continuous representation doctrine in West Virginia

2024Va. 498 , 482 S.E.2d 115 (1996) (“West Virginia adopts the continuous representation doctrine through which the statute of limitations in an attorney malpractice action is tolled until the professional relationship terminates with respect to the matter underlying the malpractice action.”). 15 date of the alleged individual incident of malpractice and not from the date of the last services rendered. 61 Am.

2021“West Virginia adopts the continuous representation doctrine through which the statute of limitations in an attorney malpractice action is tolled until the professional relationship terminates with respect to the matter underlying the malpractice action.” Syllabus point 6, Smith v. Stacy, 198 W.

2009See also, VanSickle v. Kohout, 215 W.Va. 433, 438 , 599 S.E.2d 856, 861 (2004) (applying continuous representation doctrine, and holding that "when a victim of legal malpractice terminates his or her relationship with the malpracticing attorney, subsequent efforts by new counsel to reverse or mitigate the harm through administrative or judicial appeals do not toll the statute of limitations."). [15] The continuous representation doctrine requires something more than a lawyer-client relationship.

2009See also, VanSickle v. Kohout, 215 W.Va. 433, 438 , 599 S.E.2d 856, 861 (2004) (applying continuous representation doctrine, and holding that "when a victim of legal malpractice terminates his or her relationship with the malpracticing attorney, subsequent efforts by new counsel to reverse or mitigate the harm through administrative or judicial appeals do not toll the statute of limitations."). [15] The continuous representation doctrine requires something more than a lawyer-client relationship.

2021Va. 43, 60 , 689 S.E.2d 255, 272 (2009) (“The continuous representation doctrine requires something more than a lawyer- client relationship.

2019In other words, this Court directed the finder of fact on remand to “resolve whether the statute[s] of limitation [were] tolled until the Spring of 2005 by [Lawyer Rockwell’s] continuous representation of the Dunns[.]” Id. 11 Following the Court’s determination that the continuous representation doctrine might apply to Mr. Rockwell, it examined the claims asserted against his wife, Mrs. Rockwell.

2021Va. 299, 303 , 484 S.E.2d 182, 186 (1997) (“It 8 has been widely held that . . . exceptions [to statutes of limitations] are strictly construed and are not enlarged by the courts upon considerations of apparent hardship.” (quotations and citations omitted)). 14 conclusion that the continuous representation doctrine has no application in this case.

2009See Preer v. Mims, 323 S.C. 516, 519 , 476 S.E.2d 472, 473 (1996) (commenting that the continuous treatment doctrine "has been adopted in one form or another by a significant number of courts around the country," and collecting cases).

2009See Preer v. Mims, 323 S.C. 516, 519 , 476 S.E.2d 472, 473 (1996) (commenting that the continuous treatment doctrine "has been adopted in one form or another by a significant number of courts around the country," and collecting cases).

1996A. Requirement of Continuity of Same or Related Service In Muller v. Sturman, 79 A.D.2d 482 , 437 N.Y.S.2d 205 (N.Y.App.Div.1981), the court explained that the continuous representation doctrine applies only where there are “clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney....” Id. 437 N.Y.S.2d at 208 .

1996A. Requirement of Continuity of Same or Related Service In Muller v. Sturman, 79 A.D.2d 482 , 437 N.Y.S.2d 205 (N.Y.App.Div.1981), the court explained that the continuous representation doctrine applies only where there are “clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney....” Id. 437 N.Y.S.2d at 208 .

1996In Morrison , the Kansas court recognized that “[a]t least one court has held that the continuous representation rule is not applicable when the client learns of the attorney’s negligence before the termination of the relationship.” 889 P.2d at 147 ; see Economy Housing Co., Inc. v. Rosenberg, 239 Neb. 267 , 475 N.W.2d 899 (1991). 9 As the Morrison court recognized, however, “this runs counter to the rationale for the rule ...” designed to permit a “client to work with the attorney to correct the error even though the client knows the error exists.” 889 P.2d at 147 .

1996In Morrison , the Kansas court recognized that “[a]t least one court has held that the continuous representation rule is not applicable when the client learns of the attorney’s negligence before the termination of the relationship.” 889 P.2d at 147 ; see Economy Housing Co., Inc. v. Rosenberg, 239 Neb. 267 , 475 N.W.2d 899 (1991). 9 As the Morrison court recognized, however, “this runs counter to the rationale for the rule ...” designed to permit a “client to work with the attorney to correct the error even though the client knows the error exists.” 889 P.2d at 147 .

1996In Morrison v. Watkins, 20 Kan.App.2d 411 , 889 P.2d 140 (1995), the court emphasized that the applicability of the continuous representation rule ceases when the attorney/client relationship terminates.

1996In Morrison v. Watkins, 20 Kan.App.2d 411 , 889 P.2d 140 (1995), the court emphasized that the applicability of the continuous representation rule ceases when the attorney/client relationship terminates.

1996The Supreme Court of Kentucky justifies application of the rule by reference to the underlying discovery rule, reasoning that the continuous representation rule is simply a “branch of the discovery rule,” which holds that “by virtue of the attorney-client relationship, there can be no effective discovery of the negligence so long as the relationship prevails.” Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Ky.1994).

1996The rule “recognizes the attorney’s superior knowledge of the law and the dependence of the client, and protects the client from an *505 unscrupulous attorney.” Id.