one now bar in Pennsylvania

1938It was there stated (page 175) : “Though the same defendant figures in both cases, yet, since the record tendered as evidence involved an issue pending between a plaintiff other than the one now at bar, the mere fact that the injury to both plaintiffs occurred in the same accident and that the present plaintiff appeared as a witness for the other plaintiff, would not make the judgment for defendant in such other suit res judicata in this suit: Walker v. Phila., 195 Pa. 168,173-4 ; Siegfried v. Boyd, 237 Pa. 55, 58-60 .” See also Williams v. Lumbermen’s Ins.

1938The court, in a per curiam opinion, there said: “Though the same defendant figures in both cases, yet, since the record tendered as evidence involved an issue pending between a plaintiff other than the one now at bar, the mere fact that the injury to both plaintiffs occurred in the same accident and that the present plaintiff appeared as a witness for the other plaintiff, would not make the judgment for defendant in such other suit res judicata in this suit: Walker v. Phila., 195 Pa. 168, 173-4 ; Siegfried v. Boyd, 237 Pa. 55, 58-60 .” On the authority of the Woodburn case, the judgment is aff

1938It was there stated (page 175) : “Though the same defendant figures in both cases, yet, since the record tendered as evidence involved an issue pending between a plaintiff other than the one now at bar, the mere fact that the injury to both plaintiffs occurred in the same accident and that the present plaintiff appeared as a witness for the other plaintiff, would not make the judgment for defendant in such other suit res judicata in this suit: Walker v. Phila., 195 Pa. 168,173-4 ; Siegfried v. Boyd, 237 Pa. 55, 58-60 .” See also Williams v. Lumbermen’s Ins.

1938The court, in a per curiam opinion, there said: “Though the same defendant figures in both cases, yet, since the record tendered as evidence involved an issue pending between a plaintiff other than the one now at bar, the mere fact that the injury to both plaintiffs occurred in the same accident and that the present plaintiff appeared as a witness for the other plaintiff, would not make the judgment for defendant in such other suit res judicata in this suit: Walker v. Phila., 195 Pa. 168, 173-4 ; Siegfried v. Boyd, 237 Pa. 55, 58-60 .” On the authority of the Woodburn case, the judgment is aff

1996As well, in Hartung v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (City of Pittsburgh), 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 240 , 410 A.2d 1301 (1980), we explained that section 413 has no applicability to final receipts.

1996As well, in Hartung v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (City of Pittsburgh), 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 240 , 410 A.2d 1301 (1980), we explained that section 413 has no applicability to final receipts.

1941Reserve Acc. et al., 143 Pa. Superior Ct. 37 , 17 A. 2d 732 , cited by appellants as controlling the one now at bar, is readily distinguishable.

1941Reserve Acc. et al., 143 Pa. Superior Ct. 37 , 17 A. 2d 732 , cited by appellants as controlling the one now at bar, is readily distinguishable.

1940We recently cited a number of cases dealing with this problem in Baker v. Freed, supra, a case comparable with the one now at bar and in which the circumstantial evidence was held sufficient to support the award.

1938Clark v. Clearfield Opera House Co. et al., 275 Pa. 244 , 119 A. 136 , is another illustration of the application of the principle.

1938Clark v. Clearfield Opera House Co. et al., 275 Pa. 244 , 119 A. 136 , is another illustration of the application of the principle.

1938Co. of Philadelphia, 332 Pa. 1 , 1 A. (2d) 658.

1936The cases of Leslie v. Cantanzaro, 272 Pa. 419 , 116 A. 504 , and Stickler v. Cantanzaro, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 63 , while not involving a right angle collision may readily be distinguished from the one now at bar.

1936The cases of Leslie v. Cantanzaro, 272 Pa. 419 , 116 A. 504 , and Stickler v. Cantanzaro, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 63 , while not involving a right angle collision may readily be distinguished from the one now at bar.

1936The cases of Leslie v. Cantanzaro, 272 Pa. 419 , 116 A. 504 , and Stickler v. Cantanzaro, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 63 , while not involving a right angle collision may readily be distinguished from the one now at bar.

1934It is referred to in McHugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197 (p. 201), as a somewhat extreme illustration of the application *34 of the doctrine that the failure of a party to an action to appear at the trial, when he has a strong motive to appear, may properly be considered as amounting to “evidence against him.” Moreover, the controlling facts and surrounding circumstances of the Brown case differ materially from those here present.

1933A. 742, as the substance of the proposition on the part of the insurer to the insured: “We will take two years in which to ascertain whether your representations are false or not, and whether you have been guilty of any fraud in obtaining the policy; and if, within that period, we cannot detect any such falsity or fraud, we will obligate ourselves to make no further inquiry, and to make no defense on account of them.” (See to the same effect Lawler v. Home Life Insurance Co. of America, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 409 .) None of these cases is decisive of. the one now at bar; in the Central Trust Comp