continuous representation doctrine in Connecticut

2019It further observed that in the interim between the trial court's decision and our Supreme Court's opinion, this court had recognized the continuous representation doctrine in Rosenfield v. Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle, LLC , 69 Conn. App. 151 , 166, 795 A.2d 572 (2002).

2019It further observed that in the interim between the trial court's decision and our Supreme Court's opinion, this court had recognized the continuous representation doctrine in Rosenfield v. Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle, LLC , 69 Conn. App. 151 , 166, 795 A.2d 572 (2002).

2002“The continuous treatment doctrine was first recognized in a medical malpractice context in Giambozi v. Peters, [ 127 Conn. 380 , 16 A.2d 833 (1940), overruled in part on other grounds, Foran v. Carangelo, 153 Conn. 356, 360 , 216 A.2d 638 (1966)]. [Our Supreme Court] stated in Giambozi that [t]he term malpractice itself may be applied to a single act of a physician or surgeon or, again, to a course of treatment.

2002“The continuous treatment doctrine was first recognized in a medical malpractice context in Giambozi v. Peters, [ 127 Conn. 380 , 16 A.2d 833 (1940), overruled in part on other grounds, Foran v. Carangelo, 153 Conn. 356, 360 , 216 A.2d 638 (1966)]. [Our Supreme Court] stated in Giambozi that [t]he term malpractice itself may be applied to a single act of a physician or surgeon or, again, to a course of treatment.

1995Textile Mills, Inc. v. Brown, Jacobson, Tillinghast, Lahan King, P.C., 32 Conn. App. 786 (1993), the Appellate Court reaffirmed this criteria by noting, "the continuous representation rule has been defined as follows: it tolls the statute of limitations or defers accrual of the cause of action while the attorney continues to represent the client and the representations relates to the same transaction or subject matter as the negligent acts.

1994Although the continuous representation rule discussed in Textile Mills , supra, 32 Conn. App. 786 , was not expressly adopted by the Appellate Court in that case, the Supreme Court implicitly accepted and followed the rationale for the rule in Robbins v. McGuinness , 178 Conn. 258 , 261-62 , when it held that an attorney has no continuing duty to his former client where the error can no longer be corrected and his representation in the matter has terminated.

1995Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758 , 762 (N.D. 1986)." S.M.S.

1994Similarly, the rationale given by the courts that have applied the continuing course of conduct doctrine to legal malpractice cases by adopting the continuous representation rule is that the rule gives an attorney the opportunity to remedy his error or to establish that no error was made during the time that "the attorney continues to represent the client and the representation relates to the same transaction or subject matter as the allegedly negligent acts." Wall v. Lewis , 393 N.W.2d 758 , 762-63 (N.D. 1986).

2019The Second Circuit questioned the extent to which it is appropriate to rely on continuous treatment cases for guidance when analyzing a case under the continuing course of conduct doctrine because of certain differences between the doctrines. **506 The doctrines differ in certain important respects but "share similar supporting rationales." Martinelli v. Fusi , supra, 290 Conn. at 356 , 963 A.2d 640 ; see Sean O'Kane A.I.A.

2019The Second Circuit questioned the extent to which it is appropriate to rely on continuous treatment cases for guidance when analyzing a case under the continuing course of conduct doctrine because of certain differences between the doctrines. **506 The doctrines differ in certain important respects but "share similar supporting rationales." Martinelli v. Fusi , supra, 290 Conn. at 356 , 963 A.2d 640 ; see Sean O'Kane A.I.A.

2019Under that rule, a plaintiff may invoke the doctrine, and thus toll the statute of limitations, when the plaintiff can show: (1) that the defendant continued to represent him with regard to the same underlying matter; and (2) either that the plaintiff did not know of the alleged malpractice or that the attorney could still mitigate the harm allegedly caused by that malpractice during the continued representation period." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks *770 omitted.) Farnsworth v. O'Doherty , 85 Conn. App. 145 , 150, 856 A.2d 518 (2004).

