gist defense in Oregon

1942Rep. 501 : "In legal effect, adequate recitals contained in negotiable municipal bonds are equivalent to a representation, or warranty, or certificate on the part of the officers, that everything necessary by law to be done has been done, and every fact necessary by law to have existed did exist, to make them legal and binding. * * * "The gist of the rule is aptly stated by Mr. Justice Strong, in Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484 , as follows: `Where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of the municipality were invested with the power to decide whether the con

1899In such a case, Mr. Justice Matthews, in Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83 (4 Sup. Ct. 315), says : “The meaning of the law granting power to issue bonds is that they may be issued, not upon the existence of certain facts, to be ascertained or determined whenever disputed, but upon the ascertainment and determination of their existence by the officers or body designated by law to issue the bonds upon such a contingency.” The gist of the rule is aptly stated by Mr. Justice Strong, in Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484 , as follows : “Where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment

1999Heggemeier, 106 Or App at 697-98 .

1986Cf. Mooney v. Johnson Cattle, 291 Or 709 , 634 P2d 1333 (1981).

1986Cf. Mooney v. Johnson Cattle, 291 Or 709 , 634 P2d 1333 (1981).

1979We find nothing in this case to refute this equality and, accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to partition to secure her the half interest which she claims.” 215 Or at 451 .

1967“That an agent manufactures an offense against the law and then incites a person against his will to commit that offense for the purpose of prosecution is the gist of a defense of entrapment.” Judge Clark writing for the court in United States v. Abdallah, 149 F2d 219 (2d Cir), said: “Defendant argues that there must be reason *271 able cause for suspicion before a detective may give the culprit an opportunity to commit the crime, citing cases such as De Mayo v. United States, 8 Cir., 32 F.2d 472, 474, 475 ; Fisk v. United States, 6 Cir., 279 F. 12 ; Partan v. United States, 9 Cir., 261 F. 515

1967“That an agent manufactures an offense against the law and then incites a person against his will to commit that offense for the purpose of prosecution is the gist of a defense of entrapment.” Judge Clark writing for the court in United States v. Abdallah, 149 F2d 219 (2d Cir), said: “Defendant argues that there must be reason *271 able cause for suspicion before a detective may give the culprit an opportunity to commit the crime, citing cases such as De Mayo v. United States, 8 Cir., 32 F.2d 472, 474, 475 ; Fisk v. United States, 6 Cir., 279 F. 12 ; Partan v. United States, 9 Cir., 261 F. 515

1967Ed. 415 ; United States v. Reisenweber, 2 Cir., 288 F. 520 .

1960In Du Pont Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 US 100 , 61 L ed 1016, 37 S Ct 575 , Mr. Justice Holmes uses these words: “* * * The word ‘property’ as' applied to trademarks, and trade: secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain-, secondary, consequences of the primary fact that the law. makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith.

1960In Du Pont Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 US 100 , 61 L ed 1016, 37 S Ct 575 , Mr. Justice Holmes uses these words: “* * * The word ‘property’ as' applied to trademarks, and trade: secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain-, secondary, consequences of the primary fact that the law. makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith.

1959Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., supra ( 120 NE at 202 ).

1925But, while a verdict will aid an informal statement of the facts in a pleading, it will not supply a material averment that goes to the gist of the defense: Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 98 Or. 183 ( 193 Pac. 909 ), and local citations therein noted: Duby et al. v. Hicks, 105 Or. 27 ( 209 Pac. 156 ).

1925But, while a verdict will aid an informal statement of the facts in a pleading, it will not supply a material averment that goes to the gist of the defense: Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 98 Or. 183 ( 193 Pac. 909 ), and local citations therein noted: Duby et al. v. Hicks, 105 Or. 27 ( 209 Pac. 156 ).

1925But, while a verdict will aid an informal statement of the facts in a pleading, it will not supply a material averment that goes to the gist of the defense: Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 98 Or. 183 ( 193 Pac. 909 ), and local citations therein noted: Duby et al. v. Hicks, 105 Or. 27 ( 209 Pac. 156 ).

1925But, while a verdict will aid an informal statement of the facts in a pleading, it will not supply a material averment that goes to the gist of the defense: Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 98 Or. 183 ( 193 Pac. 909 ), and local citations therein noted: Duby et al. v. Hicks, 105 Or. 27 ( 209 Pac. 156 ).

1902Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 187 (12 Sup. Ct. 437).

1899In such a case, Mr. Justice Matthews, in Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83 (4 Sup. Ct. 315), says : “The meaning of the law granting power to issue bonds is that they may be issued, not upon the existence of certain facts, to be ascertained or determined whenever disputed, but upon the ascertainment and determination of their existence by the officers or body designated by law to issue the bonds upon such a contingency.” The gist of the rule is aptly stated by Mr. Justice Strong, in Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484 , as follows : “Where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment