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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Laird v. Blackergreen2 sentences2023(Laird v. Blacker, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 618 ; see also Knoell v. Petrovich (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 164, 169 [rejecting argument that nonclient can invoke continuous representation tolling provision to toll the statute of limitations].) Therefore, the continuous representation rule does not apply to toll the limitations period in section 340.6. 2023(Laird v. Blacker, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 618 ; see also Knoell v. Petrovich (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 164, 169 [rejecting argument that nonclient can invoke continuous representation tolling provision to toll the statute of limitations].) Therefore, the continuous representation rule does not apply to toll the limitations period in section 340.6. | 2 | 5 |
Knoell v. Petrovichgreen2 sentences2023(Laird v. Blacker, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 618 ; see also Knoell v. Petrovich (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 164, 169 [rejecting argument that nonclient can invoke continuous representation tolling provision to toll the statute of limitations].) Therefore, the continuous representation rule does not apply to toll the limitations period in section 340.6. 2023(Laird v. Blacker, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 618 ; see also Knoell v. Petrovich (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 164, 169 [rejecting argument that nonclient can invoke continuous representation tolling provision to toll the statute of limitations].) Therefore, the continuous representation rule does not apply to toll the limitations period in section 340.6. | 2 | 2 |
Hensley v. Caiettigreen2 sentences2007Bill No. 298 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 9, 1977, p. 3; Statute of Limitations, at p. 24; Hensley v. Caietti (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1171 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 ].) This provision was intended to codify the continuous representation rule as it had then developed in other states. 2007Bill No. 298 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 9, 1977, p. 3; Statute of Limitations, at p. 24; Hensley v. Caietti (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1171 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 ].) This provision was intended to codify the continuous representation rule as it had then developed in other states. | 2 | 2 |
Gurkewitz v. Habermangreen2 sentences1993(See, e.g., Gurkewitz v. Haberman (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 328 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 14 ].) This view finds support in the Panacea article: “The proviso of subdivision 2 adopts in California the continuous representation rule as it exists in other jurisdictions,” citing three New York cases. 1993(See, e.g., Gurkewitz v. Haberman (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 328 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 14 ].) This view finds support in the Panacea article: “The proviso of subdivision 2 adopts in California the continuous representation rule as it exists in other jurisdictions,” citing three New York cases. | 1 | 2 |
Gonzalez v. Kalugreen1 sentence2020(Gonzalez v. Kalu (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 21, 28 (Gonzalez).) The statute’s legislative history likewise does not address the question. | 1 | 1 |
Gotek Energy, Inc. v. Socal IP Law Grp., LLPgreen1 sentence2020“In deciding whether an attorney continues to represent a client, we do not focus ‘ “on the client’s subjective beliefs” ’; instead, we objectively examine ‘ “evidence of an ongoing mutual relationship and of activities in furtherance of the relationship.” ’ ” (Shaoxing City Maolong Wuzhong Down Products, Ltd. v. Keehn & Associates, APC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038 (Shaoxing City); see also GoTek Energy, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1248 .) Representation ends “ ‘ “when the client actually has or reasonably should have no expectation that the attorney will provide further legal services.” ’ | 1 | 1 |
Flake v. Neumiller & Beardsleegreen1 sentence2020“In deciding whether an attorney continues to represent a client, we do not focus ‘ “on the client’s subjective beliefs” ’; instead, we objectively examine ‘ “evidence of an ongoing mutual relationship and of activities in furtherance of the relationship.” ’ ” (Shaoxing City Maolong Wuzhong Down Products, Ltd. v. Keehn & Associates, APC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038 (Shaoxing City); see also GoTek Energy, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1248 .) Representation ends “ ‘ “when the client actually has or reasonably should have no expectation that the attorney will provide further legal services.” ’ | 1 | 1 |
Shaoxing City Maolong Wuzhong Down Products, Ltd. v. Keehn & Associates, APCgreen1 sentence2020“In deciding whether an attorney continues to represent a client, we do not focus ‘ “on the client’s subjective beliefs” ’; instead, we objectively examine ‘ “evidence of an ongoing mutual relationship and of activities in furtherance of the relationship.” ’ ” (Shaoxing City Maolong Wuzhong Down Products, Ltd. v. Keehn & Associates, APC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038 (Shaoxing City); see also GoTek Energy, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1248 .) Representation ends “ ‘ “when the client actually has or reasonably should have no expectation that the attorney will provide further legal services.” ’ | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Haberman & Kassoygreen2 sentences1993(Jo hnson v. Haberman & Kassoy (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1468, 1474 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; Gurkewitz v. Haberman (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 328, 336 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 14 ].) The continuous representation rule was adopted in order to “ ‘avoid the disruption of an attorney-client relationship by a lawsuit while enabling the attorney to correct or minimize an apparent error, and to prevent an attorney from defeating a malpractice cause of action by continuing to represent the client until the statutory period has expired. . . .’” (Laird v. *120 Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606, 618 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 , 828 P.2 1993(Jo hnson v. Haberman & Kassoy (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1468, 1474 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; Gurkewitz v. Haberman (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 328, 336 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 14 ].) The continuous representation rule was adopted in order to “ ‘avoid the disruption of an attorney-client relationship by a lawsuit while enabling the attorney to correct or minimize an apparent error, and to prevent an attorney from defeating a malpractice cause of action by continuing to represent the client until the statutory period has expired. . . .’” (Laird v. *120 Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606, 618 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 , 828 P.2 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Muller v. Sturman
