9 California opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sickle v. Gilbertgreen2 sentences2013(Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1528 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 542 ].) 6. 2013(Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1528 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 542 ].) 6. | 1 | 1 |
Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Boardgreen1 sentence2009(See Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1254 [preemptive action against prospective complainants is no less retaliatory than action taken after the fact].) Secondly, contrary to the Agency’s assertion, this statement provides direct evidence of the nexus needed to prove George’s claim of retaliation. | 1 | 1 |
Whitaker v. Colbertgreen1 sentence2006(See Whitaker, supra, 442 S.E.2d at p. 431 [allocation could not be made because there was no evidence to “elucidate the merits” of the various damage components].) Cathy did not offer any other excerpts from the Kmart trial—no testimony describing George’s pain and suffering; no evidence of George’s medical expenses; no testimony as to George’s emotional distress; and no evidence describing the injury itself—all of which were component parts of George’s claim against the defendants. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Castellanosgreen1 sentence2002(Id. at p. 803.) In reaching this latter conclusion, however, Justice Kennard departed from Chief Justice George’s analysis because she determined “the Mendoza-Martinez factors are a central part of the second prong” of “the two-prong ex post facto punishment test.” (Id. at p. 802.) In Mendoza-Martinez , the United States Supreme Court confronted whether statutes automatically divesting an American of citizenship for leaving or remaining outside the United States at time of war and national emergency for the purpose of evading military service were unconstitutional in that those statutes impos | 1 | 1 |
Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Clubgreen2 sentences1994(Id. at pp. 321-322 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Since Justice George’s analysis garnered the support of a majority of the high court, “. . . we follow the lead opinion as though it were a majority opinion.” (Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 817, 821, fn. 1 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 270 ].) 2 We assume that Knight speaks in terms of “ordinary careless conduct” rather than “negligent conduct” because the latter phrase connotes conduct which breaches a duty of care, and the existence of such a duty is the very issue to be decided here. 3 As phrased, the rule is not entirely clea 1994(Id. at pp. 321-322 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Since Justice George’s analysis garnered the support of a majority of the high court, “. . . we follow the lead opinion as though it were a majority opinion.” (Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 817, 821, fn. 1 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 270 ].) 2 We assume that Knight speaks in terms of “ordinary careless conduct” rather than “negligent conduct” because the latter phrase connotes conduct which breaches a duty of care, and the existence of such a duty is the very issue to be decided here. 3 As phrased, the rule is not entirely clea | 1 | 1 |
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences1994(See People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 146-147 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 , 833 P.2d 561 ].) The custodial circumstances George will face in both preparing for and presenting his defense pro se must be made known to him prior to his waiver. 5 Disposition Let a writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its order denying George’s motion for self-representation and to conduct a hearing to inform George of his custodial circumstances and to provide an opportunity to waive his right of self-representation. 1994(See People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 146-147 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 , 833 P.2d 561 ].) The custodial circumstances George will face in both preparing for and presenting his defense pro se must be made known to him prior to his waiver. 5 Disposition Let a writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its order denying George’s motion for self-representation and to conduct a hearing to inform George of his custodial circumstances and to provide an opportunity to waive his right of self-representation. | 1 | 1 |
Fenton v. City of Delanogreen1 sentence1993In our 1990 opinion, we indicated that a court could reach the contrary conclusion and determine "that section 7285 is constitutional" (73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 117), since none of the cases we relied upon to support our conclusion were directly in point (see Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 836-839 ; City of Westminster v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 623, 627-628 ; City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 ; Myers v. City Council of Pismo Beach (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 237, 242-244 ; see also Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2024Legal Principles “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘ “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961 .) “ ‘[W]e look to “the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]” [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question “ ‘ in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the stat | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Arroyo
green
1 sentence2024Legal Principles “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘ “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961 .) “ ‘[W]e look to “the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]” [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question “ ‘ in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the stat | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2013(Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 901 .) “But a statement of decision is not treated as appealable when a formal order or judgment does follow, as in this case.” (Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 901 , italics added.) Although the trial court apparently treated its statement of decision as a judgment when it entertained George’s motion for a new trial, its error in doing so does not affect our jurisdiction to hear George’s appeal under the particular facts and circumstances presented here. 2013(Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 901 .) “But a statement of decision is not treated as appealable when a formal order or judgment does follow, as in this case.” (Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 901 , italics added.) Although the trial court apparently treated its statement of decision as a judgment when it entertained George’s motion for a new trial, its error in doing so does not affect our jurisdiction to hear George’s appeal under the particular facts and circumstances presented here. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
