38 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc.-The Hospital Co.green2 sentences2025See Austin, 967 S.W.2d at 401 . 2008Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc. , 967 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. 1998). | 8 | 8 |
Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauckgreen2 sentences2025However, in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, the Texas Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine, providing that an employee can maintain an action for wrongful termination when he was fired solely for refusing to commit an unlawful act carrying criminal penalties. 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985). 2023Although the Texas Supreme Court has recognized a “narrow exception” to the at-will employment doctrine that prohibits employers from terminating employment “for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act,” Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985), the Texas Legislature has not waived immunity for such a claim, and Leonard has not made one. | 7 | 17 |
Texas Department of Human Services v. Hindsgreen2 sentences2010See Texas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex.1995) (characterizing Sabine Pilot claim as “a cause of action for retaliatory discharge”). 2010See Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex.1995) (characterizing Sabine Pilot claim as "a cause of action for retaliatory discharge"). | 3 | 3 |
Eric D. Hillman v. Nueces County, Texas and Nueces County District Attorney's Officegreen2 sentences2023See Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 358–59. 2023See Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 358–59. | 2 | 2 |
County of Dallas v. Wilandgreen2 sentences2008This would clearly violate the at-will employment doctrine — and its general prohibition against wrongful termination claims by at-will employees — by creating liability where at law none may exist (ie., by allowing monetary recovery when the employer terminates the employee for a “bad reason”). 6 See, e.g., Wiland, 216 S.W.3d at 347 ; Brown, 965 S.W.2d at 502 . 2008This would clearly violate the at-will employment doctrine C and its general prohibition against wrongful termination claims by at-will employees C by creating liability where at law none may exist ( i.e. , by allowing monetary recovery when the employer terminates the employee for a A bad reason @ ). [6] See, e.g., Wiland , 216 S.W.3d at 347 ; Brown , 965 S.W.2d at 502 . | 2 | 2 |
City of Midland v. O'BRYANTgreen2 sentences2007In Sabine Pilot , the Texas Supreme Court recognized only one limited common-law exception to the at-will employment doctrine. (footnote: 4) See City of Midland v. O’Bryant , 18 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. 2000); Sabine Pilot , 687 S.W.2d at 735 . 2003See City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex.2000) (discussing legislative enactments affecting the employment relationship); Montgomery County Hosp. | 2 | 2 |
Salay v. Baylor Universitygreen2 sentences2006The legislature could have protected persons who assist or participate in any way in a proceeding under the workers' compensation statute, but chose to protect only *413 those persons who "testified." To apply the anti-retaliation statute to an employee who, like Griggs, has not actually engaged in activity declared by the legislature to be protected, would require this Court to "encroach on the at-will employment doctrine without express legislative action." Salay v. Baylor Univ., 115 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, pet. denied) (construing Labor Code section 21.055(4)). 2006The legislature could have protected persons who assist or participate in any way in a proceeding under the workers’ compensation statute, but chose to protect only those persons who “testified.” To apply the anti-retaliation statute to an employee who, like Griggs, has not actually engaged in activity declared by the legislature to be protected, would require this Court to “encroach on the at-will employment doctrine without express legislative action.” Salay v. Baylor Univ., 115 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, pet. denied) (construing Labor Code section 21.055(4)). | 2 | 2 |
Runge v. Raytheon E-Systems, Inc.green2 sentences2003Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc. , 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1998); Runge v. Raytheon E-Systems, Inc. , 57 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.). 2003Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.1998); Runge v. Raytheon E-Systems, Inc., 57 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no *375 pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Bishop v. Woodgreen2 sentences1993See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 , 96 S.Ct. 2074 , 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (affirming termination of at-will police officer). 1993See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 , 96 S.Ct. 2074 , 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (affirming termination of at-will police officer). | 2 | 2 |