2019Under that rule, a plaintiff may invoke the doctrine, and thus toll the statute of limitations, when the plaintiff can show: (1) that the defendant continued to represent him with regard to the same underlying matter; and (2) either that the plaintiff did not know of the alleged malpractice or that the attorney could still mitigate the harm allegedly caused by that malpractice during the continued representation period." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks *770 omitted.) Farnsworth v. O'Doherty , 85 Conn. App. 145 , 150, 856 A.2d 518 (2004).

2016If the trier of fact finds that the defendants continued to represent the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs retained Fuller and Pearson, it will then have to determine whether Fitzpatrick was able to or would have been able to mitigate his professional negligence. 18 After reviewing the record and considering the law regarding professional negligence, the statute of limitations, and the continuous representation doctrine, we conclude that there are many genuine issues of material fact and that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plainti

2016If the trier of fact finds that the defendants continued to represent the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs retained Fuller and Pearson, it will then have to determine whether Fitzpatrick was able to or would have been able to mitigate his professional negligence. 18 After reviewing the record and considering the law regarding professional negligence, the statute of limitations, and the continuous representation doctrine, we conclude that there are many genuine issues of material fact and that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plainti

2016If the trier of fact finds that the defendants continued to represent the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs retained Fuller and Pearson, it will then have to determine whether Fitzpatrick was able to or would have been able to mitigate his professional negligence. 18 After reviewing the record and considering the law regarding professional negligence, the statute of limitations, and the continuous representation doctrine, we conclude that there are many genuine issues of material fact and that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plainti

2016If the trier of fact finds that the defendants continued to represent the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs retained Fuller and Pearson, it will then have to determine whether Fitzpatrick was able to or would have been able to mitigate his professional negligence. 18 After reviewing the record and considering the law regarding professional negligence, the statute of limitations, and the continuous representation doctrine, we conclude that there are many genuine issues of material fact and that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plainti

2016In Targonski v. Clebowicz, supra, 142 Conn.App. at 97 , 63 A.3d 1001 , this court applied the continuous representation doctrine in the context of a real estate transaction; id., at 99 , 63 A.3d 1001 ; which notably is not litigation, but the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine because the plaintiff buyers were unaware of the defendant attorney's negligence for several years.

2016In Targonski v. Clebowicz, supra, 142 Conn.App. at 97 , 63 A.3d 1001 , this court applied the continuous representation doctrine in the context of a real estate transaction; id., at 99 , 63 A.3d 1001 ; which notably is not litigation, but the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine because the plaintiff buyers were unaware of the defendant attorney's negligence for several years.

2016Under § 10-57, "the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense." Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn.App. 680 , 688, 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009).

2016Under § 10-57, "the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense." Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn.App. 680 , 688, 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009).

2016Under § 10-57, "the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense." Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn.App. 680 , 688, 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009).

2016Under § 10-57, "the continuing course of conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense." Beckenstein Enterprises-Prestige Park, LLC v. Keller, 115 Conn.App. 680 , 688, 974 A.2d 764 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 916 , 979 A.2d 488 (2009).

2016The plaintiffs filed a motion to reargue in which they claimed that the court had misapprehended or overlooked significant issues of material fact and that this court's decision in Cefaratti v. Aranow, 154 Conn.App. 1 , 19-20, 105 A.3d 265 (2014) (genuine issue of material fact whether continuing course of treatment doctrine tolled statute of limitations in medical malpractice action), aff'd, 321 Conn. 637 , 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016) (same), cast doubt on the trial court's reasoning.

2016The plaintiffs filed a motion to reargue in which they claimed that the court had misapprehended or overlooked significant issues of material fact and that this court's decision in Cefaratti v. Aranow, 154 Conn.App. 1 , 19-20, 105 A.3d 265 (2014) (genuine issue of material fact whether continuing course of treatment doctrine tolled statute of limitations in medical malpractice action), aff'd, 321 Conn. 637 , 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016) (same), cast doubt on the trial court's reasoning.

