referendum requirement in Florida

2008This distinction is dispositive because it directly implicates the central premise of our decisions in County of Volusia v. State, 417 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla.1982), and Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance v. Magaha, 769 So.2d 1012, 1023-26 (Fla.2000): The entity of local government may not circumvent the referendum requirement because its financing scheme inevitably requires that it pay for its debt with ad valorem tax revenue.

2008This distinction is dispositive because it directly implicates the central premise of our decisions in County of Volusia v. State, 417 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla.1982), and Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance v. Magaha, 769 So.2d 1012 , 1023-26 (Fla.2000): The entity of local government may not circumvent the referendum requirement because its financing scheme inevitably requires that it pay for its debt with ad valorem tax revenue.

2008Miami Beach, 392 So.2d at 893-94 .

2008As this case makes clear, the "pledge of taxing power only" premise underlying State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So.2d 875 (Fla.1980), can be used by local governments to circumvent the constitutional check on long-term debt "payable from ad valorem taxation." Instead of deferring to precedent that vitiates the referendum requirement of article VII, section 12, it is our responsibility to reassess and, if necessary, recede from that precedent.

2010The trial court found that the arguments advanced by the Tribe and New Hope ignored the plain language of the Florida Constitution, the relevant Florida Statutes, the governing resolution and agreements, and this Court’s recent decision in Strand v. Escambia County, 992 So.2d 150, 157-59 (Fla.2008), in which this Court reaffirmed its long-held distinction between pledges of ad valorem taxing power and the use of ad valorem tax revenues.

2008See also Strand v. Escambia County, No. SC06-1894, slip op. at 22-29, 992 So.2d 150 at 161-64 (Fla. Sept. 18, 2008) (Lewis, J., dissenting); Miami Beach, 392 So.2d at 894 ("The Court looks at the substance and not the form of the proposed bonds" to determine whether the entity of local government has complied with the Constitution.).

2008"The determination of a statute's constitutionality and the interpretation of a constitutional provision are both questions of law reviewed de novo by this Court." Fla. Dep't of Rev. v. City of Gainesville, *169 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla.2005).

2008"The determination of a statute's constitutionality and the interpretation of a constitutional provision are both questions of law reviewed de novo by this Court." Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla.2005).

2008This distinction is dispositive because it directly implicates the central premise of our decisions in County of Volusia v. State, 417 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla.1982), and Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance v. Magaha, 769 So.2d 1012, 1023-26 (Fla.2000): The entity of local government may not circumvent the referendum requirement because its financing scheme inevitably requires that it pay for its debt with ad valorem tax revenue.

2008This distinction is dispositive because it directly implicates the central premise of our decisions in County of Volusia v. State, 417 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla.1982), and Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance v. Magaha, 769 So.2d 1012 , 1023-26 (Fla.2000): The entity of local government may not circumvent the referendum requirement because its financing scheme inevitably requires that it pay for its debt with ad valorem tax revenue.

2001Accordingly, we held that courthouses, see Posey v. Wakulla County, 148 Fla. 115 , 3 So.2d 799 (1941), jails, see Tapers v. Pichard, 124 Fla. 549 , 169 So. 39 (1936), public health centers, see State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 48 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1950), and mobile fire stations, see City of Jacksonville v. Savannah Mach. & Foundry Co., 47 So.2d 634 (Fla.1950), were so necessary to the operation of local government that they were exempted from the referendum requirement.

1980This doctrine was made clear in Posey v. Wakulla County, 148 Fla. 115 , 3 So.2d 799 (1941), where the Court, citing Tapers said: "[t]he construction of a county courthouse is an essential governmental requirement of the county and certificates of indebtedness for that purpose payable from budgetary requirements in due course of law do not require an approving vote of the freeholders." Posey v. Wakulla County, 148 Fla. at 119, 3 So.2d at 801 .

2001This Court, however, recently rejected this argument in Boschen v. City of Clearwater, 777 So.2d 958 , 26 Fla. L.

2001Boschen, 777 So.2d at 965-66 (footnote omitted).

2001See State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 60 So.2d 747, 751, 753 (Fla.1952) (describing the issuance of bonds preceding the depression and the ensuing financial hardship that led to the adoption of amended article IX, section 6).

2001However, we declined to recognize the essentiality of county hospitals, see Florida State Improvement, 60 So.2d at 754 ; County of Manatee, 93 So.2d at 383-84 , voting machines, see State v. Broward County, 54 So.2d 512 (Fla.1951), and the acquisition of rights-of-way for road construction, see Yon v. Orange County, 43 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1949).

1980See, e.g., State v. Orange County, 281 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1973); State v. City of Miami Beach, 234 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1970).