federal commerce clause in California

1950P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 [ 69 S.Ct. 657 , 93 L.Ed. 865 ], marks a departure from earlier decisions in interpreting the effect of local police regulations upon the federal commerce clause.

1950P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 [ 69 S.Ct. 657 , 93 L.Ed. 865 ], marks a departure from earlier decisions in interpreting the effect of local police regulations upon the federal commerce clause.

2024(Citing Ventas Finance I, LLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1207 (Ventas); Macy’s Dept.

2018In an earlier appeal, this court reversed an order sustaining the Board's demurrer to this issue in the complaint. ( Harley-Davidson (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193 , 203-208, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 , ( Harley I ).) We found that this provision of California's tax system treats intrastate and interstate unitary businesses differently, but we made no finding on whether that differential treatment was discriminatory. ( Id . at pp. 203, 206, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 .) We found only that Harley-Davidson adequately alleged that this differential treatment was discriminatory because it benefitted intrastate uni

2018In an earlier appeal, this court reversed an order sustaining the Board's demurrer to this issue in the complaint. ( Harley-Davidson (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193 , 203-208, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 , ( Harley I ).) We found that this provision of California's tax system treats intrastate and interstate unitary businesses differently, but we made no finding on whether that differential treatment was discriminatory. ( Id . at pp. 203, 206, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 .) We found only that Harley-Davidson adequately alleged that this differential treatment was discriminatory because it benefitted intrastate uni

2018In an earlier appeal, this court reversed an order sustaining the Board's demurrer to this issue in the complaint. ( Harley-Davidson (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193 , 203-208, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 , ( Harley I ).) We found that this provision of California's tax system treats intrastate and interstate unitary businesses differently, but we made no finding on whether that differential treatment was discriminatory. ( Id . at pp. 203, 206, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 .) We found only that Harley-Davidson adequately alleged that this differential treatment was discriminatory because it benefitted intrastate uni

2018In an earlier appeal, this court reversed an order sustaining the Board's demurrer to this issue in the complaint. ( Harley-Davidson (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193 , 203-208, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 , ( Harley I ).) We found that this provision of California's tax system treats intrastate and interstate unitary businesses differently, but we made no finding on whether that differential treatment was discriminatory. ( Id . at pp. 203, 206, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 .) We found only that Harley-Davidson adequately alleged that this differential treatment was discriminatory because it benefitted intrastate uni

2018In an earlier appeal, this court reversed an order sustaining the Board's demurrer to this issue in the complaint. ( Harley-Davidson (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193 , 203-208, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 , ( Harley I ).) We found that this provision of California's tax system treats intrastate and interstate unitary businesses differently, but we made no finding on whether that differential treatment was discriminatory. ( Id . at pp. 203, 206, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 .) We found only that Harley-Davidson adequately alleged that this differential treatment was discriminatory because it benefitted intrastate uni

2018In an earlier appeal, this court reversed an order sustaining the Board's demurrer to this issue in the complaint. ( Harley-Davidson (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193 , 203-208, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 , ( Harley I ).) We found that this provision of California's tax system treats intrastate and interstate unitary businesses differently, but we made no finding on whether that differential treatment was discriminatory. ( Id . at pp. 203, 206, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 .) We found only that Harley-Davidson adequately alleged that this differential treatment was discriminatory because it benefitted intrastate uni

2006(Bishop v. State, supra, 526 S.E.2d 917, 920-921 .) Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that application of California law is preempted by federal law. 3 Fourth and finally, application of California law in this setting would not, at least on its face, constitute a violation of the federal commerce clause.

2002Among many other things, the high court said the class “claim” could not go forward (only an individual claim could) because it was “not authorized by the statutes governing claims for refunds of vehicle license fees and use taxes.” (Woosley v. State of California, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 788 .) Most of the court’s opinion on the point is taken up with a discussion on the statutory procedure for seeking refunds of vehicle license fees and use taxes.

1991Bendix held that where “a [s]tate denies ordinary legal defenses or like privileges to out-of-state persons or corporations engaged in commerce, the state law will be reviewed under the Commerce Clause to determine whether the denial is ... an impermissible burden on commerce.” (Id., at p. 893 [ 100 L.Ed.2d at p. 903 ].) Balancing California’s putative interests against the interstate restraints, Abramson held that Code of Civil Procedure section 351 imposes a significant burden by forcing “a nonresident individual engaged in interstate commerce to choose between being present in California fo

1991(Abramson v. Brownstein, supra, 897 F.2d at at p. 391.) However, relying on Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises (1988) 486 U.S. 888 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 896 , 108 S.Ct. 2218 ], it concluded Code of Civil Procedure section 351 was unconstitutional under the federal commerce clause.

