time of final hearing in Florida

1949Upon the presentation of the motion to strike, this Court ordered: "It is ordered that said motion be and the same is hereby denied without prejudice to further consideration and action on said motion at the time of final hearing of this appeal." The Court's action on final determination on the merits of the motion to strike was more implied than expressed but this Court on the appeal did reverse the Chancellor with respect to the order of February 4, 1946, as reported in 36 So.2d 619 , which was the same order to which the petition for certiorari had been addressed.

1949Upon the presentation of the motion to strike, this Court ordered: "It is ordered that said motion be and the same is hereby denied without prejudice to further consideration and action on said motion at the time of final hearing of this appeal." This Court's action on final determination on the merits of motion to strike was more implied than expressed but this Court on the appeal did reverse the Chancellor with respect to the order of February 4, 1946, as reported in 36 So.2d 619 , which order was the same order to which the petition for certiorari had been addressed.

1991Mulhern v. Mulhern, 446 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 455 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 1984); Young v. Young, 322 So.2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 333 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1976).

1991Mulhern v. Mulhern, 446 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 455 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 1984); Young v. Young, 322 So.2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 333 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1976).

1988To deny the former wife fees is to put form over substance under circumstances much more compelling than those present in Finkelstein wherein the supreme court held: "We refuse to deprive plaintiffs of their substantive right to attorney's fees merely because the final judgment did not contain the magic words `jurisdiction is reserved.'" Id. at 1243 .

1983Appellant relies upon this court's decision in Stricklin v. Stricklin, 383 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

1976Pursuant to that decision, the City of Miami Beach passed a revised rent control ordinance, which is the subject of the instant action for injunction. *234 The final judgment in this case contained the following findings of fact: that the City of Miami Beach had the power and legal authority under Section 166.021(1), Florida Statutes, to enact Ordinance 74-2018; that the ordinance was validly enacted in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Section 9 of the Charter of Miami Beach, which provides for the adoption of ordinances to meet public emergencies; that due to the unusual character

1974In Posner v. Posner, Fla. 1970, 233 So.2d 381 , which involved an antenuptial agreement providing for a set amount of alimony in the event of divorce, the Supreme Court held such agreement to be valid and binding between the parties as to conditions existing at the time the agreement was made, provided the agreement was entered into under the conditions outlined in Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, Fla. 1962, 143 So.2d 17 .

1974In Posner v. Posner, Fla. 1970, 233 So.2d 381 , which involved an antenuptial agreement providing for a set amount of alimony in the event of divorce, the Supreme Court held such agreement to be valid and binding between the parties as to conditions existing at the time the agreement was made, provided the agreement was entered into under the conditions outlined in Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, Fla. 1962, 143 So.2d 17 .

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c

1970“That is the reason, incidentally, he does stay at home.” In this case the trial court was called upon to observe the established principle, as stated in Belford v. Belford, 159 Fla. 547 , 32 So.2d 312 , that upon application for change of custody the court does not have the same degree of discretion to choose between the parents as that which is reposed in the court at the time of final hearing and judgment.

1970“That is the reason, incidentally, he does stay at home.” In this case the trial court was called upon to observe the established principle, as stated in Belford v. Belford, 159 Fla. 547 , 32 So.2d 312 , that upon application for change of custody the court does not have the same degree of discretion to choose between the parents as that which is reposed in the court at the time of final hearing and judgment.

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c

1970In that case the Su preme Court quoted from Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465 , as follows : “ ‘ * * * But it is likewise the law that a decree in a divorce suit, fixing the custody of a child of the parents being divorced, whether based on a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the court, or whether entered by the court after adversary hearing and determination of a contested issue respecting the matter, is nevertheless a final decree of the court on the conditions then existing, and is not to be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered c