at-will employment doctrine in California

2014(See Lujan, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045 [terminating perceived whistleblowers “can effectively discourage the filing of those complaints”].) Otherwise, the policy to encourage the reporting of alleged violations will be frustrated. 18 “The employer is bound, at a minimum, to know the fundamental public policies of the state and nation as expressed in their constitutions and statutes; so limited, the public policy exception [to the at-will employment doctrine] presents no impediment to employers that operate within the bounds of law.” (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095 ; see Stevenson, s

2014Code, § 2922; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094 , overruled on another ground in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6 ; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172 .) The Supreme Court explained the foundations of the public policy-based wrongful discharge cause of action: "We have held that this public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be 4 Brede does not challenge the summary adjudication of his first cause of action for retaliation against whistleblowing based upon Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (a) (pre

2004DISCUSSION I, II * III Plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is a well-established exception to the at-will employment doctrine. ( Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167 ; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 665-671 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ]; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88-91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ].) While an employer may discharge an employee for any reason, or for no reason at all, an employer may not do so when the discharge violates “fundamental public policy.” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4

2004DISCUSSION I, II * III Plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is a well-established exception to the at-will employment doctrine. ( Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167 ; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 665-671 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ]; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88-91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ].) While an employer may discharge an employee for any reason, or for no reason at all, an employer may not do so when the discharge violates “fundamental public policy.” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4

2004DISCUSSION I, II * III Plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is a well-established exception to the at-will employment doctrine. ( Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167 ; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 665-671 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ]; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88-91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ].) While an employer may discharge an employee for any reason, or for no reason at all, an employer may not do so when the discharge violates “fundamental public policy.” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4

2004DISCUSSION I, II * III Plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is a well-established exception to the at-will employment doctrine. ( Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167 ; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 665-671 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ]; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88-91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ].) While an employer may discharge an employee for any reason, or for no reason at all, an employer may not do so when the discharge violates “fundamental public policy.” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4

2014Code, § 2922; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094 , overruled on another ground in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6 ; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172 .) The Supreme Court explained the foundations of the public policy-based wrongful discharge cause of action: "We have held that this public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be 4 Brede does not challenge the summary adjudication of his first cause of action for retaliation against whistleblowing based upon Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (a) (pre

2010A. Wrongful Termination (Tameny Claim) In Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 178 , the Supreme Court “recognized that although employers have the power to terminate employees at will, they may not terminate an employee for a reason that is contrary to public policy.” (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1076 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 63 P.3d 979 ] (Little).) “ ‘[The] public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be based on policies “carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions ....”’ [Citation.] Moreover,

2014(See Lujan, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045 [terminating perceived whistleblowers “can effectively discourage the filing of those complaints”].) Otherwise, the policy to encourage the reporting of alleged violations will be frustrated. 18 “The employer is bound, at a minimum, to know the fundamental public policies of the state and nation as expressed in their constitutions and statutes; so limited, the public policy exception [to the at-will employment doctrine] presents no impediment to employers that operate within the bounds of law.” (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095 ; see Stevenson, s

2014Code, § 2922; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094 , overruled on another ground in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6 ; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172 .) The Supreme Court explained the foundations of the public policy-based wrongful discharge cause of action: "We have held that this public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be 4 Brede does not challenge the summary adjudication of his first cause of action for retaliation against whistleblowing based upon Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (a) (pre

2014Code, § 2922; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094 , overruled on another ground in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6 ; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172 .) The Supreme Court explained the foundations of the public policy-based wrongful discharge cause of action: "We have held that this public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be 4 Brede does not challenge the summary adjudication of his first cause of action for retaliation against whistleblowing based upon Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (a) (pre

1998“In the absence of an express or implied agreement to the contrary, an employment relationship without a fixed term is presumed to be validly terminable at the will of either party, employer or employee, at any time. [Citations.]” (Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1251-1252 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223 , 876 P.2d 1022 ].) This at-will employment doctrine is not without exceptions.

2014Code, § 2922; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094 , overruled on another ground in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6 ; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172 .) The Supreme Court explained the foundations of the public policy-based wrongful discharge cause of action: "We have held that this public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be 4 Brede does not challenge the summary adjudication of his first cause of action for retaliation against whistleblowing based upon Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (a) (pre

2014Code, § 2922; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094 , overruled on another ground in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6 ; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172 .) The Supreme Court explained the foundations of the public policy-based wrongful discharge cause of action: "We have held that this public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be 4 Brede does not challenge the summary adjudication of his first cause of action for retaliation against whistleblowing based upon Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (a) (pre

1992Discussion A. Sources of the Public Policy Exception This court first recognized a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167 , and has since reaffirmed its commitment to that principle on several occasions (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d 654, 665-671 ; Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 23 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 303 , 801 P.2d 1054 , A.L.R.4th 1720]), and most recently in Rojo v. Kliger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 65, 88-89.

