Missouri rule in Oklahoma

2019We now find that this analysis and construction of Section 10-104(B) cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment and we overrule Cripps as well as Bemo v. State, 2013 OK CR 4 , 298 P.3d 1190 , Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42 , 60 P.3d 1048 , and Guest v. State, 2002 OK CR 5 , 42 P.3d 289 , insofar as these cases are inconsistent with this opinion. 1. ¶9 In Cripps, we found Section 10-104(B) beyond the reach of McNeely because its per se rule was different from the Missouri rule struck down in McNeely .

2019We now find that this analysis and construction of Section 10-104(B) cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment and we overrule Cripps as well as Bemo v. State, 2013 OK CR 4 , 298 P.3d 1190 , Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42 , 60 P.3d 1048 , and Guest v. State, 2002 OK CR 5 , 42 P.3d 289 , insofar as these cases are inconsistent with this opinion. 1. ¶9 In Cripps, we found Section 10-104(B) beyond the reach of McNeely because its per se rule was different from the Missouri rule struck down in McNeely .

2019We now find that this analysis and construction of Section 10-104(B) cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment and we overrule Cripps as well as Bemo v. State, 2013 OK CR 4 , 298 P.3d 1190 , Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42 , 60 P.3d 1048 , and Guest v. State, 2002 OK CR 5 , 42 P.3d 289 , insofar as these cases are inconsistent with this opinion. 1. ¶9 In Cripps, we found Section 10-104(B) beyond the reach of McNeely because its per se rule was different from the Missouri rule struck down in McNeely .

2019We now find that this analysis and construction of Section 10-104(B) cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment and we overrule Cripps as well as Bemo v. State, 2013 OK CR 4 , 298 P.3d 1190 , Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42 , 60 P.3d 1048 , and Guest v. State, 2002 OK CR 5 , 42 P.3d 289 , insofar as these cases are inconsistent with this opinion. 1. ¶9 In Cripps, we found Section 10-104(B) beyond the reach of McNeely because its per se rule was different from the Missouri rule struck down in McNeely .

2019We now find that this analysis and construction of Section 10-104(B) cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment and we overrule Cripps as well as Bemo v. State, 2013 OK CR 4 , 298 P.3d 1190 , Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42 , 60 P.3d 1048 , and Guest v. State, 2002 OK CR 5 , 42 P.3d 289 , insofar as these cases are inconsistent with this opinion. 1. ¶9 In Cripps, we found Section 10-104(B) beyond the reach of McNeely because its per se rule was different from the Missouri rule struck down in McNeely .

2019We now find that this analysis and construction of Section 10-104(B) cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment and we overrule Cripps as well as Bemo v. State, 2013 OK CR 4 , 298 P.3d 1190 , Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42 , 60 P.3d 1048 , and Guest v. State, 2002 OK CR 5 , 42 P.3d 289 , insofar as these cases are inconsistent with this opinion. 1. ¶9 In Cripps, we found Section 10-104(B) beyond the reach of McNeely because its per se rule was different from the Missouri rule struck down in McNeely .

1947Cafky, cashier of said bank, and stockholder therein, took the acknowledgment of Ewing and wife to its execution.” And after considering authorities to the contrary there is declared: “ ‘When a recorded instrument shows on its face that the acknowledgment was taken by a party in interest, it is improperly recorded, and is not constructive notice; but when it is fair upon its face, it is the duty of the register to receive and record it, and its record operates as notice, notwithstanding there may be some hidden defect.’ The rule here laid down has special force in this territory at this time,

1947Cafky, cashier of said bank, and stockholder therein, took the acknowledgment of Ewing and wife to its execution.” And after considering authorities to the contrary there is declared: “ ‘When a recorded instrument shows on its face that the acknowledgment was taken by a party in interest, it is improperly recorded, and is not constructive notice; but when it is fair upon its face, it is the duty of the register to receive and record it, and its record operates as notice, notwithstanding there may be some hidden defect.’ The rule here laid down has special force in this territory at this time,

1933Grant, 29 Okla. 255 , 116 P. 913 , this court, speaking generally of the power of cities under a charter form of government, followed the Missouri rule.

1933Grant, 29 Okla. 255 , 116 P. 913 , this court, speaking generally of the power of cities under a charter form of government, followed the Missouri rule.

1924And the ¡supreme Court of Missouri has since repudiated that doctrine and overruled the Daily Case in the case of Hays v. Hogan (Mo.) 200 S. W. 286 .

1924And the ¡supreme Court of Missouri has since repudiated that doctrine and overruled the Daily Case in the case of Hays v. Hogan (Mo.) 200 S. W. 286 .

1924In McCullough v. Harshman, supra, the court said: “A parent, as such, is not liable for the negligence' of a child in handling an instrument furnished by the parent where the instrument is not per se dangerous, unless at the time of the act complained of the child was engaged in the pursuit of some purpose incident to the business of the father. ‘Business,’ as here used, includes the pleasure, comfort, and convenience of the father’s family.” *263 In the body of the opinion the court said: “In McNeal v. McKain, supra, this court expressly refused to approve the Missouri rule announced in the c

1924In McCullough v. Harshman, supra, the court said: “A parent, as such, is not liable for the negligence' of a child in handling an instrument furnished by the parent where the instrument is not per se dangerous, unless at the time of the act complained of the child was engaged in the pursuit of some purpose incident to the business of the father. ‘Business,’ as here used, includes the pleasure, comfort, and convenience of the father’s family.” *263 In the body of the opinion the court said: “In McNeal v. McKain, supra, this court expressly refused to approve the Missouri rule announced in the c

1950One of the most interesting discussions of the problem now before this court is contained in an opinion by Chief Justice Thomas, in Strong v. Commonwealth, 1926, 216 Ky. 98 , 287 S.W. 235, 237 , and though the court did not see fit to overrule its former decisions, necessary for the adoption of the rule, nevertheless the case presents a strong argument for the rule that is being considered.

1950One of the most interesting discussions of the problem now before this court is contained in an opinion by Chief Justice Thomas, in Strong v. Commonwealth, 1926, 216 Ky. 98 , 287 S.W. 235, 237 , and though the court did not see fit to overrule its former decisions, necessary for the adoption of the rule, nevertheless the case presents a strong argument for the rule that is being considered.

1950This is an excellent opportunity to apply the progressive principles announced in vigorous and fine language in the excellent opinion by Judge Brett and concurred in by the other judges in Ex parte Lewis, 85 Okla.

1950This is an excellent opportunity to apply the progressive principles announced in vigorous and fine language in the excellent opinion by Judge Brett and concurred in by the other judges in Ex parte Lewis, 85 Okla.

1927Co., 93 Okla. 20 , 219 Pac. 332 , the action involved very much the same principles involved here; the injuries sued for were alleged to have been caused by both delay and rough handling; the same contention was made there that is made here, viz., that the shipper was required to prove that the injuries were caused either by negligent delay or negligent handling, and that the trial court in instruction No. 4% used the following language, to wit: “In this connection you are instructed that mere proof of delay is not proof of negligence.” This instruction was held to be prejudicial error by this

1927Co., 93 Okla. 20 , 219 Pac. 332 , the action involved very much the same principles involved here; the injuries sued for were alleged to have been caused by both delay and rough handling; the same contention was made there that is made here, viz., that the shipper was required to prove that the injuries were caused either by negligent delay or negligent handling, and that the trial court in instruction No. 4% used the following language, to wit: “In this connection you are instructed that mere proof of delay is not proof of negligence.” This instruction was held to be prejudicial error by this