Chevron Oil test in Washington

2007But in 1992 in Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34 , 830 P.2d 318 (1992) the court rejected the Chevron Oil test.

2007But in 1992 in Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34 , 830 P.2d 318 (1992) the court rejected the Chevron Oil test.

2007Because the rejection of modified prospectivity precludes retroactive application of a new rule to some litigants when it is not applied to others, the Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the particular case.” Id. at 76 (quoting Beam Distilling, 501 U.S. at 543 ).

2007Because the rejection of modified prospectivity precludes retroactive application of a new rule to some litigants when it is not applied to others, the Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the particular case.” Id. at 76 (quoting Beam Distilling, 501 U.S. at 543 ).

2009In Atsbeha — a criminal case — we cited the Chevron Oil factors but did not employ a full analysis before determining that retroactive application of our decision in State v. Ellis, 136 Wn.2d 498 , 963 P.2d 843 (1998), would not be inequitable.

2009In Atsbeha — a criminal case — we cited the Chevron Oil factors but did not employ a full analysis before determining that retroactive application of our decision in State v. Ellis, 136 Wn.2d 498 , 963 P.2d 843 (1998), would not be inequitable.

2009See, e.g., Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 117 Haw. 92, 97 , 176 P.3d 91 (2008) (presumption of retroactive application may be overcome only by showing of substantial prejudice); Wiles v. Wiles, 289 Ark. 340, 342 , 711 S.W.2d 789 (1986) (exceptions to retroactive application based upon reliance); MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 657-58 , 672 N.E.2d 1 (1996) (reserving selective prospectivity for contract and property law where rights vested under prior rule); Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 398 , 881 P.2d 1376 (1994) (strong presumption

2009See, e.g., Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 117 Haw. 92, 97 , 176 P.3d 91 (2008) (presumption of retroactive application may be overcome only by showing of substantial prejudice); Wiles v. Wiles, 289 Ark. 340, 342 , 711 S.W.2d 789 (1986) (exceptions to retroactive application based upon reliance); MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 657-58 , 672 N.E.2d 1 (1996) (reserving selective prospectivity for contract and property law where rights vested under prior rule); Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 398 , 881 P.2d 1376 (1994) (strong presumption

2009See, e.g., Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 117 Haw. 92, 97 , 176 P.3d 91 (2008) (presumption of retroactive application may be overcome only by showing of substantial prejudice); Wiles v. Wiles, 289 Ark. 340, 342 , 711 S.W.2d 789 (1986) (exceptions to retroactive application based upon reliance); MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 657-58 , 672 N.E.2d 1 (1996) (reserving selective prospectivity for contract and property law where rights vested under prior rule); Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 398 , 881 P.2d 1376 (1994) (strong presumption

2009See, e.g., Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 117 Haw. 92, 97 , 176 P.3d 91 (2008) (presumption of retroactive application may be overcome only by showing of substantial prejudice); Wiles v. Wiles, 289 Ark. 340, 342 , 711 S.W.2d 789 (1986) (exceptions to retroactive application based upon reliance); MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 657-58 , 672 N.E.2d 1 (1996) (reserving selective prospectivity for contract and property law where rights vested under prior rule); Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 398 , 881 P.2d 1376 (1994) (strong presumption

2009Lau v. Nelson, 92 Wn.2d 823, 826-28 , 601 P.2d 527 (1979) (citing Vaughn v. Murray, 214 Kan. 456 , 521 P.2d 262 (1974)); see also Milbradt v. Margaris, 103 Wn.2d 337, 339-40 , 693 P.2d 78 (1985).

2009Lau v. Nelson, 92 Wn.2d 823, 826-28 , 601 P.2d 527 (1979) (citing Vaughn v. Murray, 214 Kan. 456 , 521 P.2d 262 (1974)); see also Milbradt v. Margaris, 103 Wn.2d 337, 339-40 , 693 P.2d 78 (1985).

2009Brown, 113 Wash.2d at 544 , 782 P.2d 1013 . [16] We used the term "selective prospectivity" exactly one time in Audett: "[I]n Chevron Oil the United States Supreme Court has suggested three factors to consider to determine whether a case should be given prospective application or selective prospectivity." Audett, 158 Wash.2d at 721, 147 P.3d 982 (emphasis added). [17] Our different treatment of retroactive application to settlement agreements compared to initial causes of action is further highlighted by our rejection of the Court of Appeals' use in Bradbury of the Chevron Oil test in favor of

2009Brown, 113 Wash.2d at 544 , 782 P.2d 1013 . [16] We used the term "selective prospectivity" exactly one time in Audett: "[I]n Chevron Oil the United States Supreme Court has suggested three factors to consider to determine whether a case should be given prospective application or selective prospectivity." Audett, 158 Wash.2d at 721, 147 P.3d 982 (emphasis added). [17] Our different treatment of retroactive application to settlement agreements compared to initial causes of action is further highlighted by our rejection of the Court of Appeals' use in Bradbury of the Chevron Oil test in favor of

2009Lau v. Nelson, 92 Wn.2d 823, 826-28 , 601 P.2d 527 (1979) (citing Vaughn v. Murray, 214 Kan. 456 , 521 P.2d 262 (1974)); see also Milbradt v. Margaris, 103 Wn.2d 337, 339-40 , 693 P.2d 78 (1985).

