examined factors in Pennsylvania

2017In re Petition of Dolington Land Group, 839 A.2d at 1032 .

2017This Court examined the doctrine of transferred intent in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441 (Pa. Super. 2008).

2017Prior to reaching its conclusion that the regulations were not unreasonably restrictive, the Court examined factors informing the substance of zoning ordinances that had previously been of little or no concern but in the time since its landmark decision in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of Upper Providence, 476 Pa. 182 , 382 A.2d 105 (1977), had gained preeminence, stating: These include but are not limited to an increased awareness of the environmental sensitivity and public value of undisturbed wetlands, floodplains, slopes, and woodlands; the growing national and state-wide

2017Prior to reaching its conclusion that the regulations were not unreasonably restrictive, the Court examined factors informing the substance of zoning ordinances that had previously been of little or no concern but in the time since its landmark decision in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of Upper Providence, 476 Pa. 182 , 382 A.2d 105 (1977), had gained preeminence, stating: These include but are not limited to an increased awareness of the environmental sensitivity and public value of undisturbed wetlands, floodplains, slopes, and woodlands; the growing national and state-wide

2017Id. at 549 .

2010See Cook, supra; Hornaman, supra. 4 ¶ 9 Recently, this Court examined whether a claim that an appellant’s sentence was manifestly excessive based on the imposition of consecutive sentences presents a substantial question.

2008West, supra at 492, 938 A.2d at 1040 , citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596 (1998); Commonwealth v. Glass, 526 Pa. 329 , 586 A.2d 369 (1991). ¶ 12 A majority of the panel found the factors weighed in favor of West, including that he was prejudiced due to lost transcripts and missed opportunities to challenge further his conviction, and ordered he be discharged.

2008West, supra at 492, 938 A.2d at 1040 , citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596 (1998); Commonwealth v. Glass, 526 Pa. 329 , 586 A.2d 369 (1991). ¶ 12 A majority of the panel found the factors weighed in favor of West, including that he was prejudiced due to lost transcripts and missed opportunities to challenge further his conviction, and ordered he be discharged.

2008West, supra at 492, 938 A.2d at 1040 , citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596 (1998); Commonwealth v. Glass, 526 Pa. 329 , 586 A.2d 369 (1991). ¶ 12 A majority of the panel found the factors weighed in favor of West, including that he was prejudiced due to lost transcripts and missed opportunities to challenge further his conviction, and ordered he be discharged.

2008West, supra at 492, 938 A.2d at 1040 , citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596 (1998); Commonwealth v. Glass, 526 Pa. 329 , 586 A.2d 369 (1991). ¶ 12 A majority of the panel found the factors weighed in favor of West, including that he was prejudiced due to lost transcripts and missed opportunities to challenge further his conviction, and ordered he be discharged.

2008West, supra at 492, 938 A.2d at 1040 , citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596 (1998); Commonwealth v. Glass, 526 Pa. 329 , 586 A.2d 369 (1991). ¶ 12 A majority of the panel found the factors weighed in favor of West, including that he was prejudiced due to lost transcripts and missed opportunities to challenge further his conviction, and ordered he be discharged.

2008After recognizing the lack of Pennsylvania authority on the issue of whether there is a right to “speedy incarceration,” this court examined the factors used in the speedy trial case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and applied them in West: Pennsylvania courts have previously followed Barker in resolving claims that procedural delays in criminal cases constitute a substantive due process violation, and we have set forth a four prong test in which we inquire as follows: (1) whether the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry; (2) if so, th

2008After recognizing the lack of Pennsylvania authority on the issue of whether there is a right to “speedy incarceration,” this court examined the factors used in the speedy trial case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and applied them in West: Pennsylvania courts have previously followed Barker in resolving claims that procedural delays in criminal cases constitute a substantive due process violation, and we have set forth a four prong test in which we inquire as follows: (1) whether the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry; (2) if so, th

2007In Patel v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Sauquoit Fibers Co.), 88 Pa.Cmwlth.76, 488 A.2d 1177 (1985), this court examined the doctrine of collateral estoppel, stating in pertinent part: [Wjhere particular questions of fact essential to the judgment are actually litigated and determined by a final valid judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in any subsequent action on a different cause of action.

2007This Court examined this exception in Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 571 Pa. 219 , 812 A.2d 497 (2002), noting: Subsection (iii) of Section 9545 [(b)(1)] has two requirements.

2007This Court examined this exception in Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 571 Pa. 219 , 812 A.2d 497 (2002), noting: Subsection (iii) of Section 9545 [(b)(1)] has two requirements.

2002In the usual case the basis of past experience from which this conclusion may be drawn is common to the community, and is a matter of general knowledge, which the court recognizes on much the same basis as when it takes judicial notice of facts which everyone knows.” 10 In McDonald v. Aliquippa Hospital, supra, the court examined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it applied to the malfunction of machinery, including automatic doors: “ ‘This principle has been applied in cases in which machinery has malfunctioned but where there is no evidence to identify the specific reason for such malfunc

2002In the usual case the basis of past experience from which this conclusion may be drawn is common to the community, and is a matter of general knowledge, which the court recognizes on much the same basis as when it takes judicial notice of facts which everyone knows.” 10 In McDonald v. Aliquippa Hospital, supra, the court examined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it applied to the malfunction of machinery, including automatic doors: “ ‘This principle has been applied in cases in which machinery has malfunctioned but where there is no evidence to identify the specific reason for such malfunc

2002In the usual case the basis of past experience from which this conclusion may be drawn is common to the community, and is a matter of general knowledge, which the court recognizes on much the same basis as when it takes judicial notice of facts which everyone knows.” 10 In McDonald v. Aliquippa Hospital, supra, the court examined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it applied to the malfunction of machinery, including automatic doors: “ ‘This principle has been applied in cases in which machinery has malfunctioned but where there is no evidence to identify the specific reason for such malfunc

2002In the usual case the basis of past experience from which this conclusion may be drawn is common to the community, and is a matter of general knowledge, which the court recognizes on much the same basis as when it takes judicial notice of facts which everyone knows.” 10 In McDonald v. Aliquippa Hospital, supra, the court examined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it applied to the malfunction of machinery, including automatic doors: “ ‘This principle has been applied in cases in which machinery has malfunctioned but where there is no evidence to identify the specific reason for such malfunc

2001Accordingly, the court’s comment that “[njothing in the legislative history suggests that the legislature ever intended statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away with the traditional common-law elements of reliance and causation” would not be applicable to claims brought under the revised catchall provision. 565 Pa. at 618 , 777 A.2d at 446 . .

2001Accordingly, the court’s comment that “[njothing in the legislative history suggests that the legislature ever intended statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away with the traditional common-law elements of reliance and causation” would not be applicable to claims brought under the revised catchall provision. 565 Pa. at 618 , 777 A.2d at 446 . .

1990In Feigley v. Jeffes, 104 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 540 , 522 A.2d 179 (1987) this Court examined the doctrine of lis pendens.

1990In Feigley v. Jeffes, 104 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 540 , 522 A.2d 179 (1987) this Court examined the doctrine of lis pendens.