contentions error in Illinois

2012While the reviewing court agreed with the State that it was possible that the certificate merely omitted some words and that counsel had in fact ascertained the defendant’s contentions of error in the guilty plea and the sentence, the court did “not know with certainty because counsel failed to strictly comply with [the] Rule.” Id. at 768 . ¶7 Most recently, in People v. Richard, 2012 IL App (5th) 100302 , the court held that counsel’s certification that he had ascertained the defendant’s “ ‘contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights’ ” (id. ¶ 8) did not show that counsel had ascertai

2012While arguments are made that each of the defendant's claims of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty in the instant case has a constitutional basis, thus making counsel's certification sufficient, this circumvents the purpose of Rule 604(d). ¶ 13 In People v. Prather, 379 Ill.App.3d 763 , 320 Ill.Dec. 264 , 887 N.E.2d 44 (2008), the Fourth District held that counsel's certification that he ascertained the defendant's contention of "error and sentence" was insufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 604(d). 379 Ill.App.3d at 768 , 320 Ill.Dec. 264 , 887 N.E.2d 44 .

2025In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 406 (1998).

2025In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 406 (1998).

2025Webber v. Wight & Co., 368 Ill.

2025Webber v. Wight & Co., 368 Ill.

2006Though Illinois courts distinguish the terms "void" and "voidable" for the purposes of determining the propriety of collateral attacks (People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155-56 (1993)), that distinction does not bear upon on the issues raised by the instant case, since Barnes' original sentence was properly 16 1-03-2334 vacated upon his motion for resentencing.

2006Though Illinois courts distinguish the terms “void” and “voidable” for the purposes of determining the propriety of collateral attacks (People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155-56 (1993)), that distinction does not bear upon on the issues raised by the instant case, since Barnes’ original sentence was properly vacated upon his motion for resentencing.

2006Brown, 83 Ill. 2d at 350 ; accord Hampton, 252 Ill.

2006Brown, 83 Ill. 2d at 350 ; accord Hampton, 252 Ill.

2005People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 509-10 , 782 N.E.2d 251, 257-58 (2002).

2005People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 509-10 , 782 N.E.2d 251, 257-58 (2002).

2004Defendant contends that this matter must be remanded for a new fitness hearing and, if necessary, a new trial, because the trial court failed to make an independent judgment regarding her fitness to stand trial. "[T]he due process clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions prohibit the prosecution of a defendant who is unfit for trial." People v. Cleer , 328 Ill.

2004Defendant contends that this matter must be remanded for a new fitness hearing and, if necessary, a new trial, because the trial court failed to make an independent judgment regarding her fitness to stand trial. “[T]he due process clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions prohibit the prosecution of a defendant who is unfit for trial.” People v. Cleer, 328 Ill.

2025See Suaste-Gonzalez, 2023 IL App (2d) 220323, ¶ 33 (refusing “to speculate as to whether an examination of the record and consultation with defendant occurred” where the record did not show “that counsel actually discussed with defendant the contentions of error in the guilty plea or sentence after counsel was furnished with the appropriate transcripts.” (Emphasis in original.)); see also Richard, 2012 IL App (5th) 100302, ¶ 10 (“[T]his court cannot simply assume or infer compliance with Rule 604(d)” as any issue not raised in the postplea motion is waived). -7- No. 1-23-1125 ¶ 21 Thus, we con

2012While the reviewing court agreed with the State that it was possible that the certificate merely omitted some words and that counsel had in fact ascertained the defendant’s contentions of error in the guilty plea and the sentence, the court did “not know with certainty because counsel failed to strictly comply with [the] Rule.” Id. at 768 . ¶7 Most recently, in People v. Richard, 2012 IL App (5th) 100302 , the court held that counsel’s certification that he had ascertained the defendant’s “ ‘contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights’ ” (id. ¶ 8) did not show that counsel had ascertai

2025See Suaste-Gonzalez, 2023 IL App (2d) 220323, ¶ 33 (refusing “to speculate as to whether an examination of the record and consultation with defendant occurred” where the record did not show “that counsel actually discussed with defendant the contentions of error in the guilty plea or sentence after counsel was furnished with the appropriate transcripts.” (Emphasis in original.)); see also Richard, 2012 IL App (5th) 100302, ¶ 10 (“[T]his court cannot simply assume or infer compliance with Rule 604(d)” as any issue not raised in the postplea motion is waived). -7- No. 1-23-1125 ¶ 21 Thus, we con

2023In Easton, our supreme court highlighted the importance of consultation in furthering the purpose of Rule 604(d) by finding that -9- 2023 IL App (2d) 220323 the prior language of Rule 604(d)—which used the conjunction “or” rather than the current conjunction “and”—should be read to require that counsel certify that she or he has consulted with the defendant to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty.

2015More important, counsel's certifying that he consulted with the defendant about both types of error would make it more likely, rather than less likely, that all of the contentions of error were included in the post-plea motion, enabling the trial court to address and correct any improper conduct or errors of the trial court that may have produced the guilty plea." (Emphases in original.) Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329, ¶ 19 , 5 N.E.3d 176 . ¶ 23 Rejecting the State's literal, disjunctive reading of Rule 604(d) as contrary to the rule's purpose, our supreme court concluded as follows: "We hold that

2015More important, counsel's certifying that he consulted with the defendant about both types of error would make it more likely, rather than less likely, that all of the contentions of error were included in the post-plea motion, enabling the trial court to address and correct any improper conduct or errors of the trial court that may have produced the guilty plea." (Emphases in original.) Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329, ¶ 19 , 5 N.E.3d 176 . ¶ 23 Rejecting the State's literal, disjunctive reading of Rule 604(d) as contrary to the rule's purpose, our supreme court concluded as follows: "We hold that

1988Our concern here is to "promote judicial economy and finality of judgments" while "protecting the integrity of the judicial system and the rights of criminal defendants." ( People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 190 .) Our review of the defendant's contentions of error in this case will be guided by those principles.

1988Our concern here is to “promote judicial economy and finality of judgments” while “protecting the integrity of the judicial system and the rights of criminal defendants.” (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190 .) Our review of the defendant’s contentions of error in this case will be guided by those principles.

2025Within that statutory range, the trial court is charged with fashioning a sentence based upon the particular circumstances of the individual case, including the nature of the offense and the character of the defendant.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 55 (1999).

2025“The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference.” People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010).