enhancement factors in Oregon

2010Accordingly, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider those factors in sentencing defendant.” In other words, defendant contends that, because the state failed to file the notice of the enhancement factors with the trial court or, alternatively, include those factors in the indictment, the trial court “did not have jurisdiction to consider those factors in sentencing defendant.” *527 The underlying premise of defendant’s contentions with respect to his first and second assignments of error is that enhancement factors must be treated as “elements” of a crime in light of the Unite

2010Accordingly, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider those factors in sentencing defendant.” In other words, defendant contends that, because the state failed to file the notice of the enhancement factors with the trial court or, alternatively, include those factors in the indictment, the trial court “did not have jurisdiction to consider those factors in sentencing defendant.” *527 The underlying premise of defendant’s contentions with respect to his first and second assignments of error is that enhancement factors must be treated as “elements” of a crime in light of the Unite

2010Accordingly, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider those factors in sentencing defendant.” In other words, defendant contends that, because the state failed to file the notice of the enhancement factors with the trial court or, alternatively, include those factors in the indictment, the trial court “did not have jurisdiction to consider those factors in sentencing defendant.” *527 The underlying premise of defendant’s contentions with respect to his first and second assignments of error is that enhancement factors must be treated as “elements” of a crime in light of the Unite

2010Accordingly, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider those factors in sentencing defendant.” In other words, defendant contends that, because the state failed to file the notice of the enhancement factors with the trial court or, alternatively, include those factors in the indictment, the trial court “did not have jurisdiction to consider those factors in sentencing defendant.” *527 The underlying premise of defendant’s contentions with respect to his first and second assignments of error is that enhancement factors must be treated as “elements” of a crime in light of the Unite

2010We recently considered a similar argument to the one defendant makes here in Sanchez. 238 Or.App. at 262 , 242 P.3d at 693 .

2010We recently considered a similar argument to the one defendant makes here in Sanchez. 238 Or App at 262 .

2026The state responded that, in its view, “the ‘statutory maximum’ sentence for first-degree murder is life without the possibility of parole, so long as the defendant was at least 18 years of age when the crime was committed” and that “by virtue of the wholesale changes to the Oregon’s [sic] murder statutes enacted in 2019, the legislature effectively created a sentencing range giving discretion to the court to decide the appropriate sentence.” Alternatively, the state requested that “a separate post-verdict jury trial on the enhancement factors separately filed be conducted,” and, in anticipati

2026The state responded that, in its view, “the ‘statutory maximum’ sentence for first-degree murder is life without the possibility of parole, so long as the defendant was at least 18 years of age when the crime was committed” and that “by virtue of the wholesale changes to the Oregon’s [sic] murder statutes enacted in 2019, the legislature effectively created a sentencing range giving discretion to the court to decide the appropriate sentence.” Alternatively, the state requested that “a separate post-verdict jury trial on the enhancement factors separately filed be conducted,” and, in anticipati

2024Similarly, in State v. Ramirez, 343 Or 505 , 173 P3d 817 (2007), the trial court had imposed an enhanced sentence without sub- mitting the enhancement factors to the jury.

2024Similarly, in State v. Ramirez, 343 Or 505 , 173 P3d 817 (2007), the trial court had imposed an enhanced sentence without sub- mitting the enhancement factors to the jury.

2023He argues that prior cases which allowed the state to proceed to trial on enhancement factors that were not submitted to a grand jury are no longer good law, in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390, 1398 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020), and its rejection of the concept of selective incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2023He argues that prior cases which allowed the state to proceed to trial on enhancement factors that were not submitted to a grand jury are no longer good law, in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390, 1398 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020), and its rejection of the concept of selective incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2014As amplified below, (1) although the trial court’s noncompliance with ORS 136.770 and ORS 136.773 constituted “plain error,” we decline to exercise our discretion to remedy that statutory error; and (2) the trial court’s purported noncompliance with Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution was not plain error in that the applicability of that provision in these circumstances is “reasonably in dispute.” State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355 , 800 P2d 259 (1990).

2014As amplified below, (1) although the trial court’s noncompliance with ORS 136.770 and ORS 136.773 constituted “plain error,” we decline to exercise our discretion to remedy that statutory error; and (2) the trial court’s purported noncompliance with Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution was not plain error in that the applicability of that provision in these circumstances is “reasonably in dispute.” State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355 , 800 P2d 259 (1990).

2014After this case was briefed and argued, the Supreme Court rejected the identical argument, State v. Reinke, 354 Or 98 , 309 P3d 1059 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 354 Or 570 , 316 P3d 286 (2013), and we reject it again without discussion.

2014After this case was briefed and argued, the Supreme Court rejected the identical argument, State v. Reinke, 354 Or 98 , 309 P3d 1059 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 354 Or 570 , 316 P3d 286 (2013), and we reject it again without discussion.

2014After this case was briefed and argued, the Supreme Court rejected the identical argument, State v. Reinke, 354 Or 98 , 309 P3d 1059 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 354 Or 570 , 316 P3d 286 (2013), and we reject it again without discussion.

2014After this case was briefed and argued, the Supreme Court rejected the identical argument, State v. Reinke, 354 Or 98 , 309 P3d 1059 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 354 Or 570 , 316 P3d 286 (2013), and we reject it again without discussion.

2009The ruling setting aside defendant's guilty pleas was made by the Honorable Ted Carp, and the Honorable Jack A. Billings presided at the subsequent jury trial. [3] The trial court explained that it was "treat[ing] this as a motion by the State pursuant to ORS 135.365, and any other statutes that might be applicable to cause the defendant to withdraw his plea." As later discussed, 232 Or.App. at 328-29 , 222 P.3d at 723 , the state now cites ORS 135.395 as an alternative statutory basis for the court's actions. [4] As the dissent correctly points out, defendant's counsel at one point indicated

2009The ruling setting aside defendant's guilty pleas was made by the Honorable Ted Carp, and the Honorable Jack A. Billings presided at the subsequent jury trial. [3] The trial court explained that it was "treat[ing] this as a motion by the State pursuant to ORS 135.365, and any other statutes that might be applicable to cause the defendant to withdraw his plea." As later discussed, 232 Or.App. at 328-29 , 222 P.3d at 723 , the state now cites ORS 135.395 as an alternative statutory basis for the court's actions. [4] As the dissent correctly points out, defendant's counsel at one point indicated

2004Third, and again with respect to both cases, under the reasoning of State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), and State v. Wedge, 293 Or 598 , 652 P2d 773 (1982), reliance on certain upward departure factors pursuant to the sentencing guidelines violated Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.

2004Third, and again with respect to both cases, under the reasoning of State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), and State v. Wedge, 293 Or 598 , 652 P2d 773 (1982), reliance on certain upward departure factors pursuant to the sentencing guidelines violated Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.

2004Third, and again with respect to both cases, under the reasoning of State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), and State v. Wedge, 293 Or 598 , 652 P2d 773 (1982), reliance on certain upward departure factors pursuant to the sentencing guidelines violated Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.

2004Third, and again with respect to both cases, under the reasoning of State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), and State v. Wedge, 293 Or 598 , 652 P2d 773 (1982), reliance on certain upward departure factors pursuant to the sentencing guidelines violated Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.

1999Id. at 440-41 . *347 As for the argument that there was no older statute with which to compare the newer one — because the older statute had been declared unconstitutional — we quoted the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Dobbert that, regardless of the ultimate fate of the older statute, the fact remained that, while it was “in effect,” it provided “fair warning” as to the state’s intentions with respect to the crime involved.