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9 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Steiglergreen2 sentences2020C. § 1447A(Pf). 4 See id. 1S See In re Steigler, 250 A.2d 379, 382 (Del. 1969) (internal quotations omitted). '6 Td. at 383. 1995In its prior decision captioned In re Steigler, Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 379 (1969) the Supreme Court noted that at a proof positive hearing the Superior Court is to “avoid even the appearance of a determination of ultimate guilt or innocence” and that the applicable standard is whether the State has “a fair likelihood of convicting the accused.” When the Superior Court reconsidered the Marine case on remand it concluded that the term “prima facie case” as used in the context of a reverse amenability hearing meant something more than whether some credible evidence exists tending to prove each eleme | 2 | 3 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2016State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 322 (Del. 2013). 2014(This Supreme Court opinion will be referred to as Wright-2013.) 7 The Supreme Court reinstated Wright’s conviction and remanded to me for resentencing. 5 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 6 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 7 State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 319 (Del. 2013). 4 • Upon remand, I re-sentenced Wright to death, whereupon Wright appealed. | 2 | 2 |
Marine v. Stategreen2 sentences2020This provision entitles a juvenile defendant to an evidentiary hearing and allows the firearm charge to return to Family Court if the State cannot meet its burden.* The proof positive or presumption great standard is commonly understood as whether “after [a] full hearing ‘there is good ground to doubt the truth of the accusation.” If so, then “the Court in its discretion [may] conclude[] from the evidence that the State does not have a fair likelihood of convicting the accused of the . . . offense.” > Harper, 2014 WL 1303012 , at *5 (citing Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Del. 1993)). 8 2020This provision entitles a juvenile defendant to an evidentiary hearing and allows the firearm charge to return to Family Court if the State cannot meet its burden.* The proof positive or presumption great standard is commonly understood as whether “after [a] full hearing ‘there is good ground to doubt the truth of the accusation.” If so, then “the Court in its discretion [may] conclude[] from the evidence that the State does not have a fair likelihood of convicting the accused of the . . . offense.” > Harper, 2014 WL 1303012 , at *5 (citing Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Del. 1993)). 8 | 1 | 1 |
Poon v. Stategreen1 sentence2019The WPD tossed the only evidence of a gun that may have been used in one robbery, albeit a toy gun. lt is true that a “firearm need not be recovered to support a jury finding that a defendant possessed 17 a firearm during the commission of a felony.”53 However, the State must establish through direct or circumstantial evidence that there was, in fact, a firearm.54 Under either a proof positive standard (that Defendant used, displayed or discharged) or beyond a reasonable doubt standard (that Defendant possessed), the State must establish evidence of a firearm.55 Since the State was unable to l | 1 | 1 |
Desmond v. Stategreen2 sentences2019The WPD tossed the only evidence of a gun that may have been used in one robbery, albeit a toy gun. lt is true that a “firearm need not be recovered to support a jury finding that a defendant possessed 17 a firearm during the commission of a felony.”53 However, the State must establish through direct or circumstantial evidence that there was, in fact, a firearm.54 Under either a proof positive standard (that Defendant used, displayed or discharged) or beyond a reasonable doubt standard (that Defendant possessed), the State must establish evidence of a firearm.55 Since the State was unable to l 2019The witnesses in Desmond “viewed the weapon at close range and for extended periods of time.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Pardo v. Stategreen1 sentence2019C. § 2116(b), provides that the defendant “shall be brought before the Superior Court.” We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.27 (22) The statute provides that “if after release [on the first offense] the defendant is charged by arrest . . . with the commission of a subsequent offense, that defendant shall be brought before the Superior Court.”28 It then provides, “If after a hearing, the Superior Court finds proof positive or presumption great that the defendant has committed [the] subsequent offense during such period of release . . . the Court shall revoke” the defendant’s | 1 | 1 |
Younger v. Stategreen1 sentence2018This unsupported allegation is insufficient to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 55 State v. Winn, 2004 WL 3030023 , *2 (Del.Super.), ajirmed, 2005 WL 3357513 (Del.); State v. Robinson, 2012 WL 1415645 , *3 (Del.Super.), affirmed, 2012 WL 4162948 (Del.). 54 State v. Exum, 2002 WL 100576 , *2 (Del.Super.), ajj‘l`rmed, 2002 WL 2017230 , *l (Del.); McAllister v. State, 2010 WL 3398949, *2 (Del.). 65 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990); State v. Brown, 2004 WL 74506 , *2 (Del.Super. 2004)(conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations of unprofessional conduct are insuf | 1 | 1 |
McAllister v. Stategreen1 sentence2018This unsupported allegation is insufficient to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 55 State v. Winn, 2004 WL 3030023 , *2 (Del.Super.), ajirmed, 2005 WL 3357513 (Del.); State v. Robinson, 2012 WL 1415645 , *3 (Del.Super.), affirmed, 2012 WL 4162948 (Del.). 54 State v. Exum, 2002 WL 100576 , *2 (Del.Super.), ajj‘l`rmed, 2002 WL 2017230 , *l (Del.); McAllister v. State, 2010 WL 3398949, *2 (Del.). 65 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990); State v. Brown, 2004 WL 74506 , *2 (Del.Super. 2004)(conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations of unprofessional conduct are insuf | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cruz-Urvina v. State
green
2 sentences2019The WPD tossed the only evidence of a gun that may have been used in one robbery, albeit a toy gun. lt is true that a “firearm need not be recovered to support a jury finding that a defendant possessed 17 a firearm during the commission of a felony.”53 However, the State must establish through direct or circumstantial evidence that there was, in fact, a firearm.54 Under either a proof positive standard (that Defendant used, displayed or discharged) or beyond a reasonable doubt standard (that Defendant possessed), the State must establish evidence of a firearm.55 Since the State was unable to l 2019The WPD tossed the only evidence of a gun that may have been used in one robbery, albeit a toy gun. lt is true that a “firearm need not be recovered to support a jury finding that a defendant possessed 17 a firearm during the commission of a felony.”53 However, the State must establish through direct or circumstantial evidence that there was, in fact, a firearm.54 Under either a proof positive standard (that Defendant used, displayed or discharged) or beyond a reasonable doubt standard (that Defendant possessed), the State must establish evidence of a firearm.55 Since the State was unable to l | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence2014(This Supreme Court opinion will be referred to as Wright-2013.) 7 The Supreme Court reinstated Wright’s conviction and remanded to me for resentencing. 5 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 6 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 7 State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 319 (Del. 2013). 4 • Upon remand, I re-sentenced Wright to death, whereupon Wright appealed. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2014(This Supreme Court opinion will be referred to as Wright-2013.) 7 The Supreme Court reinstated Wright’s conviction and remanded to me for resentencing. 5 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 6 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 7 State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 319 (Del. 2013). 4 • Upon remand, I re-sentenced Wright to death, whereupon Wright appealed. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Blount v. State
green
2 sentences1993The State, seizing upon a parenthetical statement by this Court in Blount v. State, Del.Supr., 511 A.2d 1030 (1986) (a proof positive hearing “amounts to” a preliminary hearing), argues that the State’s burden of proof in a section 939 hearing is no greater than the State’s burden in a preliminary hearing. 1993Id. at 1039 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.