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70 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 18 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Grahamgreen2 sentences2026See id. at 351-52 . ¶ 17 Turning to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that as the Illinois Supreme Court explained in People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003): “Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). [Citation.] Under Strickland, a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding wo 2025Specifically, “a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). ¶ 30 In Hattery, our supreme court held prejudice will be presumed “[w]here ‘counsel entirely | 10 | 17 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2021Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 143-44 (2005). 2016People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 143-44 (2005). | 9 | 9 |
People v. Alvinegreen2 sentences2004People v. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 293 (1996). 2004People v. Alvine, 173 Ill.2d 273, 293 , 219 Ill.Dec. 546 , 671 N.E.2d 713 (1996). | 8 | 8 |
People v. Wheelergreen2 sentences2022People v. Wheeler, 401 Ill. 2022People v. Wheeler, 401 Ill. | 7 | 8 |
People v. Herrongreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87 (noting that under the first prong of the plain-error doctrine, the defendant must prove the error was prejudicial, and under the second prong, prejudice to the defendant is presumed). ¶ 23 It is axiomatic that a defendant who acquiesces to an alleged error cannot later argue that he or she was prejudiced by the error. 2022Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187 (stating that the defendant must prove the error was prejudicial under the first prong of the plain error rule). 1 ¶ 24 In contrast, under the second prong of the plain error rule, the reviewing courts are not concerned with “prejudicial” error. | 4 | 4 |
People v. Boydgreen2 sentences2011"To obtain relief under Strickland , a defendant must prove that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance caused prejudice by creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the trial result would have been different." Id. ¶ 17 "`An attorney's failure to seek discharge of his client on speedy-trial grounds generally will be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been discharged had a timely motion for discharge been made and no jus 2011"To obtain relief under Strickland , a defendant must prove that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance caused prejudice by creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the trial result would have been different." Id. ¶ 17 "`An attorney's failure to seek discharge of his client on speedy-trial grounds generally will be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been discharged had a timely motion for discharge been made and no jus | 3 | 7 |
People v. Halegreen2 sentences2025Specifically, “a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). ¶ 30 In Hattery, our supreme court held prejudice will be presumed “[w]here ‘counsel entirely 2025Specifically, “a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). ¶ 49 A. The State’s Appeal—Alibi Witnesses ¶ 50 1. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Shortygreen2 sentences2018See People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 , 830 N.E.2d 467, 479 (2005) (stating the defendant must prove the error was prejudicial under the first prong of the plain-error analysis); see also People v. Shorty, 408 Ill. 2017See People v. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d 167 , 187, 294 Ill.Dec. 55 , 830 N.E.2d 467 , 479 (2005) (stating the defendant must prove the error was prejudicial under the first prong of the plain-error analysis); see also People v. Shorty , 408 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026See id. at 351-52 . ¶ 17 Turning to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that as the Illinois Supreme Court explained in People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003): “Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). [Citation.] Under Strickland, a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding wo 2025Specifically, “a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). ¶ 30 In Hattery, our supreme court held prejudice will be presumed “[w]here ‘counsel entirely | 1 | 10 |
Michel v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2018Specifically, “a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). ¶ 46 In accordance with Strickland, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged a 2017Specifically, "a defendant must prove that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." People v. Graham , 206 Ill. 2d 465 , 476, 276 Ill.Dec. 878 , 795 N.E.2d 231 (2003). ¶ 46 In accordance with Strickland , "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, und | 1 | 2 |
People v. Statengreen2 sentences2011"To obtain relief under Strickland , a defendant must prove that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance caused prejudice by creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the trial result would have been different." Id. ¶ 17 "`An attorney's failure to seek discharge of his client on speedy-trial grounds generally will be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been discharged had a timely motion for discharge been made and no jus 2011"To obtain relief under Strickland , a defendant must prove that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance caused prejudice by creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the trial result would have been different." Id. ¶ 17 "`An attorney's failure to seek discharge of his client on speedy-trial grounds generally will be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been discharged had a timely motion for discharge been made and no jus | 1 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2011Thus, if moving to discharge would have been successful, Shipp's counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. ¶ 18 Section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) provides that a defendant is entitled to a trial within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless his own acts occasioned delay. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2006). ¶ 19 "Where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional 2011Thus, if moving to discharge would have been successful, Shipp's counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. ¶ 18 Section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) provides that a defendant is entitled to a trial within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless his own acts occasioned delay. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2006). ¶ 19 "Where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional | 1 | 2 |
