably conclude that there was no penetration, [appellant] was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition.

2005However, appellant produces no evidence of this, other than her allegation. {¶ 9} Additionally, in Eiland v. Coldwell Banker Hunter Realty (1997), 122 Ohio App.3d 446 , 457 , we held the following regarding a claim of fraud in the sale of a home: "If a purchase agreement states that the buyer purchases real property in its `as is' physical condition, as it does here, the vendor has no duty to disclose latent defects.

2002Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Employment Relations Bd. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392 , 692 N.E.2d 140 , at syllabus, citing Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , 653 N.E.2d 226 .

2002Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Employment Relations Bd. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392 , 692 N.E.2d 140 , at syllabus, citing Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , 653 N.E.2d 226 .

2002Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Employment Relations Bd. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392 , 692 N.E.2d 140 , at syllabus, citing Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , 653 N.E.2d 226 .

2002Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Employment Relations Bd. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392 , 692 N.E.2d 140 , at syllabus, citing Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , 653 N.E.2d 226 .

1966As the syllabus in Rhoades v. City of Cleveland (1952), 157 Ohio St. 107 , states: “Where claimed errors in the charge of the court are errors of omission and not errors of commission, unless counsel has requested the court to supply the omissions, such errors of omission will not ordinarily justify a reversal.” See, also: Oherlin v. Friedman (1965), 5 Ohio St. 2d 1, 3 .