1991(Abramson v. Brownstein, supra, 897 F.2d at at p. 391.) However, relying on Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises (1988) 486 U.S. 888 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 896 , 108 S.Ct. 2218 ], it concluded Code of Civil Procedure section 351 was unconstitutional under the federal commerce clause.

1971This argument — which apparently sought to draw an analogy to those cases decided under the federal commerce clause which forbid a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce itself (see Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor (1951) 340 U.S. 602 [ 95 L.Ed. 573 , 71 S.Ct. 508 ]; Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission (1937) 302 U.S. 90 [ 82 L.Ed. 68 , 58 S.Ct. 72 ]; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District (1887) 120 U.S. 489 [ 30 L.Ed. 694 , 7 S.Ct. 592 ]) — was held to lack any basis in state constitutional provisions.

1971This argument — which apparently sought to draw an analogy to those cases decided under the federal commerce clause which forbid a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce itself (see Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor (1951) 340 U.S. 602 [ 95 L.Ed. 573 , 71 S.Ct. 508 ]; Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission (1937) 302 U.S. 90 [ 82 L.Ed. 68 , 58 S.Ct. 72 ]; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District (1887) 120 U.S. 489 [ 30 L.Ed. 694 , 7 S.Ct. 592 ]) — was held to lack any basis in state constitutional provisions.

1971This argument — which apparently sought to draw an analogy to those cases decided under the federal commerce clause which forbid a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce itself (see Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor (1951) 340 U.S. 602 [ 95 L.Ed. 573 , 71 S.Ct. 508 ]; Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission (1937) 302 U.S. 90 [ 82 L.Ed. 68 , 58 S.Ct. 72 ]; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District (1887) 120 U.S. 489 [ 30 L.Ed. 694 , 7 S.Ct. 592 ]) — was held to lack any basis in state constitutional provisions.

1971This argument — which apparently sought to draw an analogy to those cases decided under the federal commerce clause which forbid a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce itself (see Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor (1951) 340 U.S. 602 [ 95 L.Ed. 573 , 71 S.Ct. 508 ]; Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission (1937) 302 U.S. 90 [ 82 L.Ed. 68 , 58 S.Ct. 72 ]; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District (1887) 120 U.S. 489 [ 30 L.Ed. 694 , 7 S.Ct. 592 ]) — was held to lack any basis in state constitutional provisions.

1971This argument — which apparently sought to draw an analogy to those cases decided under the federal commerce clause which forbid a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce itself (see Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor (1951) 340 U.S. 602 [ 95 L.Ed. 573 , 71 S.Ct. 508 ]; Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission (1937) 302 U.S. 90 [ 82 L.Ed. 68 , 58 S.Ct. 72 ]; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District (1887) 120 U.S. 489 [ 30 L.Ed. 694 , 7 S.Ct. 592 ]) — was held to lack any basis in state constitutional provisions.

1971This argument — which apparently sought to draw an analogy to those cases decided under the federal commerce clause which forbid a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce itself (see Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor (1951) 340 U.S. 602 [ 95 L.Ed. 573 , 71 S.Ct. 508 ]; Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission (1937) 302 U.S. 90 [ 82 L.Ed. 68 , 58 S.Ct. 72 ]; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District (1887) 120 U.S. 489 [ 30 L.Ed. 694 , 7 S.Ct. 592 ]) — was held to lack any basis in state constitutional provisions.

1971However, when the court turned its attention to the validity of the particular tax at bench it recognized that the argument of multiple burdens, “while it does not result in a holding of lack of power to tax, does suggest that such tax ordinances must be scrutinized carefully to see that a city measures its tax by the taxable event that occurs in the city, and does not measure in such a manner that an unfair or discriminatory burden is imposed on such carriers.” ( 117 Cal.App.2d at p. 453 .) The tax before it, the court concluded, was measured in an invalid manner because the amount of tax was

1971However, when the court turned its attention to the validity of the particular tax at bench it recognized that the argument of multiple burdens, "while it does not result in a holding of lack of power to tax, does suggest that such tax ordinances must be scrutinized carefully to see that a city measures its tax by the taxable event that occurs in the city, and does not measure in such a manner that an unfair or discriminatory burden is imposed on such carriers." ( 117 Cal. App.2d at p. 453 .) The tax before it, the court concluded, was measured in an invalid manner because the amount of tax wa