City of Westminster v. County of Orange
green
1 sentence1993In our 1990 opinion, we indicated that a court could reach the contrary conclusion and determine "that section 7285 is constitutional" (73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 117), since none of the cases we relied upon to support our conclusion were directly in point (see Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 836-839 ; City of Westminster v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 623, 627-628 ; City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 ; Myers v. City Council of Pismo Beach (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 237, 242-244 ; see also Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 4 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Dare v. Lakeport City Council
green
1 sentence1993In our 1990 opinion, we indicated that a court could reach the contrary conclusion and determine "that section 7285 is constitutional" (73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 117), since none of the cases we relied upon to support our conclusion were directly in point (see Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 836-839 ; City of Westminster v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 623, 627-628 ; City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 ; Myers v. City Council of Pismo Beach (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 237, 242-244 ; see also Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 4 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
City of Atascadero v. Daly
green
1 sentence1993In our 1990 opinion, we indicated that a court could reach the contrary conclusion and determine "that section 7285 is constitutional" (73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 117), since none of the cases we relied upon to support our conclusion were directly in point (see Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 836-839 ; City of Westminster v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 623, 627-628 ; City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 ; Myers v. City Council of Pismo Beach (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 237, 242-244 ; see also Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 4 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Rider v. County of San Diego
green
1 sentence1993In our 1990 opinion previously cited, we concluded that section 7285 was unconstitutional in allowing the electorate to vote on a tax ordinance. (73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 114-117.)3 In our more recent opinion, however, we indicated that Justice George's concurring opinion in Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 16-25 , "now casts doubt upon our 1990 conclusion." (76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 101, fn. 3.) Presented with the question again, we now conclude that a court would follow Justice George's analysis in ruling section 7285 to be constitutional. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Community Health Assn. v. Board of Supervisors
green
1 sentence1993In our 1990 opinion, we indicated that a court could reach the contrary conclusion and determine "that section 7285 is constitutional" (73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 117), since none of the cases we relied upon to support our conclusion were directly in point (see Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 836-839 ; City of Westminster v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 623, 627-628 ; City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 ; Myers v. City Council of Pismo Beach (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 237, 242-244 ; see also Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 4 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Geiger v. Board of Supervisors
green
1 sentence1993In our 1990 opinion, we indicated that a court could reach the contrary conclusion and determine "that section 7285 is constitutional" (73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 117), since none of the cases we relied upon to support our conclusion were directly in point (see Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 836-839 ; City of Westminster v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 623, 627-628 ; City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 ; Myers v. City Council of Pismo Beach (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 237, 242-244 ; see also Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 4 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Myers v. City Council of Pismo Beach
green
1 sentence1993In our 1990 opinion, we indicated that a court could reach the contrary conclusion and determine "that section 7285 is constitutional" (73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 117), since none of the cases we relied upon to support our conclusion were directly in point (see Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 836-839 ; City of Westminster v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 623, 627-628 ; City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 ; Myers v. City Council of Pismo Beach (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 237, 242-244 ; see also Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 4 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
2 sentences1992MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting. (1e), (8b), (9b) Because I agreed with the substance of the majority opinion in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ] (see id. at p. 830), I concur generally with Justice George's analysis as set forth in part II of the lead opinion. 1992MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting. (1e), (8b), (9b) Because I agreed with the substance of the majority opinion in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ] (see id. at p. 830), I concur generally with Justice George's analysis as set forth in part II of the lead opinion. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.