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10 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschkegreen1 sentence2025This argument ignores that Monschke held, with five votes, that mandatory LWOP sentences under RCW 10.95.030 are unconstitutional when applied to 18- to 20-year-old offenders because they fail to allow for consideration of youth, in violation of our constitution’s prohibition on cruel punishment. 197 Wn.2d at 306-07, 326 (Gordon McCloud, J., lead opinion), 329 (González, C.J., concurring) (stating that “I concur with the lead opinion that the petitioners are entitled to a new sentencing hearing to determine whether their ages at the time of their crimes are a mitigating factor justifying a dow | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Garcia-Martinez
green
2 sentences2016State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. 2016State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Grewe
green
2 sentences1995State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)). [14] We examine in turn whether each of the three challenged reasons may be provided by a trial court as a legitimate justification for a downward departure from the standard sentence range under the framework just elaborated. *726 A "Extraordinarily Small Amount" of a Controlled Substance We first examine the trial court's reliance on the fact Alexander's crime involved only an "extraordinarily small amount" of cocaine as a reason for departure from the standard rang 1995State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)). [14] We examine in turn whether each of the three challenged reasons may be provided by a trial court as a legitimate justification for a downward departure from the standard sentence range under the framework just elaborated. *726 A "Extraordinarily Small Amount" of a Controlled Substance We first examine the trial court's reliance on the fact Alexander's crime involved only an "extraordinarily small amount" of cocaine as a reason for departure from the standard rang | 2 | 1995–2021 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1995State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)). [14] We examine in turn whether each of the three challenged reasons may be provided by a trial court as a legitimate justification for a downward departure from the standard sentence range under the framework just elaborated. *726 A "Extraordinarily Small Amount" of a Controlled Substance We first examine the trial court's reliance on the fact Alexander's crime involved only an "extraordinarily small amount" of cocaine as a reason for departure from the standard rang 1995State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)). [14] We examine in turn whether each of the three challenged reasons may be provided by a trial court as a legitimate justification for a downward departure from the standard sentence range under the framework just elaborated. *726 A "Extraordinarily Small Amount" of a Controlled Substance We first examine the trial court's reliance on the fact Alexander's crime involved only an "extraordinarily small amount" of cocaine as a reason for departure from the standard rang | 2 | 1995–2021 |
State v. Hughes
red
1 sentence2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Hughes
red
1 sentence2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. O'Dell
green
2 sentences2021I part company, however, with its analysis of the retroactivity of State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015). 2021I part company, however, with its analysis of the retroactivity of State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
1 sentence2020Cf. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 436 ; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Ramos
green
1 sentence2020Cf. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 436 ; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2020Cf. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 436 ; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence2020The State discussed the jury’s special verdict finding that Carson sold methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop at the sentencing hearing, but this special verdict alone did not support the imposition of the enhancements consecutively to each other. 7 No. 52812-6-II To the extent the State argues that the trial court’s sentence was proper because it satisfied the three-pronged test for an exceptional sentence articulated in State v. Davis, we reject that argument. 146 Wn. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1994The State cites State v. Nelson, 108 Wn.2d 491 , 740 P.2d 835 (1987) as support for its argument that a secondary role in a crime is not a "substantial and compelling reason to leave the standard range”. 1994The State cites State v. Nelson, 108 Wn.2d 491 , 740 P.2d 835 (1987) as support for its argument that a secondary role in a crime is not a "substantial and compelling reason to leave the standard range”. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.