Montgomery County Hospital District v. Browngreen2 sentences2008This would clearly violate the at-will employment doctrine — and its general prohibition against wrongful termination claims by at-will employees — by creating liability where at law none may exist (ie., by allowing monetary recovery when the employer terminates the employee for a “bad reason”). 6 See, e.g., Wiland, 216 S.W.3d at 347 ; Brown, 965 S.W.2d at 502 . 2008This would clearly violate the at-will employment doctrine C and its general prohibition against wrongful termination claims by at-will employees C by creating liability where at law none may exist ( i.e. , by allowing monetary recovery when the employer terminates the employee for a A bad reason @ ). [6] See, e.g., Wiland , 216 S.W.3d at 347 ; Brown , 965 S.W.2d at 502 . | 1 | 3 |
Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2021See Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. 2012) (“Apart from Sabine Pilot, this Court has steadfastly adhered to the employment at- will doctrine.” (citation omitted)); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (recognizing a narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine allowing employees to sue their employers if they are discharged “for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act”). 2021See Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. 2012) (“Apart from Sabine Pilot, this Court has steadfastly adhered to the employment at- will doctrine.” (citation omitted)); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (recognizing a narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine allowing employees to sue their employers if they are discharged “for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act”). | 1 | 1 |
Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarezgreen1 sentence2021Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 453 (Tex. 1996); see, e.g., Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (creating the at-will employment exception prohibiting employers from terminating employees for refusing to commit illegal acts) see also Word v. N. Jones Reg’l Health Sys., No. 05-06-00881-CV, 2007 WL 2421500 , at *4 (Tex. App.— Dallas Aug. 28, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Statutes protecting workers from retaliatory discharge are exceptions to the common law doctrine of employment at will.”). | 1 | 1 |
Double Ace, Inc. v. Popegreen1 sentence2018See, e.g. , Double Ace, Inc. v. Pope , 190 S.W.3d 18 , 28 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2005, no pet.) ; Crow v. Rockett Special Util. | 1 | 1 |
Marsh USA Inc. v. Cookgreen1 sentence2017Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 776 (Tex. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Sawyer, 430 S.W.3d at 399 . | 1 | 1 |
Gary Sawyer, Doug Kempf, Peter Barnaba, Sr., Geoff Rorrev, Tim Gregory v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Companygreen1 sentence2017Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 776 (Tex. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Sawyer, 430 S.W.3d at 399 . | 1 | 1 |
Midland Independent School District v. Watleygreen1 sentence2014See Watley, 216 S.W.3d at 376 ; Salazar, 88 S.W.3d at 353 ; Hohman, 6 S.W.3d at 777 ; Carroll, 938 S.W.2d at 134–35. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2002See also Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 882 F.Supp. 612, 616 (S.D.Tex.1995); Brown v. City of Galveston, 870 F.Supp. 155, 160 (S.D.Tex.1994) (citing Reynolds Mfg. 2002See also Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 882 F.Supp. 612, 616 (S.D.Tex.1995); Brown v. City of Galveston, 870 F.Supp. 155, 160 (S.D.Tex.1994) (citing Reynolds Mfg. | 1 | 1 |
Bird v. W.C.W.green1 sentence2002See Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 769 (considering, among other factors, the consequences of imposing a duty on a party). | 1 | 1 |
Figueroa v. Westgreen2 sentences2002See Figueroa v. West, 902 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) (holding that an at-will employee has no negligent-termination claim); Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170, 175-76 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (observing that there is no negligence exception to the at-will employment doctrine); see also Theisen, 636 N.W.2d at 82 (explaining that allowing a negligent-investigation claim would not only contradict the court’s refusal to recognize a negligent-discharge claim but would also “swallow[ ]” the at-will-employment rule). 2002See Figueroa v. West, 902 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) (holding that an at-will employee has no negligent-termination claim); Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170, 175-76 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (observing that there is no negligence exception to the at-will employment doctrine); see also Theisen, 636 N.W.2d at 82 (explaining that allowing a negligent-investigation claim would not only contradict the court’s refusal to recognize a negligent-discharge claim but would also “swallow[ ]” the at-will-employment rule). | 1 | 1 |