People v. Allengreen2 sentences2026See id. at 351-52 . ¶ 17 Turning to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that as the Illinois Supreme Court explained in People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003): “Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). [Citation.] Under Strickland, a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding wo 2026See id. at 351-52 . ¶ 17 Turning to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that as the Illinois Supreme Court explained in People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003): “Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). [Citation.] Under Strickland, a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding wo | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2025However, in People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 269 (1989), our supreme clarified there is no “per se ineffectiveness whenever the defense attorney concedes his client’s guilt to offenses in which there is overwhelming evidence of that guilt but fails to show on the record consent by [the] defendant. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Schmittgreen1 sentence2024People v. Schmitt, 131 Ill. 2d 128, 137 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rossgreen2 sentences2020To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, “a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance caused prejudice.” People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 260 , 891 N.E.2d 865, 869 (2008). 2020To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, “a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance caused prejudice.” People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 260 , 891 N.E.2d 865, 869 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Colongreen2 sentences2020To establish counsel’s substandard performance caused prejudice, a defendant must show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 135 , 866 N.E.2d 207, 213 (2007). 2020To establish counsel’s substandard performance caused prejudice, a defendant must show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 135 , 866 N.E.2d 207, 213 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2017See People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 185 , 923 N.E.2d 748, 754 (2010). 2017See People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 185 , 923 N.E.2d 748, 754 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Franks v. Delaware
green
2 sentences1992Ed. 2d 667, 672 , 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 .) At the hearing, “the defendant must prove his claim of perjury by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Lucente (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 133, 151 , 506 N.E.2d 1269 .) Defendant must prove that the affiant of the search warrant (generally a police officer), rather than the nongovernmental informant, committed the perjury. 1987At the other extreme, Franks expressly states that in order to prevail at the hearing the defendant must prove his claim of perjury by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Franks v. Delaware (1978), 438 U.S. 154, 156 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667, 672 , 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676 .) If the preponderance standard is to apply at the hearing, it follows logically *152 that the threshold requirement must be something less. | 6 | 1987–2014 |
People v. Lucente
green
2 sentences1993Ed. 2d 62 , 87 S. Ct. 1056 .) At the hearing, “the defendant must prove his claim of perjury by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 151 .) However, Franks does not require that the defendant disprove every other possibility at the preliminary stage. 1992Ed. 2d 667, 672 , 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 .) At the hearing, “the defendant must prove his claim of perjury by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Lucente (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 133, 151 , 506 N.E.2d 1269 .) Defendant must prove that the affiant of the search warrant (generally a police officer), rather than the nongovernmental informant, committed the perjury. | 6 | 1988–2014 |
People v. Lawton
green
2 sentences2025Id. 2023“Claims that this right has been denied are judged according to the two- prong, performance-prejudice test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 - 23 - 1-22- 0141 U.S. 668 (1984). [Citation.] Under Strickland, a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance caused prejudice by creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the trial result would have been different.” Id. | 4 | 2006–2025 |
United States v. Cronic
green
1 sentence2025Specifically, “a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). ¶ 30 In Hattery, our supreme court held prejudice will be presumed “[w]here ‘counsel entirely | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Hattery
green
1 sentence2025Specifically, “a defendant must prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). ¶ 30 In Hattery, our supreme court held prejudice will be presumed “[w]here ‘counsel entirely | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Coleman
green
1 sentence2022Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 92 . ¶ 58 Defendant appears to conflate the requirements for advancing a postconviction petition to third-stage proceedings with his burden of proof requirement at an evidentiary hearing and the trial court’s function during an evidentiary hearing. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Gomez
green
1 sentence1993(People v. Gomez (1992), 236 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
McCray v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1993Ed. 2d 62 , 87 S. Ct. 1056 .) At the hearing, “the defendant must prove his claim of perjury by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 151 .) However, Franks does not require that the defendant disprove every other possibility at the preliminary stage. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Seuffer
green
1 sentence1991People v. Seuffer (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 482 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Albanese
green
2 sentences1991(People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504 , 473 N.E.2d 1246 .) Also, where counsel could have reasonably believed that the jury would not believe an argument, he may strategically refrain from seeking an instruction. 1991(People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504 , 473 N.E.2d 1246 .) Also, where counsel could have reasonably believed that the jury would not believe an argument, he may strategically refrain from seeking an instruction. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.