2009Lau v. Nelson, 92 Wn.2d 823, 826-28 , 601 P.2d 527 (1979) (citing Vaughn v. Murray, 214 Kan. 456 , 521 P.2d 262 (1974)); see also Milbradt v. Margaris, 103 Wn.2d 337, 339-40 , 693 P.2d 78 (1985).

2009Based upon the application of the Chevron Oil factors in United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1985), we held the rule announced in Brown would apply prospectively only.

2009Based upon the application of the Chevron Oil factors in United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1985), we held the rule announced in Brown would apply prospectively only.

2009In Atsbeha — a criminal case — we cited the Chevron Oil factors but did not employ a full analysis before determining that retroactive application of our decision in State v. Ellis, 136 Wn.2d 498 , 963 P.2d 843 (1998), would not be inequitable.

2009In Atsbeha — a criminal case — we cited the Chevron Oil factors but did not employ a full analysis before determining that retroactive application of our decision in State v. Ellis, 136 Wn.2d 498 , 963 P.2d 843 (1998), would not be inequitable.

2009Atsbeha, 142 Wn.2d at 916-17 .

2009Atsbeha, 142 Wn.2d at 916-17 .

2009Servs., Inc., 271 Kan. 743, 755 , 27 P.3d 1 (2001) (new decision will be applied prospectively only if all three Chevron Oil factors are satisfied). ¶18 States that retain selective prospectivity substantially limit its application.

2009Servs., Inc., 271 Kan. 743, 755 , 27 P.3d 1 (2001) (new decision will be applied prospectively only if all three Chevron Oil factors are satisfied). ¶18 States that retain selective prospectivity substantially limit its application.

2009We have not, in the years since Robinson was decided, followed such a rigid approach, and for good reason. ¶36 In fact, in In re Detention of Audett, 158 Wn.2d 712, 719-23 , 147 P.3d 982 (2006), we explicitly and deliberately applied the Chevron Oil factors to determine whether a rule regarding mental evaluations of alleged sexually violent predators announced in a prior case should be given prospective application or selective prospectivity rather than retroactive application.

2009We have not, in the years since Robinson was decided, followed such a rigid approach, and for good reason. ¶36 In fact, in In re Detention of Audett, 158 Wn.2d 712, 719-23 , 147 P.3d 982 (2006), we explicitly and deliberately applied the Chevron Oil factors to determine whether a rule regarding mental evaluations of alleged sexually violent predators announced in a prior case should be given prospective application or selective prospectivity rather than retroactive application.

2009The court said that “[t]he mere passage of time, without more, does not diminish our authority to impose a prospective-only application of a court decision.” Id. at 157 . ¶51 Thus, the Ohio Court held that whenever the issue of retroactivity-prospectivity is first addressed, the court may exercise discretion and apply a rule prospectively if the Chevron Oil factors show this is appropriate.

2009The court said that “[t]he mere passage of time, without more, does not diminish our authority to impose a prospective-only application of a court decision.” Id. at 157 . ¶51 Thus, the Ohio Court held that whenever the issue of retroactivity-prospectivity is first addressed, the court may exercise discretion and apply a rule prospectively if the Chevron Oil factors show this is appropriate.

2007Further, while the Washington Supreme Court cited to its earlier decision in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Department of Revenue for the elements of the Chevron Oil test, the next paragraph of that decision cites Robinson for the proposition that the precedential weight of Chevron Oil had been called into question by recent United States Supreme Court decisions. 129 Wn.2d 177, 184 , 916 P.2d 933 (1996).

2007Further, while the Washington Supreme Court cited to its earlier decision in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Department of Revenue for the elements of the Chevron Oil test, the next paragraph of that decision cites Robinson for the proposition that the precedential weight of Chevron Oil had been called into question by recent United States Supreme Court decisions. 129 Wn.2d 177, 184 , 916 P.2d 933 (1996).

2007This reinforces the conclusion that the court did not intend to overrule binding precedent sub silentio. ¶28 In Audett the Washington Supreme Court referred to the Chevron Oil analysis as instructive to determine whether to apply new civil commitment procedures from In re Detention of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 (2002).

2007This reinforces the conclusion that the court did not intend to overrule binding precedent sub silentio. ¶28 In Audett the Washington Supreme Court referred to the Chevron Oil analysis as instructive to determine whether to apply new civil commitment procedures from In re Detention of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 (2002).

2007The Washington Supreme Court “will not overrule such binding precedent sub silentio.” State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 548 , 973 P.2d 1049 (1999).

2007The Washington Supreme Court “will not overrule such binding precedent sub silentio.” State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 548 , 973 P.2d 1049 (1999).

2007This reinforces the conclusion that the court did not intend to overrule binding precedent sub silentio. ¶28 In Audett the Washington Supreme Court referred to the Chevron Oil analysis as instructive to determine whether to apply new civil commitment procedures from In re Detention of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 (2002).

2007This reinforces the conclusion that the court did not intend to overrule binding precedent sub silentio. ¶28 In Audett the Washington Supreme Court referred to the Chevron Oil analysis as instructive to determine whether to apply new civil commitment procedures from In re Detention of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 (2002).

2007The Washington Supreme Court “will not overrule such binding precedent sub silentio.” State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 548 , 973 P.2d 1049 (1999).

2007The Washington Supreme Court “will not overrule such binding precedent sub silentio.” State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 548 , 973 P.2d 1049 (1999).