MPC hearing in Pennsylvania

2021Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Kring, . . . 565 A.2d 1238 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1989).

1991Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Kring, 129 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 402 , 565 A.2d 1238 . (1989).

2020Id.

2020Id.

2020Siegmond v. Duschak, 714 A.2d 489 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (holding issue not briefed in post-trial motions was waived). 13 Our Supreme Court acknowledged “the prevalence of short-term rentals in Pennsylvania . . . requir[es] cities, townships and boroughs to make case-by-case determinations of whether and where such rentals should be permitted.” Slice of Life II, 207 A.3d at 897 .

2020Siegmond v. Duschak, 714 A.2d 489 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (holding issue not briefed in post-trial motions was waived). 13 Our Supreme Court acknowledged “the prevalence of short-term rentals in Pennsylvania . . . requir[es] cities, townships and boroughs to make case-by-case determinations of whether and where such rentals should be permitted.” Slice of Life II, 207 A.3d at 897 .

2020See Ruf v. Buckingham Twp., 765 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001); Levin, 681 A.2d at 864 .

2017The trial court relied on City of Easton v. Marra, . . . 326 A.2d 637 ([Pa. Super.] 1974), and concluded that this controversy, at all times, involved civil enforcement proceedings despite the fact that the matters before the district justice were mistakenly initiated by criminal complaints.

2017However, despite that the municipality filed a civil complaint with the MDJ to obtain fines and attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 617.2(a) of the MPC for the violation and also filed a civil complaint with the trial court when ordered to do so on appeal, there is no requirement either in Section 617.2(a) of the MPC or Lower Mount Bethel Township that a civil complaint must be filed in order to obtain 3 although Section 617.2(a) of the MPC specifies that trial courts shall award attorney’s fees in civil enforcement proceedings, in Township of South Whitehall v. Karoly, 891 A.2d 780 (Pa. Cmwlt

2005Malone v. West Marlborough Township Board of Supervisors, 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 347 , 570 A.2d 147 (1990). [5] I note that, although consideration of the submitted briefs may have been a part of the Board's private deliberation process, the transcript of the October 22, 2003, meeting reflects no public discussion of these briefs by the Board. [6] In concluding that oral argument and written argument are indistinguishable, the trial court notes that section 908(5) of the MPC states that a hearing includes "argument" and does not restrict this to "oral argument." The trial court asserts that its constr

2005Malone v. West Marlborough Township Board of Supervisors, 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 347 , 570 A.2d 147 (1990). [5] I note that, although consideration of the submitted briefs may have been a part of the Board's private deliberation process, the transcript of the October 22, 2003, meeting reflects no public discussion of these briefs by the Board. [6] In concluding that oral argument and written argument are indistinguishable, the trial court notes that section 908(5) of the MPC states that a hearing includes "argument" and does not restrict this to "oral argument." The trial court asserts that its constr

2005Section 909.1(a)(2) of the MPC provides that a challenge must be filed “within 30 days after the effective date of such ordinance.” Citing Cranberry Park Associates v. Cranberry Township Zoning Hearing Board, 561 Pa. 456 , 751 A.2d 165 (2000), Appellants contend that because the Ordinance is void ab initio, it never became effective; thus, the statutory provisions which provide that the computation of the time period for a challenge commences on the Ordinance’s effective date are inapplicable. 5 Hence, Appellant’s take the position that, pursuant to the reasoning set forth in Cranberry Park As

2005Section 909.1(a)(2) of the MPC provides that a challenge must be filed “within 30 days after the effective date of such ordinance.” Citing Cranberry Park Associates v. Cranberry Township Zoning Hearing Board, 561 Pa. 456 , 751 A.2d 165 (2000), Appellants contend that because the Ordinance is void ab initio, it never became effective; thus, the statutory provisions which provide that the computation of the time period for a challenge commences on the Ordinance’s effective date are inapplicable. 5 Hence, Appellant’s take the position that, pursuant to the reasoning set forth in Cranberry Park As

1970Both the Township Code and the MPC provide for a challenge to an ordinance’s validity or legality by “any person aggrieved.” In Roeder v. Hatfield Borough Council, 439 Pa. 241 , 266 A. 2d 691 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a resident of the municipality was an aggrieved person.

1970Both the Township Code and the MPC provide for a challenge to an ordinance’s validity or legality by “any person aggrieved.” In Roeder v. Hatfield Borough Council, 439 Pa. 241 , 266 A. 2d 691 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a resident of the municipality was an aggrieved person.