1992Discussion A. Sources of the Public Policy Exception This court first recognized a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167 , and has since reaffirmed its commitment to that principle on several occasions (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d 654, 665-671 ; Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 23 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 303 , 801 P.2d 1054 , A.L.R.4th 1720]), and most recently in Rojo v. Kliger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 65, 88-89.

2014Found., supra, 27 Cal.4th 1097 , our high court explained the foundations of the public policy-based exception to the at-will employment rule: " '[W]hile an at-will employee may be terminated for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a purpose that contravenes fundamental public policy.' [Citations.] We have held that this public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be based on policies 'carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions . . . .' [Ci

2014Found., supra, 27 Cal.4th 1097 , our high court explained the foundations of the public policy-based exception to the at-will employment rule: " '[W]hile an at-will employee may be terminated for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a purpose that contravenes fundamental public policy.' [Citations.] We have held that this public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be based on policies 'carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions . . . .' [Ci

1996(Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1174, 1186 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 , 864 P.2d 88 ]; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1091-1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ]; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 89-91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ]; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 661-671 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ]; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170-178 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ]; Greene v. Hawaiian Dredging Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 245, 251 [ 157 P.2d 367 ]; Petermann v. International Brotherhoo

1996(Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1174, 1186 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 , 864 P.2d 88 ]; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1091-1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ]; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 89-91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ]; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 661-671 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ]; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170-178 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ]; Greene v. Hawaiian Dredging Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 245, 251 [ 157 P.2d 367 ]; Petermann v. International Brotherhoo

2015Our conclusion is supported by the holding in Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1077 , where the California Supreme Court concluded that employees could not contractually waive their right to bring Tameny claims because “an employment agreement that required employees to waive claims that they were terminated in violation of public policy would itself be contrary to public policy.” The court explained its reasoning as follows: “A Tameny claim is almost by definition unwaivable. ‘[The] public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be based on policies “carefull

2010A. Wrongful Termination (Tameny Claim) In Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 178 , the Supreme Court “recognized that although employers have the power to terminate employees at will, they may not terminate an employee for a reason that is contrary to public policy.” (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1076 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 63 P.3d 979 ] (Little).) “ ‘[The] public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be based on policies “carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions ....”’ [Citation.] Moreover,

2014(See Lujan, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045 [terminating perceived whistleblowers “can effectively discourage the filing of those complaints”].) Otherwise, the policy to encourage the reporting of alleged violations will be frustrated. 18 “The employer is bound, at a minimum, to know the fundamental public policies of the state and nation as expressed in their constitutions and statutes; so limited, the public policy exception [to the at-will employment doctrine] presents no impediment to employers that operate within the bounds of law.” (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095 ; see Stevenson, s

2013(Gantt, at pp. 1090-1091.) "[T]his public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be based on policies 'carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions . . . .'" ( Silo, supra, at p. 1104 , quoting Gantt, at p. 1095.) Here, in seeking reversal of the portion of the judgment summarily adjudicating the third cause of action in favor of the Association, Foley contends her discharge violated the public policy delineated in Labor Code section 6310 (hereafter section 6310), which (she asserts) "prohibits employers from subjecting

2013(Gantt, at pp. 1090-1091.) "[T]his public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be based on policies 'carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions . . . .'" ( Silo, supra, at p. 1104 , quoting Gantt, at p. 1095.) Here, in seeking reversal of the portion of the judgment summarily adjudicating the third cause of action in favor of the Association, Foley contends her discharge violated the public policy delineated in Labor Code section 6310 (hereafter section 6310), which (she asserts) "prohibits employers from subjecting

2013(Gantt, at pp. 1090-1091.) "[T]his public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be based on policies 'carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions . . . .'" ( Silo, supra, at p. 1104 , quoting Gantt, at p. 1095.) Here, in seeking reversal of the portion of the judgment summarily adjudicating the third cause of action in favor of the Association, Foley contends her discharge violated the public policy delineated in Labor Code section 6310 (hereafter section 6310), which (she asserts) "prohibits employers from subjecting

2010For example, many statutes simply regulate conduct between private individuals, or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns.’ [Citation.]” (Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 563, 570 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] (Phillips).) “ ‘What is vindicated through the cause of action is not the terms or promises arising out of the particular employment relationship involved, but rather the public interest in not permitting employers to impose as a condition of employment a requirement that an employee act in a manner contrary to funda

