at-will employment doctrine in West Virginia

2019In Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 210 W.Va. 740 , 559 S.E.2d 713 (2001), this Court recognized that in certain circumstances, the right of self-defense constitutes a substantial public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine as allowed by Harless.

2019In Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 210 W.Va. 740 , 559 S.E.2d 713 (2001), this Court recognized that in certain circumstances, the right of self-defense constitutes a substantial public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine as allowed by Harless.

2013An exception to the at-will employment doctrine recognizes that, in spite of the right of employers to terminate their employees, “[o]ne of the fundamental rights of an employee is the right not to be the victim of a ‘retaliatory discharge,’ that is, a discharge from employment where the employer’s motivation for the discharge is in contravention of a substantial public policy[.]” Kanagy, 208 W.Va. at 530 , 541 S.E.2d at 620 (quoting McClung v. Marion County Comm’n, 178 W.Va. 444, 450 , 360 S.E.2d 221, 227 (1987)).

2013An exception to the at-will employment doctrine recognizes that, in spite of the right of employers to terminate their employees, “[o]ne of the fundamental rights of an employee is the right not to be the victim of a ‘retaliatory discharge,’ that is, a discharge from employment where the employer’s motivation for the discharge is in contravention of a substantial public policy[.]” Kanagy, 208 W.Va. at 530 , 541 S.E.2d at 620 (quoting McClung v. Marion County Comm’n, 178 W.Va. 444, 450 , 360 S.E.2d 221, 227 (1987)).

2023Pursuant to our holding in Harless, an employee may assert a wrongful discharge claim against his employer, despite the customary at-will employment doctrine, if the employee proves that “the employer’s motivation for the discharge is to contravene some substantial public policy princip[le].” Syl., in part, id., 162 W.

2023West Virginia Code § 61-3-49b (eff. 2012) does not establish a substantial public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine pursuant to Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 162 W.

2019See Paralegal, 783 F.Supp. at 232 (finding public policy against falsifying material facts and evidence from Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(a), and 3.4(b)).

2010This Court previously has provided guidance regarding a determination of public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine: “‘[P]ublie policy’ is that principle of law which holds that ‘no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against public good ... ’ even though ‘no actual injury’ may have resulted therefrom in a particular case ‘to the public.’ ” Cordle, 174 W.Va. at 325 , 325 S.E.2d at 114 (internal citations omitted).

2010This Court previously has provided guidance regarding a determination of public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine: “‘[P]ublie policy’ is that principle of law which holds that ‘no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against public good ... ’ even though ‘no actual injury’ may have resulted therefrom in a particular case ‘to the public.’ ” Cordle, 174 W.Va. at 325 , 325 S.E.2d at 114 (internal citations omitted).

2000In Daley v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766 , 734 A.2d 112 (1999), for example, the court held that an at-will employee who claimed that she had been terminated in retaliation for criticizing her employer's failure to implement "family-friendly" policies had not established a wrongful discharge claim under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

2000In Daley v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766 , 734 A.2d 112 (1999), for example, the court held that an at-will employee who claimed that she had been terminated in retaliation for criticizing her employer's failure to implement "family-friendly" policies had not established a wrongful discharge claim under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.