Shell Oil Co. v. Humphreygreen2 sentences2002See Figueroa v. West, 902 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) (holding that an at-will employee has no negligent-termination claim); Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170, 175-76 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (observing that there is no negligence exception to the at-will employment doctrine); see also Theisen, 636 N.W.2d at 82 (explaining that allowing a negligent-investigation claim would not only contradict the court’s refusal to recognize a negligent-discharge claim but would also “swallow[ ]” the at-will-employment rule). 2002See Figueroa v. West, 902 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) (holding that an at-will employee has no negligent-termination claim); Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170, 175-76 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (observing that there is no negligence exception to the at-will employment doctrine); see also Theisen, 636 N.W.2d at 82 (explaining that allowing a negligent-investigation claim would not only contradict the court’s refusal to recognize a negligent-discharge claim but would also “swallow[ ]” the at-will-employment rule). | 1 | 1 |
Theisen v. Covenant Medical Center, Inc.green2 sentences2002See Figueroa v. West, 902 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) (holding that an at-will employee has no negligent-termination claim); Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170, 175-76 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (observing that there is no negligence exception to the at-will employment doctrine); see also Theisen, 636 N.W.2d at 82 (explaining that allowing a negligent-investigation claim would not only contradict the court’s refusal to recognize a negligent-discharge claim but would also “swallow[ ]” the at-will-employment rule). 2002See Figueroa v. West, 902 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) (holding that an at-will employee has no negligent-termination claim); Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170, 175-76 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (observing that there is no negligence exception to the at-will employment doctrine); see also Theisen, 636 N.W.2d at 82 (explaining that allowing a negligent-investigation claim would not only contradict the court’s refusal to recognize a negligent-discharge claim but would also “swallow[ ]” the at-will-employment rule). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. City of Galveston, Tex.green2 sentences2002See also Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 882 F.Supp. 612, 616 (S.D.Tex.1995); Brown v. City of Galveston, 870 F.Supp. 155, 160 (S.D.Tex.1994) (citing Reynolds Mfg. 2002See also Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 882 F.Supp. 612, 616 (S.D.Tex.1995); Brown v. City of Galveston, 870 F.Supp. 155, 160 (S.D.Tex.1994) (citing Reynolds Mfg. | 1 | 1 |
| Leach v. Conoco, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carroll v. Black
green
1 sentence2014See Watley, 216 S.W.3d at 376 ; Salazar, 88 S.W.3d at 353 ; Hohman, 6 S.W.3d at 777 ; Carroll, 938 S.W.2d at 134–35. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Salazar v. Lopez
green
1 sentence2014See Watley, 216 S.W.3d at 376 ; Salazar, 88 S.W.3d at 353 ; Hohman, 6 S.W.3d at 777 ; Carroll, 938 S.W.2d at 134–35. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v. Hohman
green
1 sentence2014See Watley, 216 S.W.3d at 376 ; Salazar, 88 S.W.3d at 353 ; Hohman, 6 S.W.3d at 777 ; Carroll, 938 S.W.2d at 134–35. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re JFC
green
1 sentence2010Id. 10 The Sabine Pilot cause of action is an exception to the at-will-employment doctrine adopted in Texas courts. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Labs, Inc. , 765 S.W.2d 497 , 500–02 (Tex. App.— Austin 1989 , writ denied). [10] Under these circumstances, we decline appellant’s invitation to expand the limited common-law exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine under the facts of this case. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Reynolds Manufacturing Co. v. Mendoza
green
2 sentences2002Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ), stands for the proposition that where there is no express agreement limiting the employer's right to unilaterally amend or withdraw the personnel manual, no modification of the at-will employment doctrine will be found. 2002Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ), stands for the proposition that where there is no express agreement limiting the employer’s right to unilaterally amend or withdraw the personnel manual, no modification of the at-will employment doctrine will be found. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Molder v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
green
1 sentence2000See Leach, 892 S.W.2d at 961 ; Jones, 846 S.W.2d at 925 ; Molder, 665 S.W.2d at 177 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann
green
1 sentence2000See Leach, 892 S.W.2d at 961 ; Jones, 846 S.W.2d at 925 ; Molder, 665 S.W.2d at 177 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.