green
2 sentences1993“The New York rule is explained in Muller v. Sturman (1981) 79 App.Div.2d 482 [ 437 N.Y.S.2d 205, 208 ]: ‘In those cases where the continuous representation doctrine has been applied to attorney malpractice there are clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney *1172 often involving an attempt by the attorney to rectify an alleged act of malpractice [citations].’ Further, ‘application of the continuous representation doctrine in attorney malpractice envisions a relationship between the parties that is marked with trust and c 1987The *848 New York rule in attorney malpractice cases was derived from concepts delineated in medical malpractice decisions.” (Ibid.) The New York rule is explained in Muller v. Sturman (1981) 79 App.Div.2d 482 [ 437 N.Y.S.2d 205, 208 ]: “In those cases where the continuous representation doctrine has been applied to attorney malpractice there are clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney often involving an attempt by the attorney to rectify an alleged act of malpractice [citations].” Further, “application of the continuou | 2 | 1987–1993 |
Foxborough v. Van Atta
green
1 sentence2020Section 340.6, subdivision (a)(2) (hereafter section 340.6(a)(2)), provides that the statute of limitations “shall be tolled during the time that . . . [¶] The attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred.” As the text of section 340.6(a)(2) indicates, the continuous representation exception applies only to the attorney’s representation of the plaintiff in the “specific subject matter” in which the alleged wrongdoing occurred. (§ 340.6(a)(2).) In light of its limitation to a “matter,” the exception is | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price
green
1 sentence2020(See Jocer, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 571 .) Similarly, evidence that an attorney continued to bill a client for work related to the matter defeated summary judgment over the application of section 340.6(a)(2), notwithstanding evidence that another attorney had taken over the representation. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cristler v. Express Messenger Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009(Cristler v. Express Messenger Systems, Inc., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 81 .) The billing records were apparently relevant to establish the absence of any triable issue of fact on two pivotal issues: (1) whether Plaintiffs first sustained actual injury no later than March 2006 (because they were required to obtain new counsel to litigate the matters raised in the Miller Lawsuit), and (2) whether the tolling provisions of the continuous representation exception were inapplicable (because Plaintiffs were represented by a different attorney in the Miller Lawsuit). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Siegel v. Kranis
green
2 sentences2007Bill No. 298 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 17, 1977, p. 3; Statute of Limitations, at p. 24; Hensley , at p. 1171.) Notably, however, in the few years since the rule’s 1968 development by a pair of New York courts (Siegel v. Kranis (N.Y.App.Div. 1968) 29 A.D.2d 477 [ 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834-835 ]; Wilson v. Econom (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1968) 56 Misc.2d 272 [ 288 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383-384 ]; see Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice (2007 ed.) § 22.13, pp. 397-398), the rule had been extended only to tolling of an action based on continued representation by the defendant attorney or firm. 4 We are thus re 2007Bill No. 298 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 17, 1977, p. 3; Statute of Limitations, at p. 24; Hensley , at p. 1171.) Notably, however, in the few years since the rule’s 1968 development by a pair of New York courts (Siegel v. Kranis (N.Y.App.Div. 1968) 29 A.D.2d 477 [ 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834-835 ]; Wilson v. Econom (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1968) 56 Misc.2d 272 [ 288 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383-384 ]; see Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice (2007 ed.) § 22.13, pp. 397-398), the rule had been extended only to tolling of an action based on continued representation by the defendant attorney or firm. 4 We are thus re | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Wilson v. Econom
green
2 sentences2007Bill No. 298 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 17, 1977, p. 3; Statute of Limitations, at p. 24; Hensley , at p. 1171.) Notably, however, in the few years since the rule’s 1968 development by a pair of New York courts (Siegel v. Kranis (N.Y.App.Div. 1968) 29 A.D.2d 477 [ 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834-835 ]; Wilson v. Econom (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1968) 56 Misc.2d 272 [ 288 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383-384 ]; see Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice (2007 ed.) § 22.13, pp. 397-398), the rule had been extended only to tolling of an action based on continued representation by the defendant attorney or firm. 4 We are thus re 2007Bill No. 298 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 17, 1977, p. 3; Statute of Limitations, at p. 24; Hensley , at p. 1171.) Notably, however, in the few years since the rule’s 1968 development by a pair of New York courts (Siegel v. Kranis (N.Y.App.Div. 1968) 29 A.D.2d 477 [ 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834-835 ]; Wilson v. Econom (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1968) 56 Misc.2d 272 [ 288 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383-384 ]; see Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice (2007 ed.) § 22.13, pp. 397-398), the rule had been extended only to tolling of an action based on continued representation by the defendant attorney or firm. 4 We are thus re | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Shapero v. Fliegel
green
2 sentences1993(Mallen, supra, Panacea, 52 Cal. State Bar J. at p. 24, fn. omitted.) Caietti places principal reliance upon Shapero v. Fliegel (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 842 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 696 ] which provides the following synopsis of the “continuous representation” rule. 1993(Mallen, supra, Panacea, 52 Cal. State Bar J. at p. 24, fn. omitted.) Caietti places principal reliance upon Shapero v. Fliegel (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 842 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 696 ] which provides the following synopsis of the “continuous representation” rule. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.