2010For example, many statutes simply regulate conduct between private individuals, or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns.’ [Citation.]” (Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 563, 570 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] (Phillips).) “ ‘What is vindicated through the cause of action is not the terms or promises arising out of the particular employment relationship involved, but rather the public interest in not permitting employers to impose as a condition of employment a requirement that an employee act in a manner contrary to funda

2010For example, many statutes simply regulate conduct between private individuals, or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns.’ [Citation.]” (Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 563, 570 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] (Phillips).) “ ‘What is vindicated through the cause of action is not the terms or promises arising out of the particular employment relationship involved, but rather the public interest in not permitting employers to impose as a condition of employment a requirement that an employee act in a manner contrary to funda

2010For example, many statutes simply regulate conduct between private individuals, or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns.’ [Citation.]” (Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 563, 570 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ] (Phillips).) “ ‘What is vindicated through the cause of action is not the terms or promises arising out of the particular employment relationship involved, but rather the public interest in not permitting employers to impose as a condition of employment a requirement that an employee act in a manner contrary to funda

2006(Nedlloyd Lines B.V., supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 469, fn. 7 .) 10 The tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy provides a vehicle for recourse that otherwise would be unavailable under general rules of the at-will employment doctrine.

2004(Jersey v. John Muir Medical Center (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 ] (Jersey).) “Yet despite its broad acceptance, the principle underlying the public policy exception is more easily stated than applied.

2004(Jersey v. John Muir Medical Center (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 ] (Jersey).) “Yet despite its broad acceptance, the principle underlying the public policy exception is more easily stated than applied.

1998Because the Tameny court justified its adoption of a tortious wrongful termination cause of action only in the most abstract conceptual terms, subsequent cases have had to proceed on a tortuous, ad hoc, and sometimes internally inconsistent basis in attempting to define its parameters, responding in the main to “the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants.” (Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., supra, 461 N.Y.S.2d at p. 236 [ 448 N.E.2d at p. 90 ]; compare General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1180 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 ] [“positive law,”

1998Because the Tameny court justified its adoption of a tortious wrongful termination cause of action only in the most abstract conceptual terms, subsequent cases have had to proceed on a tortuous, ad hoc, and sometimes internally inconsistent basis in attempting to define its parameters, responding in the main to "the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants." ( Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., supra, 461 N.Y.S.2d at p. 236 , 448 N.E.2d 86 ; compare General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1180 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 ["positive law," apparen

1998Because the Tameny court justified its adoption of a tortious wrongful termination cause of action only in the most abstract conceptual terms, subsequent cases have had to proceed on a tortuous, ad hoc, and sometimes internally inconsistent basis in attempting to define its parameters, responding in the main to “the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants.” (Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., supra, 461 N.Y.S.2d at p. 236 [ 448 N.E.2d at p. 90 ]; compare General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1180 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 ] [“positive law,”

1998Because the Tameny court justified its adoption of a tortious wrongful termination cause of action only in the most abstract conceptual terms, subsequent cases have had to proceed on a tortuous, ad hoc, and sometimes internally inconsistent basis in attempting to define its parameters, responding in the main to “the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants.” (Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., supra, 461 N.Y.S.2d at p. 236 [ 448 N.E.2d at p. 90 ]; compare General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1180 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 ] [“positive law,”

1998(See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg (1991) 501 U.S. 1083, 1087 [ 111 S.Ct. 2749, 2755 , 115 L.Ed.2d 929 ] [false statements in proxy solicitation]; Thompson v. Thompson (1988) 484 U.S. 174, 178-179 [ 108 S.Ct. 513, 515-516 , 98 L.Ed.2d 512 ] [Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act]; Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp. (2d Cir. 1981) 645 F.2d 144, 145-146 [Federal Aviation Act provides no implied federal cause of action or remedy for wrongful discharge of private party].) As plaintiff observes, however, these cases are inapposite; they do not address the common law public policy exception to th

1998(See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg (1991) 501 U.S. 1083, 1087 [ 111 S.Ct. 2749, 2755 , 115 L.Ed.2d 929 ] [false statements in proxy solicitation]; Thompson v. Thompson (1988) 484 U.S. 174, 178-179 [ 108 S.Ct. 513, 515-516 , 98 L.Ed.2d 512 ] [Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act]; Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp. (2d Cir. 1981) 645 F.2d 144, 145-146 [Federal Aviation Act provides no implied federal cause of action or remedy for wrongful discharge of private party].) As plaintiff observes, however, these cases are inapposite; they do not address the common law public policy exception to th