2016If the trier of fact finds that the defendants continued to represent the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs retained Fuller and Pearson, it will then have to determine whether Fitzpatrick was able to or would have been able to mitigate his professional negligence. 18 After reviewing the record and considering the law regarding professional negligence, the statute of limitations, and the continuous representation doctrine, we conclude that there are many genuine issues of material fact and that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plainti

2016If the trier of fact finds that the defendants continued to represent the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs retained Fuller and Pearson, it will then have to determine whether Fitzpatrick was able to or would have been able to mitigate his professional negligence. 18 After reviewing the record and considering the law regarding professional negligence, the statute of limitations, and the continuous representation doctrine, we conclude that there are many genuine issues of material fact and that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plainti

2011In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 The individual defendants all are attorneys with the firm of Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP. 2 General Statutes § 52-577 provides: “No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.” 3 The fourth revised complaint is the operative complaint and was fitted on June 7, 2007. 4 The plaintiff has not contested the finding of the trial court regarding negligent misrepresentation. 5 With regard to the continuous representation doctrine, the court made the following observations: (1)

2011In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 The individual defendants all are attorneys with the firm of Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP. 2 General Statutes § 52-577 provides: “No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.” 3 The fourth revised complaint is the operative complaint and was fitted on June 7, 2007. 4 The plaintiff has not contested the finding of the trial court regarding negligent misrepresentation. 5 With regard to the continuous representation doctrine, the court made the following observations: (1)

2011In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 The individual defendants all are attorneys with the firm of Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP. 2 General Statutes § 52-577 provides: “No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.” 3 The fourth revised complaint is the operative complaint and was fitted on June 7, 2007. 4 The plaintiff has not contested the finding of the trial court regarding negligent misrepresentation. 5 With regard to the continuous representation doctrine, the court made the following observations: (1)

2011In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 The individual defendants all are attorneys with the firm of Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP. 2 General Statutes § 52-577 provides: “No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.” 3 The fourth revised complaint is the operative complaint and was fitted on June 7, 2007. 4 The plaintiff has not contested the finding of the trial court regarding negligent misrepresentation. 5 With regard to the continuous representation doctrine, the court made the following observations: (1)

2003Mallen and Smith indicates the jurisdictions that follow the continuous representation rule vary its application but since there is only one Connecticut appellate case on the subject the court will follow what they call the "common rule" which requires: "(1) ongoing representation by the lawyer; (2) on the same subject matter; (3) that is continuous." § 22.13 at p. 431; cf. SMS Textile Mills, Inc. v. Brown, Jacobsen, Tillinghast, Lahan King, P.C., 39 Conn. App. 786 , 791 (1993) (rule considered and rejected but described by court). (a) There is a breach of contract claim regarding the represen

2003Mallen and Smith indicates the jurisdictions that follow the continuous representation rule vary its application but since there is only one Connecticut appellate case on the subject the court will follow what they call the "common rule" which requires: "(1) ongoing representation by the lawyer; (2) on the same subject matter; (3) that is continuous." § 22.13 at p. 431; cf. SMS Textile Mills, Inc. v. Brown, Jacobsen, Tillinghast, Lahan King, P.C., 39 Conn. App. 786 , 791 (1993) (rule considered and rejected but described by court). (a) There is a breach of contract claim regarding the represen

2003As the court said in Wilson v. Econom , CT Page 3385 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 , 383-84 (1968), ". . . clients rarely consult other attorneys while their case is pending.

2003See, e.g., Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968); Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith, 38 Ohio St. 3d 385, 387 , 528 N.E.2d 941 (1988).

2003See, e.g., Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968); Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith, 38 Ohio St. 3d 385, 387 , 528 N.E.2d 941 (1988).

2003As to the firm and its purported CT Page 3383 partners and as to Segal individually, the rule under the continuous representation doctrine is that: "Ordinarily, an attorney's representation is not complete until the agreed tasks or events have occurred . . ." 22.13, p. 441 of Law of Malpractice , Mallen and Smith, Vol. 3, p. 441; also see Maddox, et al v. Burlingame , 517 N.W.2d 816 , 818 (Mich., 1994); Chapman v. Sullivan , 411 N.W.2d 754 , 755 (Mich., 1987); Panattoni, et al v. Superior Court , 250 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 392 (1988); cf. Worthington v. Ruconi , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 , 174 (1994).